Mathematica
Progress Together

Photo courtesy of MCC and MCA-Morocco

MCC Morocco Workforce Development Activity

Interim Report

(Final Report for Employment sub-Activities)

May 20, 2025

Margo Berends, Beryl Seiler, Evan Borkum, Emilie Bagby and Deirdre Duquette

Submitted to:

Millennium Challenge Corporation
1099 Fourteenth St, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
Attention: Carolyn Perrin and Alfred Rizzo
Contract Number: 95332418C0286

Submitted by:

Mathematica
1100 First Street, NE, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20002-4221
Phone: (202) 484-9220
Fax: (202) 863-1763

Contents

Tables

Figures

Acronyms

AFD	*Agence Française de Développement* (French Development Agency)
ANAPEC	*Agence Nationale de Promotion de l'Emploi et des Compétences* (National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies)
CIN	*carte nationale d'identité* (national identity card)
CNSS	*Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale* (National Social Security Fund)
CRI	*Centre Régional d'Investissement* (Regional Center for Investment)
CV	curriculum vitae
DONMT	*Direction de l'Observatoire National du Marché du Travail* (National Labor Market Observatory Directorate)
EQ	evaluation question
HCP	*Haut-Commissariat au Plan* (High Commission for Planning)
ICT	information and communication technologies
INDH	*Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain* (National Initiative for Human Development)
KII	key informant interviews
MCA-Morocco	Millennium Challenge Account-Morocco
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MEF	*Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances* (Ministry of Economy and Finance)
MESRSI	*Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation* (Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation)
MIEPEEC	Ministry of Economic Integration, Small Business, Employment and Skills
MTNRA	*Ministère de la Transition Numérique et de la Réforme de l'Administration* (Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative Reform)
OFPPT	*Office de la formation professionnelle et de la promotion du travail* (Office of Vocational Training and Work Promotion)
ONMT	*Observatoire National du Marché du Travail* (National Labor Market Observatory)
RBF	results-based financing
TVET	technical vocational education and training
UM6P	Mohammed VI Polytechnic University
WDA	Workforce Development Activity

Acknowledgements

This report is the culmination of more than five years of close collaboration between Mathematica and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Millennium Challenge Account–Morocco (MCA-Morocco) and the group of C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business.

At MCC, we are especially grateful to Carolyn Perrin, who capably shepherded the evaluation effort for these two sub-Activities, providing wise counsel and unceasing support. Many others at MCC provided valuable feedback on the evaluation design and data collection tools over the years, including Alfred Rizzo, Jenny Heintz, Ryan Moore, Isabel Dillener, Marcel Ricou and Caitlin Reichart.

The MCA-Morocco team graciously supported the evaluation effort, including providing critical data, facilitating data collection efforts and providing insight into implementation. We especially thank Abdelatif Naanaa, Omar Belahbib, Mourad Bentahar, Anass Belakbir and Abdellah Adlaoui for their support. We would also like to thank Adil Hidane, the post-Compact monitoring and evaluation focus point from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and his team for facilitating data collection efforts after the end of the Compact.

Our partners at C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business, especially Abdel Wahab Chaoui, Morad Said and Mohamed Amine Sbii, worked tirelessly to ensure the success of each data collection effort. We also thank Ragbi Aziz, who supported the quantitative data collection, and Hassan Kamil, who supported the qualitative data collection, as well as the highly capable team of supervisors and enumerators who tracked down tracer survey respondents across Morocco and skillfully led interviews and focus group discussions. The team showed a remarkable commitment to providing high-quality data and they have been an absolute pleasure to work with. We would also like to thank our Moroccan-based consultant Latifa Chbanat for her valuable contributions and technical expertise supporting qualitative data collection.

We are grateful to stakeholders who graciously took the time to speak with us about their experiences with and perceptions of the WDA sub-Activities, including staff at the eight RBF program providers, Instiglio, INDH, ANAPEC, MIEPEEC, MEF, DONMT, and UM6P, as well as RBF program participants and employers of program participants.

At Mathematica, we have drawn on support from many colleagues over the years. Paolo Abarcar played a key role in the initial evaluation design, which shaped the evaluation effort. Kristen Velyvis supported survey instrument and qualitative protocol development and moderator training. Matt Sloan provided thoughtful advice throughout the evaluation and valuable feedback on this report. John Kennedy and Alexis Benavides provided editing and production support.

MCC contracted with Mathematica to conduct an independent evaluation of the Workforce Development Activity in Morocco; this report presents final findings from the evaluation of two sub-Activities, known as the employment component of the Activity. To inform this report, Mathematica collected data in conjunction with the group of C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business and a Moroccan-based consultant. The findings in this report represent the independent assessment of the authors and do not reflect the views of MCC, C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business or the consultant. The authors report no conflicts of interest.

Executive Summary

A. Overview of Compact and the Workforce Development Activity

In 2015, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco signed a five-year, $450 million Employability and Land Compact that entered into force in 2017. The goal of the Compact was to reduce poverty through economic growth in Morocco. The Compact, which the Millennium Challenge Account-Morocco (MCA-Morocco) implemented from June 2017 to March 2023,[1] included a $107 million Workforce Development Activity (WDA). The WDA aimed to increase the employability and employment rates of Moroccans by improving the quality and relevance of workforce development programs in response to private sector needs and sought to achieve this objective through four sub-Activities: (1) Private Sector-Driven Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), also known as the Charaka Fund; (2) Operationalizing TVET Sector Policy Reform; (3) Results-Based Financing (RBF) for Employment; and (4) Labor Market Observatory (*l'Observatoire National du Marché du Travail;* ONMT). Sub-Activities 1 and 2 are known as the training component of the Activity and sub-Activities 3 and 4 are known as the employment component.

MCC contracted with Mathematica to conduct an independent mixed-methods evaluation of the WDA. During the evaluation design process, in consultation with MCC, Mathematica determined the evaluation would focus on the implementation and key outcomes of sub-Activities 1, 3 and 4.[2] This report presents Mathematica's findings from a performance evaluation of the two employment sub-Activities (3 and 4): RBF for Employment and the ONMT. MCA-Morocco implemented these sub-Activities as follows:

Sub-Activity 3: RBF for Employment supported integrated job placement services for unemployed youth, with a focus on serving women and individuals without a high school diploma. The RBF program operated through eight independent service providers and associations located throughout Morocco that primarily provided participants with a short soft skills training to support job placement and retention. The program's results-based payment model conditioned payments to service providers based on (1) training completion, (2) placement in a formal sector job and (3) retention of formal sector employment for at least six consecutive months. The RBF program operated from early 2020 until the end of December 2022. By the end of the Compact in March 2023, the RBF program had trained 5,187 participants, placed 2,069 participants in formal jobs and retained 974 participants in formal employment for at least six consecutive months, based on administrative program data of verified results.

Sub-Activity 4: ONMT sought to provide TVET sector stakeholders up-to-date, relevant and accessible data on the labor market to improve decision-making. To do this, the sub-Activity provided technical assistance to strengthen the existing ONMT by consolidating existing labor market information,

[1] The Compact entered into force in June 2017 and was originally slated to end in June 2022. However, with U.S. Congressional approval, MCC extended the Compact by nine months, until March 31, 2023, to account for delays related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

[2] It was determined that the evaluation would not include sub-Activity 2, the TVET policy reform sub-Activity because: the program logic focused only on the outputs of the sub-Activity and not outcomes; the sub-Activity did not clearly link to other sub-Activities or the overall Activity objective; the learnings from an implementation study would be limited given that the details of the sub-Activity evolved significantly over time; and the sub-Activity was a very small component of the WDA. For more information, see the Evaluation Design Report (Abarcar et al. 2022).

conducting additional labor market surveys as needed to fill key information gaps and developing an accessible online data platform called marssad.ma for analyzing and disseminating labor market information. At the Compact end date, marssad.ma had been created and many planned functionalities were fully operational. However, the website had not yet publicly launched as of our most recent interviews with stakeholders in May 2024, primarily due to a lack of consensus among implementing partners over ownership, management, and future funding of the platform.

B. Evaluation type, questions and methodology

The evaluation of the employment sub-Activities of the WDA is a performance evaluation with two components: (1) a qualitative study, which describes the implementation of the sub-Activities and perceptions of continuity; and (2) a quantitative descriptive study, which documents the labor market outcomes of participants in the RBF program. **Table ES.1** summarizes the evaluation questions related to the employment sub-Activities and the methodology used to answer each question.

Table ES.1. Evaluation questions and methodology for sub-Activities 3 and 4

Evaluation questions	Methodology
Sub-Activity 3: RBF program	
6. Has RBF demonstrated an effective long-term model for job placement services? a. How did the implementation of RBF programs facilitate or hamper the achievement of the envisaged outcomes in the WDA logic model? b. What are participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings? c. Do labor market outcomes vary by participant subgroup (sex, age, education level and region where job placement services are provided)? d. Do RBF stakeholders (participants, grantees, employers) perceive that the program has increased opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma? e. Did the RBF incentives have any unintended effects on participants' recruitment and service provision? f. To what extent has RBF been continued and expanded after the end of the Compact?	**Qualitative study and quantitative descriptive study**
Sub-Activity 4: ONMT	
7. To what extent has the ONMT's data platform improved the availability of labor market data to support decision-making in the TVET sector? a. How and to what extent are Charaka-funded centers using the labor market information produced by the ONMT data platform? b. How and to what extent is ANAPEC using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform? c. What aspects of the ONMT's new data platform are expected to be continued?	**Qualitative study**

Note: We have kept the evaluation question numbering consistent with the Evaluation Design Report (Abarcar et al. 2022).

The qualitative study documents the design, implementation and potential for continuity of both sub-Activities. For the RBF sub-Activity, the qualitative study explores the implementation of the RBF program and prospects for broader adoption of the model by the *Agence Nationale de Promotion de l'Emploi et des Compétences* (National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies, or ANAPEC) and the Moroccan government using key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions and document review. For the ONMT sub-Activity, the qualitative study seeks to document the design and development of the marssad.ma platform, use of the platform by key stakeholders (including Charaka-funded TVET centers and ANAPEC) and prospects for continuity based on KIIs, document review and a demonstration of marssad.ma.

The quantitative descriptive study of the RBF program documents the labor market outcomes of RBF participants, including job placement, retention and earnings. The study relies primarily on data from a tracer survey conducted with a representative sample of 824 program participants (about 100 per provider) approximately two years after they completed training, supplemented by administrative data from the program itself. Because we sampled the same number of participants from each provider whereas the number of participants trained varied greatly by provider, the tracer survey analysis should be interpreted as applying to the participant served by the average provider rather than the average participant. However, we also reweighted the survey data by the number of participants served by provider to estimate the results for the average participant; this did not meaningfully change the results and we therefore focus on the unweighted results.

C. Key findings

1. RBF program key findings

Overall, the findings suggest the RBF program demonstrated a potentially effective model for providing job placement services, primarily nontechnical training and job search assistance, to women and individuals without a high school diploma. The program successfully identified and trained women and individuals without a high school diploma. It also helped a large percentage of program participants secure and retain formal employment in the two years after completing training. However, employment rates were lower for women and individuals without a high school diploma compared to other participants and varied greatly by provider. The employment outcomes of participants also varied greatly across program providers, likely due to the variation in the characteristics of participants served, the location where participants received services and searched for jobs, providers' capacity to manage and adapt to a results-based financing model, and providers' previous experience with and approach to providing intermediation services. Thus, the RBF program model's effectiveness depends on the context and providers' ability to implement it successfully.

The evaluation design did not include a comparison group because participants in other similar job placement programs were substantively different from RBF program participants due to the RBF program's eligibility criteria; thus, there were no appropriate comparison groups for the RBF program. The absence of a comparison group makes it difficult to fully contextualize the employment outcomes of RBF program participants. Nevertheless, the program's achievements are notable given that (1) providers worked with women and individuals without a high school diploma who had limited prior work experience and medium-term unemployment immediately before program participation; (2) most participants

received only a short period of nontechnical training and job search assistance; (3) the program required placing participants in formal jobs, which is challenging given the prevalence of the informal labor market in Morocco, especially for women and youth without a high school diploma; (4) the program began right before the COVID-19 pandemic which resulted in significant labor market disruptions that were not anticipated during program design; and (5) some providers did not have previous experience providing labor intermediation services.

Given these results, stakeholders viewed the RBF payment model favorably and some small-scale programs funded by ANAPEC have adopted an RBF model based on the experience of and learnings from the Compact-funded program. However, scaling up the RBF program's model faces significant obstacles. Stakeholders highlighted key challenges related to complex and costly verification procedures, a need to provide intensive technical assistance and capacity-building to service providers and a desire for improved access to labor market information and increased private sector engagement.

2. ONMT key findings

Under the ONMT sub-Activity, the Compact funded the creation of an impressive online integrated data platform called marssad.ma that has the potential to improve the availability of labor market data and meet the needs of a variety of users, including the Charaka-funded TVET centers and ANAPEC. The platform includes many of the envisioned functionalities, but still lacks access to some key data inputs from institutional partners such as the *Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale* (National Social Security Fund; CNSS) and *Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail* (Office of Vocational Training and Work Promotion). Due to ongoing unresolved disputes over the ownership management of the platform, it had not yet publicly launched as of May 2024 and the future of the platform was uncertain.

3. Detailed key findings by evaluation question

EQ 6a. How did the implementation of RBF programs facilitate or hamper the achievement of the envisaged outcomes in the program logic?

The RBF program's payment structure incentivized a focus on employment outcomes while reducing risks for providers by offering pre-financing and paying for individual participant results as they were achieved (as opposed to all-or-nothing payments based on overall target achievement). However, for some providers the structure of the incentives might have overemphasized training results relative to placement and retention.

Binding subtargets for subgroups defined by sex and level of education, which capped results payments by subgroup, could have constrained the program's intended focus on serving women and individuals without a high school diploma. Although the program later relaxed subtargets for these subgroups for two providers, this flexibility was not extended to all providers and the limited experience of most providers in tailoring services to women and/or individuals without a high school diploma remained a challenge to placing them in formal sector jobs.

Implementation support provided by Instiglio, a global nongovernmental organization , helped providers navigate the complex program and was crucial to managing the eligibility and results verification processes. However, these verification processes were slow, primarily due to delays in obtaining the data required for the verification of eligibility and employment results, which hindered providers' ability to receive timely results payments.

EQ 6b. What are participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings?

More than one-half (54 percent) of survey respondents had held a formal paid job at some point in the approximately two-year period after completing training and 69 percent of respondents had been employed in any paid job (including formal and informal jobs but excluding self-employment) during this period (**Figure ES.1**).

At the survey date, about two years after completing training, 39 percent of survey respondents were employed in a formal paid job and a further 13 percent were employed in an informal paid job or self-employed (**Figure ES.2**). Overall, 62 percent were productively engaged at the survey date, defined as being employed in a paid formal or informal job, self-employed or pursuing educational or training opportunities (not shown).

Respondents who had at least one formal paid job since training completion earned a median monthly wage of 2,900 dirhams (about $290) in their most recent or current formal job, which is similar to the 2023 national monthly minimum wage of 2,902 dirhams (the same year as the median survey date). These employment outcomes varied significantly across providers.

Figure ES.1. Formal paid employment since training completion



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as being employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.

Figure ES.2. Labor market status at the survey date



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

Out of labor force is defined as those who are unavailable for work.

Some values have lower sample sizes due to missing data.

EQ 6c. Do labor market outcomes vary by participant subgroup (sex, age, education level and region where job placement services are provided)?

Women, participants without a high school diploma and those with no work experience prior to the RBF program were substantially less likely to have been formally employed since completing training (**Figure ES.3)** or at the survey date compared to other groups (**Figure ES.4**). Average monthly earnings in the most recent or current formal paid job were about 280 dirhams (about $28, or 10 percent) lower for those without a high school diploma relative to those with one, but similar by sex and pre-RBF program work experience (not shown). Labor market outcomes did not vary by participants' age, and we did not analyze the data by region because provider location was highly variable and they provided some services virtually. When we assessed differences between subgroups, we controlled for provider, because the proportion of various subgroups trained differed across providers and we did not want these comparisons to include provider effects.

Figure ES.3. Formal employment since training completion, by sex, high school diploma status and prior work experience



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those with no high school diploma and those with no prior work experience are regression adjusted for provider effects.

Sample size for males is 292 and 517 for females. Sample size for those with a high school diploma is 468 and 341 for those without a high school diploma. Sample size for those with prior work experience is 392 and 416 for those without prior work experience.

Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels, respectively.

Figure ES.4. Formal employment at the survey date, by sex, high school diploma status and prior work experience



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those with no high school diploma and those with no prior work experience are regression adjusted for provider effects.

Sample size for males is 294 and 521 for females. Sample size for those with a high school diploma is 471 and 344 for those without a high school diploma. Sample size for those with prior work experience is 393 and 421 for those without prior work experience.

Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels, respectively.

EQ 6d. Do RBF stakeholders (participants, grantees, employers) perceive that the program has increased opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma?

Stakeholders perceived that the RBF program created new opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma to build nontechnical and job search skills and obtain formal employment. The program successfully recruited and trained women and individuals without a high school diploma, groups that other ANAPEC programs do not always specifically serve. Providers also had some success in encouraging employers to hire women and, to a lesser extent, individuals without a high school diploma. Participants and employers perceived that the program equipped participants with nontechnical skills that facilitated employment, including skills related to communication, self-confidence and the job search process.

EQ 6e. Did the RBF incentives have any unintended effects on participant recruitment and service provision?

Unintended effects on participant recruitment and service provision were not widespread. However, some providers reported instances of focusing recruitment and service provision resources on participants they deemed most likely to obtain formal employment. This is a rational and even efficient use of limited program resources in response to the incentive structure, but it could be a cause for concern if widespread in large-scale public programs. That is, it could leave those who are most in need of services without support. The RBF program mitigated this risk by establishing eligibility criteria that ensured a focus on unemployed youth not receiving other support and establishing subtargets by subgroup.

EQ 6f. To what extent has RBF been continued and expanded after the end of the Compact?

Since the end of the Compact, some small-scale ANAPEC programs have adopted and refined the Compact-funded RBF model. One such program, the SABIL program, also uses a results-based payment model and seeks to engage women and youth without diplomas. However, it implements a more flexible, regionally adapted program that broadens the job placement focus beyond formal employment to include self-employment and entrepreneurship. Stakeholders noted it would be difficult to scale-up the Compact RBF program's model because its complexity makes it more costly and challenging to run relative to traditional labor intermediation programs.

EQ 7a/b. How and to what extent are Charaka-funded centers and ANAPEC using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform?

Because the platform has not yet publicly launched, Charaka-funded TVET centers and ANAPEC continue to obtain labor market information from other sources and have unmet data needs, most of which the data platform could fulfill given its current functionalities.

EQ 7c. What aspects of the ONMT's new data platform are expected to be continued?

Due to ongoing negotiations over the ownership, management and future financing of the data platform, it had not yet publicly launched as of May 2024 and the future continuity of the platform is uncertain. Despite these challenges, all parties involved are invested in publicly launching the platform and have discussed several potential options to ensure the platform's financial continuity.

D. Implications

The experience of the employment sub-Activities suggests several recommendations for future programs:

It is important to consider trade-offs between efficiency and program reach when setting payment terms and results targets for RBF programs.

Incentivizing results, especially training and job placement outcomes, commonly leads to "cream skimming," in which providers select or prioritize support to participants who are easiest to train or place

in a job. Although cream skimming is a reasonable response to program incentives and judicious use of limited program resources, it risks leaving the populations most in need of support without it, which is of particular concern if it becomes widespread in large-scale public programs. Although there were reported instances of this practice in the RBF program, it appears to have been relatively limited in scale. The RBF program helped mitigate the potential for and negative consequences of cream skimming by establishing eligibility criteria that restricted the program to unemployed youth and by creating subtargets for youth without a high school diploma and women, who were more difficult to place in formal employment. However, future programs could consider making only the subtargets for subgroups that are easier to serve (for example, men and individuals with a high school diploma) binding, a change the Compact-funded RBF program made during implementation for two of the eight providers. Additionally, future programs could consider establishing differential incentive payments for subgroups that are harder to place in employment, such as women and individuals without a high school diploma.

The payment structure of RBF programs must also strike a careful balance between mitigating providers' financial risk and sufficiently incentivizing outcomes.

An RBF payment model partly or entirely based on outcomes rather than outputs can impose financial risk on providers. The Compact-funded RBF program's payment structure helped mitigate this risk by providing pre-financing, paying for training results in addition to employment and retention and paying for individual participant results (as opposed to all-or-nothing payments for overall target achievement). Despite these strengths of the program's financing model, providers struggled to accurately anticipate operating costs and might not have appropriately budgeted for the risk inherent to an RBF payment model, resulting in challenges for implementation and continuity. In addition, for some providers the payments for placement and retention might not have been high enough relative to those for training to incentivize the desired focus on employment outcomes. Future programs could consider providing up-front budgeting support to help providers more appropriately factor the risk of not achieving outcomes and ensure that payments for employment outcomes are sufficiently high relative to payments for training outcomes.

For further scale-up of the RBF program to be feasible, there is a need for less time-consuming and costly approaches to eligibility and results verification.

Moroccan government stakeholders cited the high costs and complexity of the eligibility and results verification of the Compact-funded RBF program as a major barrier to continuity and scaling up the program. Some of the program's criteria for verifying eligibility and results created significant delays in verification and providers could not screen participants or employers to ensure they met these criteria. This contributed to delayed provider payments and managing these processes required significant time and effort on the part of ANAPEC, Instiglio and providers. To mitigate these challenges, future programs could consider (1) simplifying eligibility requirements, (2) exploring alternative approaches to verifying employment in place of CNSS declarations (for example, using employment contracts or pay stubs) and (3) verifying a random subset of participant results rather than all individual results.

A dedicated and experienced program implementation team within the government agency, such as ANAPEC, responsible for RBF programs is crucial to successfully oversee and manage these programs.

The role Instiglio played in managing the Compact-funded RBF program from design through implementation was critical. The complexity of RBF programs requires a substantial amount of work to set appropriate incentive structures, manage ongoing verifications and provide support to service providers. This work includes budgeting, especially for providers that are new to RBF programs. Such intensive support requires appropriate human resources from the overseeing agency, in terms of experienced staff with sufficient time to dedicate to overseeing a successful RBF program.

Future MCC investments in information technology products should clarify ownership issues and a plan for post-Compact management and financing responsibilities.

A lack of clarity on these issues has led to the impressive data platform, marsaad.ma, not formally launching post-Compact, leaving potential users with no net improvement in the availability of labor market information to inform decision-making. Although these issues are challenging to resolve, addressing them at the outset is critical to prevent later disagreements and ensure post-Compact continuity of MCC's investments. This lesson applies more broadly to other MCC investments in information technology products, such as online platforms and land management systems.

I. Introduction

In 2015, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco signed a five-year, $450 million Employability and Land Compact that entered into force in 2017. The goal of the Compact was to reduce poverty through economic growth in Morocco. The Compact, which the Millennium Challenge Account-Morocco (MCA-Morocco) implemented between June 2017 and March 2023,[3] included a $107 million Workforce Development Activity (WDA). The objective of the WDA was to increase the employability and employment rates of Moroccans by improving the quality and relevance of, and access to, workforce development programs in response to private sector needs, which is aligned with Morocco's national development strategy (*Royaume du Maroc*, 2017). The WDA sought to achieve this objective by: (1) improving the quality and relevance of, and access to, private sector-driven technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs that respond to private sector needs; (2) providing technical assistance to develop and implement demand-driven TVET sector policy; (3) providing effective employment services to help unemployed or economically inactive women and unemployed youth obtain quality jobs; and (4) supporting the operationalization of a labor market observatory to provide a broad range of stakeholders with dynamic labor market information to improve decision-making for public policy and private investment.

The WDA was comprised of four sub-Activities: (1) Private-Sector Driven TVET, also known as the Charaka Fund; (2) Operationalizing TVET Sector Policy Reform; (3) Results-Based Financing (RBF) for Employment; and (4) Labor Market Observatory (*l'Observatoire National du Marché du Travail;* ONMT). Sub-Activities 1 and 2 are known as the training component of the Activity and sub-Activities 3 and 4 are known as the employment component. MCC contracted with Mathematica to conduct an independent mixed-methods evaluation of the WDA. During the evaluation design process, in consultation with MCC, Mathematica determined the evaluation would focus on the implementation and key outcomes of sub-Activities 1, 3 and 4.[4]

This report presents Mathematica's findings from a performance evaluation of the two employment sub-Activities (3 and 4): RBF for Employment and the ONMT. It includes findings from a qualitative study assessing both sub-Activities and a quantitative descriptive study of the RBF sub-Activity.

In the rest of this chapter, we provide an overview of the two employment sub-Activities and the associated WDA logic model. Chapter II provides an overview of the evaluation methodology. Chapter III presents findings from the RBF sub-Activity. Chapter IV presents findings from the ONMT sub-Activity. We conclude in Chapter V with a summary of key findings and lessons for future programs.

[3] The Compact was initially scheduled to be implemented over a five-year period from June 2017 to June 2022. However, MCC extended it by nine months, until March 31, 2023, to account for delays related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

[4] It was determined that the evaluation would not include sub-Activity 2, the TVET policy reform sub-Activity because: the program logic focused only on the outputs of the sub-Activity and not outcomes; the sub-Activity did not clearly link to other sub-Activities or the overall Activity objective; the learnings from an implementation study would be limited given that the details of the sub-Activity evolved significantly over time; and the sub-Activity was a very small component of the WDA. For more information, see the Evaluation Design Report Abarcar et al. 2022.

A. Overview of the employment sub-Activities

The two employment sub-Activities of the WDA that are the focus of this report were implemented as follows:

Sub-Activity 3: RBF for Employment supported integrated job placement services for unemployed youth, with a focus on women and individuals without a high school diploma. In the original Compact agreement, MCA-Morocco expected the RBF program to engage unemployed women and "at-risk" youth. Program participants could not have been formally employed or participated in a training program for a specified period preceding their participation in the RBF program. Although the program was open to young men and women, and individuals with and without high school diplomas, the program ensured a focus on serving women and those without a high school diploma by setting specific subtargets for these two subgroups of participants and creating more stringent eligibility requirements for participants with a university degree or previous technical or vocational training.

The RBF program operated through independent service providers and associations that were responsible for recruiting participants and providing them with training to support job placement and retention. Although the nature of the training differed across providers and participants, the RBF program service providers focused primarily on providing participants with a short soft skills training over the course of a few days, aimed at equipping participants for their job search and the workplace. A minority of participants received additional training services, including technical training, psychosocial support, a curriculum vitae (CV) workshop and/or professional training. Providers also offered some post-training services to support job placements, such as providing information about job openings, assisting with job applications, connecting participants with employers or placing participants directly into a job; they also offered some post-placement job retention support, such as checking in with participants via a phone call or text message.

The program's results-based payment model focused on improving job placement and retention rates for participants by conditioning payments to service providers based on (1) the number of individuals who completed training, (2) the number placed into formal jobs and (3) the number retained in a formal job for at least six months. The program defined and verified placement and retention in formal employment based on employers' declarations to the *Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale* (CNSS), the Moroccan national social security agency. In contrast, most traditional job placement programs implemented by the *Agence Nationale de Promotion de l'Emploi et des Compétences* (ANAPEC), the government agency responsible for most of these programs, do not operate under a results-based payment model but rather pay providers up front to provide training services to job seekers.

Instiglio, an international nongovernmental organization specializing in RBF and performance management for development in low- and middle-income countries, worked with MCA-Morocco and ANAPEC to design and implement the RBF program. Nine providers were selected for the program in December 2019 through a competitive application process and signed grant agreements in January and February 2020. However, the COVID-19 pandemic delayed implementation for most providers until May 2020, and one provider withdrew from the program before implementation. The pandemic, which led to restrictions on the movement and gathering of people in Morocco from March 2020 to March 2021, continued to disrupt implementation in subsequent months. The program was initially planned to last 16

months, until May 2021. However, due to the delays and labor market disruptions caused by the pandemic and the associated nine-month Compact extension, the RBF program was extended by 18 months, ending in December 2022.

By the end of the Compact in March 2023, the RBF program had trained 5,187 participants, placed 2,069 participants in formal jobs and retained 974 participants in formal employment for at least six consecutive months, based on administrative program data of verified results.

Under the RBF sub-Activity, MCA-Morocco also funded technical assistance to the *Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain* (INDH), a national development project, to develop and pilot an RBF model for its own job placement program, although funding for the payments for these programs occurred outside the Compact. INDH used the pilot experience to consider scaling up or expanding the approach.

Sub-Activity 4: ONMT sought to provide TVET sector stakeholders—including Moroccan government ministries and agencies, TVET centers, prospective trainees, job seekers and employers—up-to-date, relevant and accessible data on the labor market to improve decision-making. To do this, the sub-Activity provided technical assistance to strengthen the existing ONMT by consolidating existing labor market information, conducting additional labor market surveys as needed to fill key information gaps and developing an accessible online data platform (marssad.ma) for analyzing and disseminating labor market information. This cloud-based platform was designed to combine labor market data from various sources and use artificial intelligence and other big data methods to analyze trends in the labor market and disseminate real-time labor market information. At the Compact end date, the platform had been created and many of planned functionalities were fully operational. However, as we discuss in Chapter IV, it had not yet launched publicly as of our most recent interviews with stakeholders in May 2024, primarily due to a lack of consensus among implementing partners over management and future funding of the platform.

B. WDA logic model

The WDA logic model, developed by MCC and MCA-Morocco, illustrates how the four main sub-Activities sought to achieve the objective and targeted results (**Figure I.1**). (For a full list of assumptions and risks to the WDA logic model, see Abarcar et al. [2022]). Sub-Activities 3 and 4, the employment component of the WDA, aimed to improve the management and delivery of job placement services, especially for women and other economically inactive youth, and improve the availability of labor market information for decision-making. The Compact expected these outcomes to improve job retention rates for those benefiting from RBF intermediation services and support improved decision-making for both intermediation services and TVET. In the long term, this was expected to contribute to increased household income for both participants in intermediation services and TVET trainees.

Figure I.1. WDA logic model



Source: MCC 2023; adapted to align language with this report and to show long-term impacts.

ICT = information and communication technologies; TVET = technical and vocational education and training.

II. Evaluation Approach

The evaluation of the employment sub-Activities of the WDA comprises two components: (1) a qualitative study, which describes the implementation of the sub-Activities and perceptions of continuity; and (2) a quantitative descriptive study, which documents the labor market outcomes of participants in the RBF program. In this chapter, we present the key evaluation questions and describe our approach to each of the two evaluation components.

A. Evaluation questions

Table II.1 summarizes the evaluation questions related to the employment sub-Activities and the methodology used to answer each question.

Table II.1 Evaluation questions and methodology for sub-Activities 3 and 4

Evaluation questions	Methodology
Sub-Activity 3: RBF program	
6. Has RBF demonstrated an effective long-term model for job placement services? a. How did the implementation of RBF programs facilitate or hamper the achievement of the envisaged outcomes in the WDA logic model? b. What are participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings? c. Do labor market outcomes vary by participant subgroup (sex, age, education level and region where job placement services are provided)? d. Do RBF stakeholders (participants, grantees, employers) perceive that the program has increased opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma? e. Did the RBF incentives have any unintended effects on participants' recruitment and service provision? f. To what extent has RBF been continued and expanded after the end of the Compact?	**Qualitative study and quantitative descriptive study**
Sub-Activity 4: ONMT	
7. To what extent has the ONMT's data platform improved the availability of labor market data to support decision-making in the TVET sector? a. How and to what extent are Charaka-funded centers using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform? b. How and to what extent is ANAPEC using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform? c. What aspects of the ONMT's new data platform are expected to be continued?	**Qualitative study**

Note: We have kept the evaluation question numbering consistent with the evaluation design report (Abarcar et al. 2022).

B. Qualitative study

For the RBF sub-Activity, the qualitative study explores the implementation of the RBF program, including mechanisms underlying achievement of outcomes or reasons expected outcomes were not achieved and prospects for broader adoption of the model by ANAPEC and the Moroccan government. For the ONMT sub-Activity, the qualitative study seeks to document the design and development of the marssad.ma

platform, use of the platform by key stakeholders including TVET centers and ANAPEC and prospects for continuity.

The qualitative study draws primarily on interviews with key stakeholders, complemented by contextual information from a review of implementation documents. Mathematica worked with a Moroccan data collection firm, the group of C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business, to conduct two rounds of qualitative interviews with key stakeholders.

The first round of interviews occurred in April and May 2023, right after the end of the Compact. It focused on implementation, how implementation might affect outcome achievement and perceptions of continuity or prospects for scale-up. The team interviewed 70 respondents, including representatives from Instiglio, MCC, MCA-Morocco and all eight RBF service providers; a sample of 24 RBF program participants (three per program provider, 13 of whom were female participants); 16 employers of program graduates (two per program provider, covering a variety of sectors and regions); and Moroccan government staff from INDH, ANAPEC, the Ministry of Economic Integration, Small Business, Employment and Skills (MIEPEEC), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (*Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, or* MEF) and the ONMT data platform development and management team, including stakeholders from the National Labor Market Observatory Directorate (*Direction de l'Observatoire National du Marché du Travail,* or DONMT*)*. Institutional respondents were those most directly involved in program implementation. We also reviewed a variety of program documents related to both sub-Activities, covering the full implementation period, and the team took part in a demonstration of the marssad.ma platform in May 2023, conducted by staff from Mohammed VI Polytechnic University (UM6P) who developed the platform.

We conducted the second round of interviews with nine respondents in May and June 2024, about a year after the end of the Compact. During the second round of data collection, the team re-interviewed Moroccan government stakeholders involved in the RBF program (INDH, ANAPEC, MIEPEEC and MEF) to discuss the scale-up of the RBF program and stakeholders from the ONMT data platform development and management team, including stakeholders from the DONMT and the ONMT consortium, to discuss the potential launch and continuity of the ONMT platform in the post-Compact period.

We used NVivo, a transcript-coding software, to organize and synthesize the key themes that emerged from document reviews and in-depth interviews. This enabled us to triangulate the findings across sources to answer the evaluation questions.

C. Quantitative descriptive study

The quantitative descriptive study of the RBF program documents the labor market outcomes of RBF participants, including job placement, retention and earnings. The study relies primarily on data from a tracer survey designed by Mathematica and conducted by C&O Marketing and Chezeen Business, supplemented by administrative data from the RBF program.

1. Tracer survey

The tracer survey collected information on (1) RBF participants' background and demographic characteristics, (2) their experiences with the training, placement and post-placement services received and (3) their full employment and wage history over an approximately two-year period since training

completion (**Table II.2**). Although the RBF program focused on formal employment, the tracer survey also captured informal and self-employment to enable us to describe more completely the employment experiences of participants.

Table II.2. Contents of RBF tracer survey

Domain	Survey contents
Demographics and background information	Date of birth; marital status; number of household members; head of household; city or country of birth; years of prior work experience in informal and formal sector; highest level of education completed; prior technical and vocational training completed; currently enrolled in university or technical and vocational training; employment status immediately preceding the pandemic and any disruptions to employment due to the pandemic
Training and job placement services received through RBF program	Virtual, in-person or hybrid training; placement and post-placement services received; perceptions of the quality and relevance of training, placement and post-placement services received
Employment	Employment history since completing RBF training • For those employed: details of each job, including start and end date, city, relevance to training (if received technical training), contract type, hours per week, size of company, formal or informal job, wages, satisfaction, whether RBF program provider helped them obtain the job • For those not employed: availability for work; job-seeking activities; perceptions of why they have been unable to find a job

The tracer survey sample frame included all participants who were eligible for and verified as having completed the training component of the RBF program between May 2020 and July 2022 (5,039 participants). Although the program ran from February 2020 to December 2022, we excluded from our sample frame participants who completed training before May 2020 or after July 2022 because a small number of providers served only a limited number of participants outside this window. We drew a random sample of 800 participants, stratified by provider (100 participants per provider) and training completion date within provider. Although we sampled the same number of participants from each provider, the number of participants trained varied greatly by provider (from 177 to 1,071). Therefore, the results from the tracer survey analysis should be interpreted as applying to the participant served by the average provider rather than the average participant. However, we also reweighted the survey data by the number of participants served by provider to estimate the results for the average participant; this did not meaningfully change the results and we therefore focus on the unweighted results.

Because participants participated in the program at different points in time, we conducted the survey in five waves from December 2022 to February 2024 to enable us to interview sampled participants about 24 months after they completed their training. The data collection period does not align exactly with the 24-month post-training follow-up period of May 2022 to July 2024. This is because the sample frame included relatively few participants who completed training in the first or last few months of the period. Therefore, for logistical and cost reasons, we grouped the completers from the earliest and latest months with completers from adjacent months to create five data collection waves of reasonable size and shorten the data collection window by a few months on each end. The median follow-up period was 25 months (range of 18 to 31 months).

The data collector made at least three attempts to contact each sampled participant by phone using contact information provided in the program's administrative database before replacing them with a respondent from the replacement list. For respondents that could not be reached after three attempts, the data collector contacted RBF program providers and other participants who completed training at the same time as the unreachable participants to attempt to obtain alternative contact information for them before replacing them with another respondent. The overall response rate for the original sample was 46.6 percent; nonresponse was largely due to inaccurate or outdated contact information. We address the potential effects of nonresponse in the next section. Using randomly selected replacements, 824 participants ultimately completed a survey, with at least 100 completed surveys per provider. About three-quarters of interviews took place in-person, with the remaining one-quarter conducted over the phone due to the availability, remote location and/or preference of respondents.

To provide context for the analysis, we examine the characteristics of tracer survey respondents. Almost two-thirds of respondents were female, respondents' average age was 25 years and a little more than one-half had a high school diploma (**Table II.3**).[5] Although almost one-half of survey respondents had work experience prior to the RBF program, mean work experience among the full sample was only 1.4 years. In addition, only 16 percent had work experience in the formal sector and mean formal sector work experience among the full sample was only four months. Across providers, the percentage of survey respondents with previous work experience ranged from 36 percent at IPDF to 65 percent at AOVDD.

2. Nonresponse

Although we originally selected a representative sample of participants from each provider for the tracer survey, the relatively high rate of survey nonresponse might have resulted in an analysis sample that was not fully representative, potentially influencing the results. This could be the case if nonresponse was not random but instead related to outcomes—for example, if participants with poorer labor market outcomes were less likely to respond to the survey. We assessed the potential for survey nonresponse to affect the results in two ways using administrative program data, which are available for both respondents and nonrespondents in the original sample. We conclude there is not strong evidence that the results in this report are substantially influenced by nonresponse based on the characteristics we examined, although we cannot rule out that differences in unobserved characteristics between respondents and nonrespondents might have affected some outcomes.

First, we compared the sociodemographic characteristics of respondents and nonrespondents. Respondents are about 11 percentage points more likely to be male and 16 percentage points more likely to have a high school diploma compared to nonrespondents, although mean age and the mean duration of unemployment before entering the RBF program are similar (**Appendix B, Table B.1**). To explore the potential effects of this imbalance in characteristics, we conducted additional analysis that reweighted the analysis sample by sex and education so the distribution of those characteristics among respondents was

[5] There are some differences in education and work experience by sex. Female participants were more likely than male participants to hold a high school diploma (61 percent of women compared to 52 percent of men) but were less likely than male participants to have prior work experience (43 percent of women compared to 58 percent of men). Female and male participants were, on average, of similar age (about 25 years old).

the same as in the original sample. The results were very similar with and without this reweighting; we therefore use unweighted values in the descriptive analyses in this report.

Table II.3. Mean characteristics of tracer survey respondents

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Female (%)	63.7	83.0	53.6	52.0	44.6	52.9	44.7	100.0	79.6
Age (years)	25.2	27.0	24.9	24.4	26.4	24.8	24.0	25.7	24.7
Household size	4.7	4.6	4.4	3.9	6.1	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.8
Highest level of education completed									
None/did not complete primary	6.2	24.0	0.9	0.0	4.0	0.0	1.0	10.0	10.2
Primary	18.0	26.0	10.9	15.0	36.6	4.9	15.5	17.0	18.5
Lower secondary (*collège*)	18.1	7.0	26.4	22.0	16.8	12.7	22.3	7.0	28.7
Upper secondary (*lycée*)	23.2	25.0	25.5	25.0	4.0	31.4	22.3	26.0	25.9
First university cycle (associates/DEUG)	8.3	3.0	5.5	19.0	4.0	4.9	11.7	13.0	5.6
Second university cycle (bachelors/*licence*)	20.6	14.0	21.8	17.0	33.7	30.4	18.4	22.0	8.3
Third university cycle (masters) or higher	5.7	1.0	9.1	2.0	1.0	15.7	8.7	5.0	2.8
Has high school diploma (*baccalaureate*)	57.8	43.0	61.8	63.0	42.6	82.4	61.2	66.0	42.6
Has completed prior technical or professional training	42.5	30.0	40.0	54.0	19.8	49.5	61.2	46.0	39.8
Work experience prior to RBF									
Has prior work experience (%)	48.6	52.0	52.3	48.0	65.3	45.1	45.6	36.0	44.4
Years of work experience	1.4	1.9	1.4	1.7	2.0	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1
Formal work experience prior to RBF									
Has formal work experience (%)	16.1	9.0	18.3	23.0	17.0	20.6	17.5	6.0	17.0
Years of formal work experience	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2
Sample size	**824**	**100**	**110**	**100**	**101**	**102**	**103**	**100**	**108**

Sources: Tracer survey respondents: RBF tracer survey data.

Note: Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values might have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Second, we compared verified placement and job retention outcomes for respondents and nonrespondents from administrative data, which were used for results-based payments. The differences in these outcomes between the two groups were small in magnitude and not statistically significant (**Appendix B, Table B.2**). We were unable to conduct a similar analysis using the outcomes measured in our tracer survey, which are not available for nonrespondents. Nevertheless, the similarity in payment

outcomes in the administrative program data does not provide evidence of nonresponse substantially skewing reported employment outcomes.

3. Administrative data

We extracted the administrative program data we used for the study in May 2023, five months after the end of the RBF program, from the Salesforce platform database used to manage the program, including the submission and verification of participant results. The data include participants' demographic characteristics, contact information, program eligibility, types and hours of training received, job placement and retention results and whether their training, placement and/or retention results were verified.

The administrative program data included 8,320 participants who participated in the RBF program in some capacity. Many of these participants were deemed ineligible after beginning training (1,908 participants or 23 percent), were eligible but did not complete training (708 participants or 9 percent) or dropped out of the program before their eligibility was verified (517 participants or 6 percent). All the analysis conducted using administrative program data (except for that of the program's dropout rate) applies to the remaining participants, who were eligible for the program and verified as completing training (5,187 participants or 62 percent). We focus on this sample because it reflects the participants for whom providers were eligible to receive training, placement and retention results payments and because we restricted our tracer survey sample frame to a similar sample.[6]

[6] The sample frame for our tracer survey is slightly smaller, with 5,039 participants, because we excluded participants who completed their training very early or very late in the program—outside the window in which most participants received training.

III. RBF sub-Activity Findings

In this chapter, we discuss findings from the implementation and outcomes evaluation of the RBF sub-Activity to examine the successes and challenges of implementation, describe the outcomes achieved and assess the potential for post-compact continuity and scalability. We begin with an overview of the RBF program design, which provides important context for these findings.

A. RBF program design

The RBF program provided unemployed youth, with a focus on women and individuals without a high school diploma, with training and job placement services aimed at helping them obtain formal sector employment. Although the nature and duration of the training differed across providers and participants, almost all participants received soft skills training that covered topics such as how to conduct a job search, conflict management, self-confidence, decision-making, teamwork, communication and self-presentation skills. The trainings generally lasted between two days and two weeks. A minority of participants received additional types of training, including technical training (which tended to be longer in duration), psychosocial support, a CV workshop and/or professional training. Providers also offered some post-training services to support job placements (for example, providing information about job openings, assisting with job applications, connecting participants with employers or placing participants directly into a job) and some post-placement job retention support (for example, checking in with participants via a phone call or text message).

Eight providers (Al Jisr, AMAPPE, AMIDEAST, AOVDD, EFE, EGO Intérim, IPDF and SFORHET) operated the program from early 2020 through December 2022 across seven regions in Morocco. These providers were selected to participate in the program through a competitive proposal process. The selection criteria largely focused on the capacity and experience of the provider in terms of achieving results. More specifically, the selection process considered the proposed intervention model, the strategy for male and female participants, the organizational and managerial capacity of the provider's director, the provider's overall experience and estimated cost effectiveness. The eight providers were located across Morocco, with several operating in more than one location (see **Appendix Table D.1** for a complete list of operating locations by provider). The vast majority of participants received in-person training, but some received training virtually, primarily during the pandemic. EGO Intérim had the greatest prevalence of virtual training, reaching about 18 percent of the survey sample virtually. About 12 percent of AMAPPE survey respondents received virtual training. For all other providers, no more than 5 percent of survey respondents received virtual training and IPDF was the only provider that did not train any respondents virtually.

Providers could receive RBF payments for three types of results: (1) training completion, defined based on a minimum number of training hours that varied by provider; (2) placement in formal employment, defined as a job with CNSS declarations; and (3) retention of formal employment for at least six consecutive months, defined as a job (or multiple consecutive jobs) with at least 15 days of CNSS declarations per month for at least six consecutive months post-placement.

Providers could receive payments only for eligible participants. To be eligible for the program, participants had to be 18 to 35 years of age, registered with ANAPEC and could neither have held a formal job during

the past three months nor have participated in another job placement or training program during the past three months. For participants who had completed a university degree or vocational training program, those without previous formal employment and participation in training or job placement programs in the past six months (rather than three months) were eligible. According to the administrative program data, participants spent on average 11.6 months without formal employment prior to the RBF program.

A subcontractor of Instiglio and ANAPEC verified the eligibility of each participant based on their date of birth, employment history, highest level of education and recent participation in another job placement program using their CNSS number and identification number from their *carte nationale d'identité* (CIN) or *carte de séjour* (residency permit) and contact information. Providers reported this participant information in an online Salesforce platform they used to manage the eligibility and results verification processes for the program.

Instiglio verified training results through a thorough review of attendance records from training sessions to confirm that the participant had attended the requisite number of session hours. Instiglio supplemented this verification by ad hoc site visits, which enabled them to observe the quality of the training and alignment with providers' proposals. Instiglio verified formal job placement and retention results in collaboration with ANAPEC, which accessed and reviewed CNSS declarations to confirm dates of employment in formal jobs. Noncompliance with eligibility and verification processes resulted in the rejection of the submitted results and therefore their non-payment.

The verification of each result trigged an associated payment from MCA-Morocco to providers. The amount tied to each type of result was fixed, specified in each providers' contract. The amounts varied by provider and result type, so the relative incentives for training, placement and retention and the magnitude of the difference across result types differed across providers (**Table III.1**). Most providers received higher payments for training relative to other results, but some received the highest payments for placement (AMAPPE, EFE Maroc and IPDF). Negotiations between each provider, Instiglio and MCA-Morocco determined results payments, which considered the providers' budgeted costs, historical costs for similar programs, results targets under the RBF program and international benchmarks for similar RBF employment programs.

Table III.1. Provider incentives, by result type

RBF provider name	Payment for training result	Payment for placement result	Payment for retention result
Al Jisr	1.54X	1.20X	X
AMAPPE	1.06X	1.11X	X
AMIDEAST	1.58X	1.14X	X
AOVDD	3.78X	1.86X	X
EFE Maroc	0.90X	1.20X	X
Ego Intérim	1.67X	1.20X	X
IPDF	1.47X	1.53X	X
SFORHET	1.50X	1.11X	X

Source: RBF program provider contracts.

Note: X stands in for the retention result payment, which varied across providers. The coefficient on X for the training and placement results payments illustrates their magnitude relative to each provider's retention payment.

Providers could receive payments for each type of result (training, placement and retention), up to pre-defined maximum targets that varied by provider. Within the overall targets for each provider, there were also subtargets disaggregated by sex and level of education of the participant, those with and without a high school diploma (**Table III.2** provides a hypothetical example). The results targets and subtargets were set during the proposal and contracting phase of the program for each provider through discussions with Instiglio, MCA-Morocco, and the provider. **Appendix A** provides an overview of each provider's performance relative to the targets and subtargets for training, job placement and job retention set out in their individual contract, which serves to indicate how well providers performed relative to their expectations, the extent of payments they received relative to the potential maximum and challenges the faced in serving particular subgroups.

Table III.2. Hypothetical example of provider targets and subtargets

	Targets and subtargets (number of participants)				
Result type	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**With diploma**	**Without diploma**
Training	**500**	250	250	180	320
Placement	**300**	160	140	130	170
Retention	**200**	105	95	70	130

Each participant counted in both a sex category and a diploma category (for example, a man without a high school diploma would count toward the maximum subtarget for men as well as the maximum subtarget for those without a high school diploma), although providers received only one payment per result type per individual. Providers could receive payments only for participants who fell into a sex and/or a diploma category for which the maximum subtarget had not yet been met and could not receive payments when the overall target for a particular result type had been met. For example, if the provider had achieved the subtarget for training men but had not yet achieved either of the diploma subtargets, it could continue to receive payments for training men. However, if the provider had achieved the subtargets for training men and for training participants with high school diplomas, it could receive payments only for men who received training if they did not have a high school diploma. When the provider met the total training target, it could not receive any additional payments for any participants trained.

The program intended for the subtargets to be binding for all four subgroups. However, during program implementation, some providers pushed for flexibility and loosening of these subtargets to enable them to receive additional payments as they began to surpass the subtargets for some subgroups while still remaining below the overall targets. Two provider contracts (Al Jisr and AMAPPE) were amended about 11 months after the program began to allow for payments for results achieved above the subtargets for women and individuals without a high school diploma. The other subtargets (men and individuals with high school diplomas) and overall targets remained binding.[7] This change enabled these two providers to received additional results-based payments while emphasizing the program's continued focus on women

[7] An exception to this was IPDF's subtargets for individuals with high school diplomas. A contract amendment for IPDF increased the subtargets for individuals with high school diplomas. Given IPDF's exclusive focus on women and emphasis on serving women who had experienced domestic violence, they received greater flexibility regarding the education level of participants.

and individuals without a high school diploma. About two years after the program began, Instiglio recommended that the same flexibility be extended to the other six providers, noting in particular that IPDF and EGO Interim had already surpassed some results subtargets for women and/or individuals without a high school diploma and that EFE Maroc was likely to do so soon. However, the recommendation was not adopted and all subtargets remained binding for the other six providers for the duration of the program.

B. Implementation findings

In this section, we focus on two evaluation questions related to implementation. **Box III.1** summarizes the key findings for these evaluation questions.

Box III.1. Summary of key findings for RBF implementation evaluation questions

EQ 6a: How did the implementation of RBF programs facilitate or hamper the achievement of the envisaged outcomes in the program logic?

- The RBF program's payment structure **incentivized a focus on employment outcomes** while reducing financial risks for providers by offering pre-financing, paying for training results in addition to employment and retention and paying for individual results as providers achieved them. However, **for some providers the incentives might have focused too heavily on training results** over placement and retention.
- **Binding subtargets for subgroups by sex and high school diploma status might have constrained the program's intended focus on serving women and individuals without a high school diploma.** Additionally, **most providers had limited experience tailoring services to these subgroups**, which resulted in variation in providers' ability to place them in formal jobs.
- **Implementation support provided by Instiglio was crucial** to managing the eligibility and results verification processes and helping providers navigate the complex program. However, **the verification processes were slow,** which hindered providers' ability to receive timely results payments.

EQ 6e: Did the RBF incentives have any unintended effects on participants' recruitment and service provision?

- **Unintended effects on participants' recruitment and service provision were not widespread.** However, **some providers reported instances of focusing recruitment and service provision resources on participants they deemed most likely to obtain formal employment after training—an example of cream skimming.** This practice is a sensible use of limited program resources but could leave the populations most in need of support without it. The RBF program mitigated this risk by establishing eligibility criteria to focus on unemployed youth and by setting subtargets for women and individuals without a high school diploma.

To answer these questions, we begin this section by examining the process of participants' recruitment, selection and eligibility verification. Next, we describe the training services provided and the quality of training and post-training services. We conclude the section with overall successes and challenges of implementing the RBF program.

1. Participants' recruitment and selection

Providers used a variety of strategies to recruit program participants, including outreach meant to engage women and individuals without high school diplomas, and working with employers.

Providers advertised the RBF program through social media (primarily Facebook), door-to-door recruitment and partner organization such as local community groups or day care facilities, among other channels. Many providers had teams dedicated specifically to recruitment efforts. Several providers reported contacting vocational training centers and high schools to obtain contact information for students who had not graduated to enable them to recruit youth without a high school diploma. Providers also developed marketing materials tailored to unemployed women and youth and advertised through partner organizations that served such individuals, including childcare organizations and community centers.

Six of the eight providers used a sourcing approach to recruit some or most participants, under which they partnered with employers to anticipate their hiring needs and source viable candidates—an approach that several providers had used before the RBF program. Some providers had teams dedicated to employer outreach to identify these sourcing opportunities. The extent and nature of such employer collaboration varied across providers. Some providers used social media to recruit potential candidates and then screen their suitability for the employers' position through an application and interview. One provider reported giving employers a list of potential RBF program participants to approve for subsequent hiring before training them.

Providers generally viewed the sourcing approach as a reasonable or even desirable approach to achieving job placement and retention results, but there were some concerns about potential gaming of the system. Some stakeholders expressed concerns that providers and employers could begin working together to send potential employees to the RBF provider for training for the sole purpose of enabling providers to obtain training and placement results payments for participants whom the employer would otherwise have hired directly. We did not find any evidence to suggest such practices were widespread; however, one employer reported sending potential employees to an RBF program provider for training as a prerequisite for employment.

Recruiting women and individuals without a high school diploma was challenging for some providers and was constrained by the binding results payment subtargets for all subgroups.

Some providers reported that women and individuals without high school diplomas—subgroups who were key focal populations for the program—were more difficult to recruit because of the opportunity cost of attending the training program and that some women were uninterested in working outside the home or faced barriers to doing so. Implementing partners also reported that the binding subtargets for women and individuals without a high school diploma affected the recruitment of participants. As discussed previously, the provider contracts imposed a cap on the number of individuals in each subgroup for which providers could receive payments for training, placement and retention results—including women and individuals without high school diplomas. Given the program's focus on serving women and people without high school diplomas, MCA-Morocco later amended the contracts for two providers to allow them to surpass the subtarget limits for these subgroups, based on an assessment that

these two providers had initially underestimated the number of participants from these two groups that they would be able to serve. However, although Instiglio and other providers pushed for similar contract amendments later on, the subtargets were not relaxed for the other six providers. Some of the providers who did not receive this contract amendment reported that as they neared or reached the subtargets for women and individuals without a high school diploma they stopped recruiting them. Extending the same flexibility regarding the subtargets for these subgroups to all providers could have renewed providers' focus on recruiting women and individuals without a high school diploma, as was the case for the two providers for whom the subtargets for these groups were relaxed.

Due to the RBF incentive structure, some providers chose to focus recruitment efforts or service provision efforts on participants for whom they were most likely to receive results payments.

Some providers noted that overall demand for the RBF program exceeded the number of participants they could accommodate. When faced with a surplus of interested eligible participants, some providers reported prioritizing enrolling the participants they deemed most likely to obtain formal employment. For example, one provider reported using pre-selection briefings and interviews with potential participants to determine those most motivated to obtain a job and best suited to the program.

In other cases, given limited resources and the RBF payment structure, some providers might have provided more post-training job placement support to participants who were best positioned for the labor market and/or to participants who fell into a subgroup for which the provider had not yet met the job placement subtargets. This might help explain why many participants reported little to no communication or placement assistance from providers following completion of training, as we discuss later (see **Table III.4 and Figure III.5**).

> "During the training, it was clear that the trainer favored three candidates in the group. The first had the language advantage, having just returned from abroad. The second already had experience in wiring, and the third was a woman who had never worked before."
>
> — Male RBF program participant

This behavior, known as cream skimming or cherry-picking participants who are easiest to train or place in a job, is a common occurrence in RBF programs, especially ones that tie most funding to targets for training completion and job placement (Clarke et al. 2021), as was the case for the Compact-funded RBF program. It is a logical response to the program's incentive structure and can help providers maximize results while minimizing costs. However, cream skimming can be a cause for concern, especially if it becomes widespread in the provision of public services, because it could leave those who are most in need of services without support (Brookings 2020; Beeck Center 2014; Instiglio 2018). Although some RBF program stakeholders expressed concerns about the potential for and negative consequences of cream skimming, interviews with providers and participants suggest the scale of the practice was relatively limited. Further, the Compact-funded RBF program mitigated the risk of leaving certain populations without support by establishing eligibility criteria that ensured a focus on youth having difficulty finding employment opportunities and establishing subtargets by subgroup.

2. Training provision, completion and quality

The training duration (number of hours), length of the training period and training content varied across and within providers, with a median duration of 36 hours over a median of one week.

Under the results-based payment model, providers had significant leeway to determine the duration and type of training and services offered to participants. Each provider outlined its training and service offerings in its proposal, but the only requirement was to meet the agreed-upon number of training hours, which varied across providers, to release the training payment for a participant. Verification of training completion was a prerequisite for job placement or retention results and payments.

IPDF and AMAPPE had the shortest median duration of training, at 26 and 27 hours respectively, with a median time to complete training of 0.3 and 1.6 weeks respectively (**Table III.3**).[8] AOVDD had by far the longest median duration of 163 hours over eight weeks, because it provided technical training, which had a longer duration, to almost all participants.

Table III.3. Characteristics of training received

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Characteristics of training received, among those who completed training									
Duration of training (hours)									
Minimum	12	28	17	17	42	18	38	19	12
Median	36	62	27	35	163	35	50	26	36
Length of training period (weeks)									
Median	1.0	1.4	0.3	0.6	8.3	0.7	1.9	1.6	0.9
Type of training received by participants (%)									
Soft skills	99.5	96.9	100.0	99.3	100.0	99.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Technical training	14.0	13.8	0.0	4.9	97.2	33.7	0.0	1.7	22.5
CV workshop	4.2	3.3	4.2	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Psychosocial support	5.9	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.1	0.0
Language training	0.3	2.5	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Professional training	5.4	31.4	0.0	0.0	56.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.9
Legal training	4.9	34.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.7	0.0
Sample size	**5177**	**484**	**548**	**670**	**177**	**576**	**666**	**985**	**1071**

Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023.

Nearly all RBF participants received soft skills training and other types of training varied across and within providers.

Across all providers, almost all participants received some sort of soft skills training, which was the focus of the RBF program (**Table III.3**). Soft skills training generally included interview and workplace physical

[8] We present medians for these (and other) measures when outliers heavily influenced the means at the provider level; however, overall means and medians across all providers are similar.

and verbal presentation, as well as socioemotional skills such as communication, conflict management, self-confidence, decision-making, teamwork and self-management for the workplace.

Other types of training varied across providers and across participants within providers. Six of the eight providers offered technical training. AOVDD provided technical training to almost all participants, and the other five providers offered technical training to a minority of participants, from 2 to 34 percent. Providers often tailored technical training to a certain industry, employer or job type based on market demand as assessed by the provider. AOVDD also provided a CV workshop to all participants and professional training across a variety of sectors to more than one-half of the participants; other providers offered these training components much less commonly. IPDF, a provider that served women who had experienced domestic violence, provided psychosocial support to nearly one-third of its participants, but this service was rare among other providers. Some providers reporting using intake assessments to determine participants' needs and/or interests in different types of training, such as technical training.

Overall, 88 percent of all eligible participants who began the RBF program completed training, with some variation in completion rates across providers and participants subgroups.

To calculate the training completion rate, we use the same definition of training completion as that used by the RBF program. Accordingly, we define completers as eligible participants who completed the requisite number of training hours and were verified by the end of 2022, the formal end date of the RBF program. SFORHET and AMIDEAST had the highest completion rates at 98 percent and EFE Maroc had the lowest at 70 percent (**Figure III.1**). The number of participants who completed training also varied by provider, with AOVDD training about 175 participants and SFORHET training more than 1,000 participants.

Figure III.1. Training completion rate among eligible participants



Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023.

The completion rates for women and individuals without a high school diploma were comparable to those for other participants. Specifically, the training completion rate for women (89 percent) was slightly higher than the completion rate for men (85 percent) and the completion rate for individuals without high school diplomas (91 percent) was slightly higher relative to individuals with high school diplomas (85 percent) (not shown). Despite high training completion rates for these groups, providers reported some challenges

related to training women and participants without high school diplomas. Providers noted that, in general, these groups had weaker French language skills, fewer years of work experience and less education (by definition, for those without a high school diploma). Providers therefore had to implement accessible training strategies, such as organizing classes by level of education, years of work experience and/or French language proficiency and creating class content in both French and Arabic. Female program participants noted that long commutes to training centers (including having to travel at night or find lodging), a lack of childcare and cultural concerns about women participating in co-ed classes made it difficult for some women to attend training sessions.

Although participants generally rated the quality of the RBF program highly, there was some variation across providers.

Overall, 85 percent of survey respondents rated their training as good or excellent and 70 percent believed training provided them with employable skills (**Figure III.2**). Perceptions of the quality of training provided by IPDF and AOVDD were slightly lower than other providers. Further, only 55 and 44 percent of surveyed participants from IPDF and AOVDD, respectively, believed they had gained employable skills, compared to more than 70 percent for the other providers. These lower ratings for IPDF and AOVDD could, at least in part, reflect differences in the type of training provided. IPDF provided psychosocial support for about one-third of participants and AOVDD provided lengthy technical trainings to almost all participants—both of which were relatively uncommon among other providers, which focused more exclusively on soft skills. IPDF participants might have viewed the psychosocial support as unrelated to developing employable skills and AOVDD participants might have had higher expectations for quality and gaining employable skills due to the duration and technical focus of the training. More generally, we should view participants' perceptions with caution as a measure of quality as they are subjective and participants' expectations could influence their perceptions, which might have varied across providers and type of training.

In qualitative interviews, RBF program participants generally expressed satisfaction with trainings. In particular, they emphasized the value of the soft skills trainings, including self-confidence exercises, presentation and communication practice and CV development support. Several participants said they felt more prepared to take on challenges in finding and retaining employment because of the training received.

Figure III.2. Participants' perceptions of training quality



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values might have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

The RBF program's focus on results might have unintentionally led some providers to prioritize speed over quality in training, which some providers felt negatively affected their ability to place participants in jobs.

Several providers felt they struggled to place some participants in jobs because they did not have adequate time to train participants; three of the eight providers achieved only about 50 percent of their overall targeted number of job placements and another three achieved less than 15 percent of the target (**Appendix A, Figure A.2**). A couple of providers noted that under the RBF program they shortened trainings or cut steps they had traditionally included in order to release training results payments more quickly. For example, one provider described its typical training process as including multiple additional stages and lasting three to four months, as opposed to three weeks under the RBF program. Under the RBF framework, all providers had the freedom to design and adjust the duration of the trainings they provided as they saw fit, as long as they met the minimum number of training hours required in their individual contract. However, incurring the up-front costs of longer trainings would introduce additional financial risk under the RBF mechanism.

3. Provision and quality of job placement and post-placement services

Overall, about two-thirds of survey respondents received job placement services from their program provider and most rated these services as good or excellent.

Among all surveyed participants, about 50 percent received job placement services they rated as good or excellent, 20 percent received services they rated as fair or poor and 30 percent did not receive any services (**Figure III.3**). Receipt of job placement services was lowest among surveyed participants from IPDF, Ego Intérim and AOVDD, with fewer than one-half of surveyed participants from these providers

receiving such services. (All AOVDD participants received CV support according to the administrative program data, which the tracer survey did not include as an option for job placement services because it characterized them as a training session by the program.) EFE Maroc provided the highest-quality job placement services from the perspective of participants, with more than three-quarters receiving services they rated as good or excellent. Most participants from AMIDEAST, SFORHET, Al Jisr and AMAPPE also received job placement services they rated as good or excellent.

Figure III.3. Participants' perceptions of job placement services



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: For more information, see Table III.4 below.

Consistent with these findings from the tracer survey, in qualitative interviews participants' satisfaction with job placement services was positive overall but far from universal. Women in particular expressed dissatisfaction with the job opportunities they received, noting they often did not accommodate cultural considerations (such as long travel times, travel at night or the sex composition of the workplace) or family responsibilities (such as caring for children, other relatives or the house). Several participants voiced disappointment with job placement services and support for retention after training. In particular, some reported minimal provider communication or support, which they felt limited their ability to obtain or retain employment. Some participants also felt they had been assured a job placement when they were recruited to the program and felt the provider had broken that promise.

The most common job placement services participants reported receiving included help preparing for a job application or interview (42 percent of all respondents) and receiving access to employers and advice on where to apply (32 percent) (**Table III.4**). Across all providers, about 17 percent of respondents were placed directly into a job; this was most common for SFORHET, AMIDEAST and Al Jisr. These three providers had especially strong networks with potential employers and relied exclusively or partially on a

sourcing approach (identifying employers' open positions and then recruiting participants for the RBF program who might be able to fill those positions).

Table III.4. Characteristics of job placement services received

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Received job placement services (%)	67.2	77.8	69.7	90.0	38.6	91.2	37.3	46.0	86.1
Type of services received (%)									
Access to employers and advice on where to apply	32.3	32.3	39.4	43.0	18.8	43.1	26.5	28.0	26.9
Informed of job opening	20.2	21.2	19.3	33.0	19.8	30.4	17.6	13.0	8.3
Help preparing for job application or interview	41.5	35.4	56.0	67.0	21.8	78.4	21.6	21.0	30.6
Organized interview	11.0	9.1	11.9	22.0	4.0	9.8	6.9	5.0	18.5
Placed directly into job	17.2	31.3	11.9	36.0	1.0	12.7	2.0	2.0	39.8
Other	0.7	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sample size	**821**	**99**	**109**	**100**	**101**	**102**	**102**	**100**	**108**
Trainees' perceptions of job placement services, among those who received services (%)									
Job placement services were excellent or good	70.4	76.9	77.3	62.9	59.0	82.8	62.2	54.3	69.9
Sample size	**550**	**78**	**75**	**89**	**39**	**93**	**37**	**46**	**93**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: Types of services received sums to more than 100 percent because respondents could receive multiple types of services.

About one-third of survey respondents reported obtaining their first job after completing the RBF training program with help from the provider.

We focus on provider support for respondents' first job (for example telling the respondent about open positions, helping prepare an application, organizing an interview with an employer and so on) because it is the job for which the provider is most likely to have provided placement support. We include all paid jobs, defined as informal or formal jobs but excluding self-employment, to provide a more comprehensive picture of service provision and support through the RBF program, regardless of the type of job respondents had in post-training. Among all respondents who obtained a paid job since completing the training program, 31 percent obtained their first paid job with help from the RBF provider (**Figure III.4**). Al Jisr and SFORHET had the highest percentage of employed tracer survey respondents who reported receiving provider support to obtain their first paid job, at 59 and 54 percent, respectively. As previously mentioned, these providers also had strong networks of employers, which might have helped with placement. AOVDD, Ego Intérim and IPDF had the lowest percentage, all less than 10 percent. These three providers also had the lowest percentage of participants who reported receiving job placement services, as described earlier.

Figure III.4. First paid job obtained with help from RBF provider among those employed post-program



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Overall, more than one-half of survey respondents with post-training employment received post-placement services from their provider and most rated these services as useful.

Although the RBF program did not track or verify the provision of post-placement services, post-placement support from providers could foster job retention and was a component of program design in providers' proposals and contracts. In the full sample, 36 percent of survey respondents who had at least one paid informal or formal job after completing training and received post-placement services rated the services as somewhat or very useful, 18 percent who received services rated them as not useful and 46 percent received no services (**Figure III.5**). Respondents from EFE Maroc and AMIDEAST were the most likely to have received post-placement services, with about three-quarters of respondents reporting they had received services. In contrast, only one-third of respondents from AOVDD reported receiving any form of post-placement service. By far the most common post-placement service reported was receiving a phone call, SMS or WhatsApp message from the provider (53 percent overall) (**Table III.5**). Few respondents received coaching, additional training or a job site visit from a provider. The relatively low prevalence and low intensity of post-job placement services might help explain why achievement of job retention results relative to provider targets was lower compared to other results (training and placement) and particularly low for some providers (see **Appendix A**).

Figure III.5. Participants' perceptions of post-placement services among those with at least one paid job since training completion



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: For more information, see Table III.5 below.

Table III.5. Characteristics of post-placement services received among those with at least one paid job since training completion

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Received post-placement services (%)	54.0	48.6	51.3	71.3	31.1	75.0	47.2	41.8	57.5
Type of services received from provider (%)									
Phone call, SMS or WhatsApp message	52.8	47.1	50.0	70.1	31.1	75.0	47.2	41.8	52.1
Coaching	5.4	4.3	9.0	9.2	2.7	7.5	6.9	0.0	1.4
Additional training	1.2	0.0	2.6	0.0	2.7	2.5	0.0	0.0	1.4
Job site visit from provider	1.7	1.4	1.3	0.0	2.7	1.3	0.0	0.0	6.8
Other	1.2	0.0	0.0	4.6	0.0	1.3	2.8	0.0	0.0
Sample size	**589**	**70**	**78**	**87**	**74**	**80**	**72**	**55**	**73**
Utility of post-job placement services, among those who received any services (%)									
Somewhat or very useful	66.8	73.5	62.5	75.8	56.5	61.7	54.5	45.5	85.7
Sample size	**316**	**34**	**40**	**62**	**23**	**60**	**33**	**22**	**42**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: Types of services received sums to more than 100 percent because respondents could receive multiple services.

Qualitative interview respondents discussed the prominence and attractiveness of the informal job market as an impediment to achieving job placement and retention results in the formal sector.

According to the *Haut-Commissariat au Plan* (HCP), the government statistical institution, the informal sector in Morocco makes up 60 to 66 percent of employment in Morocco (HCP 2023). Participants, providers and other RBF program stakeholders noted that for some participants, especially those with lower levels of education, jobs in the informal sector can pay higher wages and be easier to obtain than formal sector jobs. They noted the informal sector might also be more attractive for some participants because it enables them to engage in paid work while retaining unemployment benefits or, primarily for women, benefits they receive through their spouse's employment. Providers reported this made it difficult to recruit participants for a program that had formal employment as the end goal, keep them engaged in trainings and direct them into formal positions rather than informal ones.

4. Overall successes and challenges with RBF implementation

Stakeholders highlighted major strengths of the RBF program, including its payment structure, focus on women and individuals without a high school diploma and a participatory approach that improved providers' capacity.

Moroccan government respondents viewed the RBF program's structure positively, especially relative to the small number of RBF programs ANAPEC had operated in the past. Providers appreciated that the Compact-funded RBF program established a standardized process for triggering each type of results payment. According to Moroccan government respondents, the Compact-funded RBF program also avoided shortcomings from previous RBF programs that either focused too heavily on training outcomes (which did not sufficiently incentivize employment outcomes) or conditioned payments on achieving an aggregated result target without providing intermediate payments for each participant along the way (an all-or-nothing approach that was viewed as too unforgiving and risky for providers). In comparison, Moroccan government respondents viewed the Compact-funded RBF program as taking a more balanced approach by providing prefinancing; setting payment amounts aimed to incentivize training, placement and retention outcomes; and paying providers quarterly based on the number of participants who achieved each verified result. Moroccan government respondents also felt the Compact-funded RBF program's payment terms were fair to providers and accompanied by implementation support that facilitated a participatory approach and built the capacity of providers to participate in future RBF programs.

> "It really sets up a follow-up process with objectives. It's very clear from the start. The aim is to place those trained into jobs for the long-term. And that was done step by step. We didn't operate like that before."
>
> — RBF provider

ANAPEC staff also noted the RBF program was unique relative to other programs due to its specific focus on participants without a high school diploma. Although providers found it challenging to meet results subtargets for this subgroup and noted more limited employment opportunities for it, ANAPEC staff believed the program's explicit focus on this subgroup increased opportunities for those less likely to receive services or achieve employment outcomes under traditional programs. Other ANAPEC-supported programs either required participants to have at least a high school diploma or were open to all

participants regardless of education level but did not establish targets for participants with different educational backgrounds.

Providers appreciated that the RBF program incentivized them to better understand the needs of participants and employers. Specifically, they highlighted developing a deeper understanding of the economic profile and labor market actors in their areas of operation, reworking their standard operating procedures to respond to the needs of the populations served and communicating better with job seekers and employers.

> "We benefited enormously. We appreciated the program's management methods and the employment theme, as we were able to define the economic environment/context of our region and identify economic players such as companies, SMEs and cooperatives. We gained valuable experience."
>
> — RBF provider

Providers noted challenges with delays and complexity in the eligibility and results verification processes.

In terms of eligibility, providers found it more difficult, time consuming and costly to screen and filter interested participants than they had anticipated to ensure they met the program's eligibility criteria. They were unable to independently verify eligibility characteristics such as prior unemployment, prior participation in other training programs or registration with ANAPEC that participants self-reported during the screening process. Instead, ANAPEC would later independently verify these criteria based on its administrative data and data from CNSS (for prior employment). Independent verification of participants' eligibility, including but not limited to ANAPEC's verification, routinely took three weeks or longer; in some cases, it could take several months. Further delays could result if the only criteria missing was registration with ANAPEC, in which case participants could register with ANAPEC and the provider could resubmit the participant for eligibility verification.

Several providers noted the eligibility verification process often took so long they felt they could not reasonably ask recruited participants to continue waiting for an eligibility decision before beginning training. They instead proceeded with training and even job placement for participants pending an eligibility decision, only to sometimes later learn the participants they had trained or placed were ineligible for the program and thus the provider would not receive the corresponding results payments. Based on administrative program data, 1,401 participants (24 percent) who began but did not complete training and 507 participants (9 percent) who completed training were later determined ineligible for the program. Almost two-thirds of ineligible participants were determined to be ineligible based on ANAPEC's review—either due to recent previous employment and/or training or because they were not registered with ANAPEC, all of which were impossible for providers to verify when screening potential participants based on self-reports. This frustrated providers because they expended financial resources without recouping their costs as expected. In some cases, the lengthy screening and eligibility verification process posed significant problems for providers who used an employer sourcing approach to recruit participants. Employers sometimes had urgent staffing needs and providers found it difficult to convince them that delays for eligibility verification and program training were worth the wait.

The results verification process was also more complicated and took longer than envisioned in the design stage. Providers noted the frequent delays in CNSS declarations, which were the means of verifying placement and retention results. This in turn delayed verification of and payment for placement and retention results. However, some providers noted that communication with and support from MCA-Morocco, Instiglio and/or ANAPEC was beneficial, especially in navigating challenges with the verification process.

> "When employers recruit someone, they don't register them directly with CNSS. This can easily take one to two months, or even three. So, it wasn't just a question of verifying six months' employment, but rather eight or nine months."
>
> — RBF provider

Some providers reported instances of placing participants in jobs with employers registered with the CNSS, only to later find out (after the results verification process concluded) that the employer did not declare the RBF participant to the CNSS. For employers, not declaring employees to CNSS—or choosing to selectively declare only some but not all employees—helped lower costs. Providers generally could not convince employers to declare the participants, preventing them from receiving payments for job placement and retention in these cases.

Many providers faced challenges in managing the uncertainty associated with the results-based payment mechanism and accurately budgeting for costs, which could pose a challenge for the continuity of RBF programs.

Although Instiglio and MCA-Morocco conducted a due diligence process to assess the selected providers' ability to financially manage the RBF program, worked with providers to set individualized results targets and associated payments and provided pre-financing, several providers faced challenges budgeting and operating under a result-based payment model. The RBF payment structure required providers to take on significant up-front risks and costs that proved challenging to recover as the program progressed. Providers found it difficult to anticipate the costs associated with recruiting and screening participants who met the narrow program eligibility criteria and, for those will less experience providing intermediation services, identifying employers for job placement. Providers also reported the up-front costs of hiring trainers and recruitment staff, conducting outreach and purchasing training materials to be a challenge. Most of the providers had not worked under a results-based payment structure before and were more accustomed to receiving financing based on services provided or costs incurred, rather than results achieved.

> "We were spending, borrowing and writing checks without knowing whether or not we'd be able to pay it all back. We had to wait for the verifier and to complete other formalities before we could receive payments."
>
> — RBF provider

The pandemic created additional financial challenges and all providers received pre-financing to help with up-front costs.

During the height of the pandemic, the Moroccan government imposed restrictions on free movement and limited the size of gatherings. Some providers reported these restrictions forced them to switch to remote training and/or limit class sizes, which required additional up-front investments, such as providing participants with an internet connection and/or mobile devices or hiring additional teaching staff to limit class sizes. Health and safety considerations also required unforeseen expenditures, such as disinfectant, masks and hand sanitizer; general inflationary pressure also increased the cost of other goods and services. To mitigate these challenges and unanticipated up-front costs, MCA-Morocco extended pre-financing of 20 percent of the total contract value (which remained unchanged) to all providers, although originally only smaller providers had received pre-financing. Providers greatly appreciated the pre-financing.

Also, as a result of the pandemic and associated impact on the labor market, the program was extended from 16 months to almost three years. Implementing partners reported this extension, although welcome because it gave providers additional time to achieve results and obtain associated payments, resulted in additional budgetary challenges for providers because no additional funding or other changes in the financing structure accompanied it. Providers had planned and budgeted for a 16-month program and the extension resulted in increased costs. Further, the program had determined results targets and accompanying payments for each result before the pandemic. Providers and implementers reported that during and after the pandemic, job placement and retention in formal employment was more challenging due to the pandemic's impact on the labor market, resulting in overly ambitious targets for these result types for most providers. The combination of increased costs and decreased opportunities to achieve results became increasingly challenging for providers over time. Six of the eight providers ultimately stopped participating in the program between five and 24 months before the revised end date of December 31, 2022.

C. Labor market outcomes

In this section we focus on three evaluation questions related to participants' labor market outcomes. **Box III.2** summarizes the key findings for these evaluation questions.

Box III.2. Summary of key findings for labor market outcomes of RBF program participants

EQ 6b: What are participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings?

- **54 percent of survey respondents had held a formal paid job** at some point in the approximately two-year period following training completion.
- About **two years after completing training, 39 percent of survey respondents were employed in a formal paid job**; 62 percent were productively engaged (employed in a paid formal or informal job, self-employed or pursuing educational or training opportunities).
- Respondents who were formally employed **earned a median of 2,900 dirhams (about $290) per month** in their most recent or current formal job, which is similar to the 2023 national monthly minimum wage of 2,902 dirhams (the same year as the median survey date).

EQ 6c: Do labor market outcomes vary by participant subgroup?

- **Women, participants without a high school diploma and those without any work experience prior to the RBF program were less likely to be formally employed** in the two-year period following training completion.
- **Average monthly earnings for those in formal employment were slightly lower** for those without a high school diploma relative to those with a diploma.

EQ 6d: Do RBF stakeholders (participants, grantees, employers) perceive that the program has increased opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma?

- Stakeholders noted the program **successfully recruited and trained women and individuals without a high school diploma** that tended to be underserved by other ANAPEC programs.
- Participants and employers reported **the program equipped participants with nontechnical skills** related to communication, self-confidence and the job search process **that facilitated employment.**

To address these questions, we used our tracer survey data to examine survey respondents' employment outcomes since training completion and at the survey date, about two years after training completion. The outcomes we examined differed from the formal employment outcomes tied to results payments under the RBF program in a few ways. First, the survey data enabled us to capture longer-term employment outcomes—at two years post-training—relative to the administrative program data. The administrative data captured only results in the program's payments window, which was less than two years for most participants, and did not continue to track outcomes for participants who had been retained in formal employment for six months. Second, although we used the program's definition of formal employment as employment at a company that is registered with and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, the tracer survey data are based on self-reports because we did not have access to CNSS data for verification. Third, although we focused primarily on describing formal employment, which was the focus of the RBF sub-Activity, we also broadened our analysis to describe the activities of those not in formal employment to improve our understanding of participants' labor market outcomes.

We begin by discussing outcomes related to job placement, followed by outcomes related to job retention and long-term employment and finally earnings and other employment characteristics.[9] We also assess how these outcomes varied by participant subgroups[10] and discuss the implications of the program regarding labor market opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma.

1. Job placement

More than one-half of survey respondents had held a formal paid job since completing the RBF training program.

In the approximately two-year period since completing the RBF training program, 54 percent of respondents reported they had held a formal paid job (**Figure III.6**). AMIDEAST and EFE had the highest rates of formal employment since training completion, with 74 and 70 percent, respectively. IPDF—which primarily served women who had experienced domestic violence—and AOVDD had the lowest rate of formal employment, with 37 and 40 percent, respectively.

Broadening the analysis beyond formal employment, 69 percent of respondents had been employed in any paid job, including formal and informal employment but excluding self-employment, since completing training (**Figure III.6**). Providers with the highest and lowest formal employment rates also had the highest or lowest overall employment rates. Comparing this to overall rates of formal employment above suggests that most participants who found paid jobs after training found them in the formal sector.

[9] As mentioned previously, we sampled an equal number of participants per provider, although the number of participants served varied greatly by provider. Therefore, the labor market outcomes from the tracer survey analysis should be interpreted as applying to the participant served by the average provider rather than the average participant. However, we also reweighted the survey data by the number of participants served by provider to assess the results for the average participant. This reweighting did not meaningfully change the results, thus we report unweighted means throughout the report.

[10] For subgroup analysis under EQ 6c, the subgroups of interest have changed since this evaluation question was developed during evaluation design. The original subgroups were sex, age, education level and region where job placement services were provided. We did not analyze the data by region given that provider location was highly variable and some providers delivered services virtually. In addition, although the tables in Appendix C include analysis by age groups (younger than 25 and 25 years and older), we do not discuss these subgroups in the text because most of those differences were not substantive or statistically significant. We also chose to include another subgroup not originally considered, those with and without prior work experience, which is discussed in the text and included in the appendix tables, because interesting differences in outcomes emerged along this dimension.

Figure III.6. Employment since training completion



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as being employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.
Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values might have a smaller sample size due to missing data. For more information see Appendix Table C.1.

Many participants who had not found any paid employment since training completion believed their lack of employment was because of a lack of available jobs.

About one-quarter of survey respondents who had not found any paid employment (either formal or informal) since training completion had not actively searched for jobs over that period. Among the remaining three-quarters who had searched for jobs, 48 percent pointed to the lack of job availability as a reason for their lack of employment (**Figure III.7**). The next most common reason participants attributed to not finding a job was due to available jobs being unattractive—for example, due to distance, working conditions or pay. Other common reasons related to not meeting job requirements—for example, a lack of education, experience or language skills—deficiencies the RBF training program was unable to address during a training program that was generally short and primarily oriented toward soft-skills.

Figure III.7. Reasons participant believes they have been unable to find a job, among those who had not had paid employment since training completion but had searched for jobs



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: Reasons sum to more than 100 percent because respondents could select multiple reasons. For more information, see Appendix Table C.2.

2. Job retention and long-term employment

Among those formally employed since completing RBF training, the median respondent was formally employed more than one-half of the time since training completion.

Among those participants whose first job after completing training was in the formal sector, the median duration of that first job was 50 weeks, with Al Jisr having the lowest median duration (22 weeks) and S FORHET the highest (93 weeks). Over the entire period between training completion and the survey (a median of 109 weeks), the median respondent who found formal employment spent 55 percent of that time in formal employment (**Figure III.8**). For most participants, the duration of their employment since training completion reflects the duration of a single job; only about 10 percent of those formally employed since training completion had held more than one formal job over that period.

Figure III.8. Median percentage of time formally employed since completing training, among those who found formal paid employment



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: For more information, see Appendix Table C.3.

About two years after training completion, more than one-third of respondents were employed in a formal paid job.

We use formal employment at the time of the survey date, which was about two years after training completion, as a measure of long-term formal employment that is related to retention. To describe the labor market status of participants more completely at the survey date, we categorized their situation based on standard labor market definitions (**Figure III.9**). For those employed, we distinguish between formal paid employment, informal paid employment and self-employment. For those who were not employed, we distinguish between those available and searching for work (unemployed), those available and not searching for work (discouraged workers) and those unavailable for work (out of the labor force).

Overall, at the survey date, 39 percent of respondents were formally employed. The median duration of those formal jobs was 64 weeks, or almost one and one-quarter years. A further 9 percent were informally employed and 4 percent were self-employed. Further, 37 percent were available and searching for work, 5 percent were available and not searching and 6 percent were out of the labor force.[11]

[11] In 2022, the most recent year for which data is available, the national unemployment rate, defined as the share of people in the labor force who are unemployed but available and searching for work, was 33 percent among youth aged 15 to 24 years and 19 percent among those aged 25 to 34 (MIEPEEC 2023). Using this same definition of unemployment, 42 percent of survey respondents were unemployed. Although this unemployment rate is higher than the national unemployment rate, it is important to remember that all RBF program participants were unemployed prior to begin the program and the characteristics of program participants do not reflect the characteristics of the Moroccan population. Therefore, one might anticipate a higher unemployment rate among program participants relative to youth in the country as a whole.

EFE Maroc and AMIDEAST had the highest percentage of respondents who were formally employed at the survey date, at 57 and 49 percent, respectively. Al Jisr and IPDF had the lowest percentage of respondents that were formally employed, at 21 and 31 percent, respectively. These two providers had some of the highest rates of respondents classified as discouraged workers (unemployed, available, but not searching for work) or out of the labor force completely.

Figure III.9. Labor market status at the survey date



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

Out of labor force is defined as those who are unavailable for work.

Some values have lower sample sizes due to missing data.

For more information, see Appendix Table C.4.

Participants' employment rates at the survey date are lower than employment rates since completion, given that some who initially found employment were no longer employed by the survey date. Specifically, formal employment since completion is 15 percentage points higher than formal employment at the survey date (**Figure III.10**). Al Jisr had the largest gap, with a 32 percentage point difference between formal employment since completion and formal employment at the survey date, which reflects that first job duration for Al Jisr participants tended to be shorter than participants from other providers.

Figure III.10. Differences between formal employment since training completion and at the survey date



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Note: Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

About two years after training completion, almost two-thirds of respondents were productively engaged in employment or further education and training.

We also examined participants' productive engagement at the survey date, which we define as being employed in a paid job (formal or informal), self-employed or pursuing educational or training opportunities. This broader measure enables us to focus on productive activities that might translate into improved income now or in the long term, going beyond the formal employment measure that was the focus of the program. Overall, 62 percent of surveyed participants were productively engaged at the survey date (**Appendix Table C.4**). In addition to those employed in paid jobs (49 percent), 4 percent were self-employed and 14 percent were pursuing additional training or higher education. It was possible for respondents to be both employed and pursuing additional training or education opportunities, so there is a degree of overlap in these activities.

3. Earnings and other job characteristics

Respondents earned a median monthly wage comparable to the national monthly minimum wage in their most recent or current formal job.

Respondents who had at least one formal paid job since training completion earned a median of 2,900 dirhams (about $290)[12] per month in their most recent or current formal job (**Appendix Table C.5**). This median wage is similar to the national monthly minimum wage of 2,902 dirhams in 2023, the same year as the median survey date (MIEPEEC 2023). These results did not vary substantively across providers, suggesting a degree of similarity in the types of jobs that program participants found.

Most respondents who had been formally employed since completing training were satisfied in their most recent or current formal job.

Overall, 67 percent of respondents who had been formally employed since training completion were satisfied or very satisfied with their current or most recent formal job (**Table III.6**). Respondents reported working a median of 46 hours per week, consistent with national data that employed individuals in Morocco work 44 hours per week, on average (MIEPEEC 2023). In terms of contractual arrangements, 35 percent of respondents held a fixed-term contract for their current or most recent formal job and 32 percent held a permanent contract. Less common contractual arrangements included a short-term contract (6 percent) and paid apprenticeship or internship (18 percent). Eight percent of respondents said they had no contract for their most recent or current formal employment.

[12] We used an exchange rate from Moroccan dirhams to U.S. dollars of 0.0988, an average of the exchange rate from XE in 2023, the median year of data collection. We use this exchange rate throughout this report for conversions from dirhams to dollars.

Table III.6. Job characteristics for most recent or current formal employment among those with at least one paid formal job since training completion

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	S FORHET
Hours worked per week, mean	46.0	46.3	43.1	49.0	43.8	47.7	44.1	44.5	46.7
Hours worked per week, median	48.0	46.5	48.0	48.0	48.0	48.0	45.0	44.0	48.0
Type of contract (%)									
Permanent employee (*salarié CDI)*	31.6	33.3	26.8	28.2	29.7	43.1	31.9	17.1	36.2
Fixed-term employee (*salarié à durée déterminée)*	35.3	23.8	44.6	31.0	45.9	21.5	44.7	25.7	46.6
Short-term employee	5.8	9.5	1.8	8.5	21.6	1.5	2.1	8.6	0.0
Paid apprenticeship or internship	17.8	14.3	21.4	28.2	0.0	26.2	6.4	28.6	8.6
Other	1.9	0.0	1.8	0.0	2.7	1.5	0.0	0.0	8.6
No contract	7.5	19.0	3.6	4.2	0.0	6.2	14.9	20.0	0.0
Job satisfaction									
Very satisfied or satisfied with job (%)	67.3	66.7	76.8	67.6	64.9	60.9	66.0	57.1	74.1
Sample size	**416**	**48**	**56**	**71**	**37**	**66**	**47**	**35**	**58**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.

Results were not sensitive to outliers; therefore, top-coding was not necessary.

Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values might have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

4. Differences by subgroup

Women, participants without a high school diploma and those without work experience prior to the RBF program were less likely to have been formally employed since completing training and at the survey date.

When assessing differences between subgroups, we controlled for provider, given the proportion of various subgroups trained differed across providers and we did not want to confound subgroup outcomes with provider effects. Women were 6 percentage points less likely to have been formally employed than men since the completion of training, although this difference was not statistically significant (**Figure III.11**).

Figure III.11. Formal employment since training completion, by sex, high school diploma status and prior work experience



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those with no high school diploma and those with no prior work experience are regression adjusted for provider effects.
Sample size for males is 292 and 517 for females. Sample size for those with a high school diploma is 468 and 341 for those without a high school diploma. Sample size for those with prior work experience is 392 and 416 for those without prior work experience.
Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.
For complete analysis of employment by subgroup, see Appendix Table C.6.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels, respectively.

Those without a high school diploma were 10 percentage points less likely to have been formally employed compared to those with a high school diploma. In addition, those with any paid work experience (whether formal or informal) prior to the RBF program were 11 percentage points more likely to have been formally employed compared to those with no prior work experience.

In terms of longer-term employment, women were 11 percentage points less likely to be formally employed at the survey date than men (**Figure III.12**). Participants without a high school diploma were 11 percentage points less likely to be formally employed compared to those with a high school diploma. In addition, those with previous work experience were 9 percentage points more likely to be formally employed at the survey date compared to those with no prior work experience.

Figure III.12. Formal employment at the survey date, by sex, high school diploma status and prior work experience



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those with no high school diploma and those with no prior work experience are regression adjusted for provider effects.

Sample size for males is 294 and 521 for females. Sample size for those with a high school diploma is 471 and 344 for those without a high school diploma. Sample size for those with prior work experience is 393 and 421 for those without prior work experience.

Formal employment is defined as employed by a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS, as self-reported by participants.

For complete analysis of employment by subgroup, see Appendix Table C.6.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels, respectively.

Formally employed respondents without a high school diploma earned slightly less in their current or most recent job than those with a diploma.

Those without a high school diploma earned 280 dirhams (about $28, or 10 percent) less per month in formal jobs compared to those with a high school diploma, a statistically significant difference **(Figure III.13)**. This might reflect the different types of jobs that those with less education would typically be employed in. The differences in formal job earnings between men and women, and between those with and without work experience prior to the RBF program, were small and not statistically significant (**Appendix Table C.7**).

Figure III.13. Monthly earnings for most recent or current formal employment, by sex, high school diploma status and prior work experience



Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those with no high school diploma, and those with no prior work experience are regression adjusted for provider effects.

Sample size for males is 207 and 322 for females. Sample size for those with a high school diploma is 308 and 221 for those without a high school diploma. Sample sizes for those with prior work experience is 281 and 248 for those without prior work experience.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference between those with a high school diploma and without a high school diploma at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels, respectively.

5. Opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma

RBF stakeholders believed the program increased job opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma by equipping them with nontechnical skills and encouraging employers to hire them.

As mentioned earlier, stakeholders perceived the program's focus on training and placing women and individuals without a high school diploma that tended to be underserved by other ANAPEC programs as a major success. Stakeholders viewed acquiring nontechnical skills as an important benefit of the program that increased the employability of women and individuals without a high school diploma. Participants and employers highlighted the value of the training they received related to communication, negotiation, stress and time management and CV and interview preparation. Participants reported feeling better equipped to face the labor market after completing these trainings. A minority of participants also

> "We felt a difference, as RBF participants had received training in coaching, communication techniques and soft skills. They seemed aware of the best methods of communication and interviewing. We were fair to all candidates, but the RBF participants were shortlisted because of the training they had received."
>
> — Employer of RBF program participants

benefited from training tailored to the needs of a specific employer, thus almost assuring their employment with that company post-training.

However, Instiglio and providers reported that the required minimum number of soft-skills training hours discouraged some participants without a high school diploma from participating in or completing the program. They also suggested that participants, especially women and individuals without a high school diploma, could have benefited from psychosocial support and training that was simultaneous with employment rather than a precursor to employment. Instiglio recommended that future programs could better serve the needs of individuals without high school diplomas and women by allowing even more flexibility in terms of the required number of training hours, the type of training provided, and the timing of training relative to the start of employment. Stakeholders said the RBF program also helped connect providers and participants with potential employers, which enabled them to promote the benefits of hiring women and those without high school diplomas to employers, thus increasing job opportunities for these groups. One employer described how partnerships with the RBF program providers opened its eyes to the possibility of hiring qualified candidates without high school diplomas, resulting in a significant change in its approach to hiring as a result.

However, it remained challenging for providers to place women and participants without a high school diploma in formal employment.

Consistent with the subgroup findings earlier, providers reported that finding formal employment for women (who comprised 72 percent of trained participants) and individuals without high school diplomas (who comprised 51 percent of trained participants) was especially challenging. This is because these participants tended to have less education (by definition for the latter group) and less work experience relative to other program participants, resulting in fewer opportunities for which they were qualified. Women without high school diplomas, 41 percent of all trained participants, were the hardest to place in jobs.

Cultural concerns about women working outside the home and finding appropriate positions due to factors such as transportation, lodging and/or working hours posed additional barriers to finding appropriate employment for women. The number of potential jobs suitable for women was more limited relative to men, and it appears some providers were less adept than others at taking cultural factors, transportation, work hours and family responsibilities into consideration when matching women with potential jobs.

> "Since we live in a very conservative region, it's difficult to move to work in another town: I didn't have the option of moving to other places or taking any job. My main objective was to find job opportunities available in our commune. Unfortunately, there were no job offers."
>
> — Female RBF participant

However, providers did implement several strategies to place women in jobs, with some success:

- Engaging in partnerships with employers that specifically recruit women (for example, companies with sex integration priorities, hiring targets disaggregated by sex or organizations that serve women)
- Connecting with human resource representatives to negotiate flexibility for working mothers

- Prioritizing jobs that were culturally and individually appropriate for female participants (which some providers were more adept at than others); one provider also mentioned speaking with male relatives of female participants to try to convince them to let the women work outside the home

Participants without high school diplomas also faced employment challenges that providers could not surmount. Despite the training they received through the RBF program, this group was still often difficult to place in formal jobs because of their relatively lower education level and, often, lack of professional experience compared to other job seekers. One provider noted that attracting employers willing to formally employ participants was difficult when working with participants who were considered less qualified—especially those without a high school diploma. The provider highlighted that there was only so much that providers alone could do to incentivize employers to hire participants in formal positions with CNSS declarations. Some employers were more hesitant to hire individuals without a high school diploma than they were to hire women—several employers reported being open to hiring women or disregarding sex in the hiring process, but also noted they still preferred to hire those with at least a high school diploma.

D. Variation across providers

Section C showed there was substantial variation in employment outcomes across RBF providers, with participants from AMIDEAST and EFE Maroc having the strongest employment outcomes and IPDF, AOVDD, Al Jisr and Ego Intérim having the weakest. In this section, we explore potential reasons for this variation by examining the relationships between employment outcomes and other factors, including participants' characteristics, service provision and providers' incentives. We examine these relationships at the provider level and, when relevant, at the individual participant level. (See **Appendix Table D.1** for a summary of provider-level characteristics used in this analysis.) Because these factors likely interact in complex ways and there are only eight providers, our analysis does not seek to disentangle the effects of specific factors, but rather provides suggestive evidence of factors that might contribute to the variation in outcomes.

Variation in employment outcomes across providers in part reflects variation in characteristics of participants served.

As shown in Section C, being male and having a high school diploma corresponded with stronger employment outcomes at the individual level, including higher rates of formal employment and higher monthly earnings (**Figures III.11, III.12 and III.13**). Accordingly, providers with a higher percentage of female participants tended to have poorer employment outcomes. Specifically, Al Jisr, SFORHET and IPDF had the highest percentage of female participants (**Appendix Table D.1**). Although Al Jisr and SFORHET had moderate rates of formal employment and any paid employment since training completion, these three providers (as well as AOVDD) had the lowest formal employment rates at the survey date, reflecting challenges in maintaining long-term formal employment for women. IPDF faced particular challenges because it served women exclusively, particularly women who had experienced domestic violence. MCA-Morocco staff noted they were impressed with IPDF's ability to recruit women and tailor trainings to their specific needs. However, the provider ultimately faced challenges placing these women into formal employment, especially because their previous experience related mostly to providing sociopsychological support and advocacy rather than job placement.

AMIDEAST and EFE Maroc, two providers that had relatively strong employment outcomes, including the highest rates of formal employment since training completion, also had the lowest percentage of participants without a high school diploma (**Appendix Table D.1**). On the other hand, Al Jisr, AOVDD and IPDF—the providers with the weakest employment outcomes, including relatively low rates of formal employment since training completion and the lowest rates of formal employment at the survey date—had a much higher percentage of participants without a high school diploma. SFORHET, which had the highest percentage of participants without a high school diploma, had a relatively moderate formal employment rate since training completion; however, the formal employment rate at the survey date for SFORHET was among the lowest, consistent with it being challenging for those without a high school diploma to retain formal employment.

RBF program stakeholders perceived providers' and participants' location as an important source of variation in employment outcomes.

Another difference across providers is the location where they operated the RBF program and where participants searched for jobs. Those in big cities with large labor markets and a lot of economic activity, such as Casablanca, might have had access to more employment opportunities relative to those operating in less urban areas or cities with smaller labor markets—something that program providers and implementers highlighted during interviews. Providers operating outside of Casablanca expressed the challenges of working in areas where they found limited labor market opportunities and fewer employers willing to hire or collaborate. They also reported difficulties related to recruiting and providing transportation for participants, especially for women and individuals without a high school diploma. Al Jisr, AOVDD and IPDF, the three providers with the poorest employment outcomes, did not offer training in Casablanca. Al Jisr and AOVDD operated only in the Oriental and Drâa-Tafilalet regions, respectively, which are less urban and farther from concentrated economic activity (IPDF operated exclusively in Fès-Meknès).

Longer training and offering technical training were not positively correlated with employment outcomes.

There is no evidence of a positive relationship between the number of training hours offered by providers and the employment outcomes they achieved. This is most evident for AOVDD and Al Jisr, which had by far the longest average training duration but some of the poorest employment outcomes, particularly for paid formal employment at the survey date (**Appendix Table D.1**).[13]

In addition, although the goal of technical training was to provide participants with more specialized and employable skills, there was no strong relationship between providing this type of training and employment outcomes. At the provider level, two of the four providers that offered technical training (Al Jisr and AOVDD) had among the poorest employment outcomes, including the lowest rates of paid formal employment at the survey date, although one (EFE Maroc) had among the strongest employment outcomes, including the highest rate of paid formal employment at the survey date (**Appendix Table**

[13] We also examined whether higher perceived training quality was correlated with stronger employment outcomes and found weak evidence of this at the provider level but stronger evidence at the individual level. However, our measures of training quality relied on participants' self-reported perceptions, a factor that achieving a job post-training could influence, leading to a mechanical correlation at the individual level.

D.1). This suggests technical training was not necessarily effective in improving the employability of RBF program participants, although some types of technical trainings might have been effective. At the individual level, there was no significant difference in paid formal employment or any paid employment (whether formal or informal) since training completion between those who received technical training compared to those who did not (not shown).[14]

Variation in providers' previous experience and approaches to service provision might help explain the variation in employment outcomes.

Instiglio staff believe the vastly different approaches to service provision could explain variation in employment outcomes across providers, stemming from providers' background and experience before the RBF program. Some providers had prior experience in intermediation and job placement services, which enabled them to achieve better job placement and retention outcomes. Other providers primarily had experience as training providers, which resulted in a steeper learning curve to go beyond training and place participants into jobs, especially formal sector jobs.

Providing post-training job placement services might be expected to support employment outcomes. We found that provision of these services is correlated with employment outcomes at the provider and individual levels. AMIDEAST and EFE Maroc provided job placement services to almost all their participants and had some of the highest employment rates since completion and at the survey date (**Appendix Table D.1**). In contrast, Ego Intérim, AOVDD and IPDF had the lowest proportion of participants receiving these services and had some of the lowest employment rates. At the individual level, receipt of job placement services is also correlated with employment outcomes. Those who had received job placement services were more likely to be employed in a formal paid job (56 versus 36 percent) since training completion or any paid job (72 versus 62 percent), both statistically significant differences.

The evidence for the effect of providing post-placement services on employment is more mixed. At the provider level, the providers that provided post-placement services to a large proportion of their participants (AMIDEAST and EFE) also had the highest rates of formal employment at the survey date (**Appendix Table D.1**). However, at the individual level, differences in outcomes for formal employment or any employment between those who had and had not received post-placement services were small and not statistically significant.

Variation in payments to providers for training, placement and retention results could also have affected their investments in training or job-related services.

As discussed earlier, the relative magnitude of training, placement and retention payments differed across providers (**Table III.1**). These variations created different incentive structures for each provider, which might have incentivized different behaviors leading to different employment outcomes. Although most providers received the highest payment for training and the lowest payment for job retention, AOVDD stands out given the magnitude of the difference in payment amounts—its training payment was more than double its placement payment and almost four times its retention payment—likely due to the significantly longer and more technical trainings it provided relative to other providers, which required

[14] For all comparisons of employment outcomes at the individual level, we control for sex, diploma status, youth status (being younger than 25) and prior work experience.

more funding and resources. AOVDD also had some of the poorest outcomes for formal employment and any employment since training completion and at the survey date. This payment structure might have unintentionally incentivized AOVDD to prioritize training over job placement and retention. In contrast, EFE Maroc, the provider that received the highest payments for job placement results relative to training results—and hence had the strongest incentives to focus on placement—achieved some of the strongest employment outcomes.

However, beyond these two extreme cases, the relationship between employment outcomes and incentive structure is less clear. The payments for some providers (AMAPPE and IPDF) were relatively similar for both training and placement results, yet AMAPPE achieved relatively strong employment outcomes compared to other providers and IPDF achieved some of the poorest outcomes. Other providers (Al Jisr, AMIDEAST, Ego Intérim and SFORHET) had payments for training that were about 30 to 40 percent higher than those for placement. Yet these providers had employment outcomes ranging from poor to strong. Taken together, this suggests the RBF payment structure might play a role in incentivizing providers to focus on certain outcomes, but only when the differences in payment amounts are relatively extreme. Furthermore, incentives alone are not sufficient to overcome other factors that can also contribute to variation in employment outcomes, such as participants' characteristics and service location.

E. Continuity and scale-up

In this section we draw on KIIs with stakeholders to answer the evaluation question pertaining to continuity and scale-up. **Box III.3 summarizes** the key findings for this evaluation question.

Box III.3. Summary of key findings for continuity and scale-up of the RBF program

EQ 6f: To what extent has RBF been continued and expanded after the end of the Compact?

- Since the end of the Compact, **some ANAPEC programs have adopted and refined the Compact-funded RBF model on a small scale.** One such program, the SABIL program, also uses a results-based payment model and seeks to engage women and youth without diplomas, but implements a more flexible, regionally adapted program that broadens the job placement focus beyond formal employment to include self-employment and entrepreneurship.
- Although ANAPEC and other Moroccan government stakeholders viewed the Compact-funded RBF program positively, **it might be challenging to scale it up more widely because it is costly and challenging to run** relative to traditional labor intermediation programs.

1. Adoption of the RBF model by ANAPEC and other Moroccan government agencies

Some elements of the results-based financing model have been adopted or replicated in other programs on a smaller scale.

As of May 2024, neither ANAPEC nor other Moroccan government agencies had scaled up the program's RBF model. However, ANAPEC staff noted the institution had benefited from lessons learned from the RBF program and from implementation support and resources provided by Instiglio, which they drew from and applied to results-based payment models for other relatively small-scale programs.

One such program is ANAPEC's new SABIL program, which draws upon the experience of and lessons learned from the Compact-funded RBF program. Financed jointly by the French Development Agency

(AFD) and the European Union, the program aims to facilitate the economic integration of some 12,000 youth ages 18 to 34 in Souss Massa, Fès-Meknès and Beni Mellal-Khenifra. Under SABIL, ANAPEC set up a professional integration program for designated private sector providers to deliver to place participants in paid jobs or provide entrepreneurship training and support for participants to set up their own businesses. The SABIL program began in late 2022 or early 2023 and is projected to run until the end of 2025.

Similar to the Compact-funded RBF program, the SABIL program has a particular focus on youth without high school diplomas and women, and it pays providers based on the results achieved (employment in a paid job or self-employment). Based on lessons from the RBF program, the SABIL program includes implementation support—to fulfill the role played by Instiglio under the RBF program—and a dedicated information management system intended to facilitate coordination among ANAPEC, subcontractors and providers.

One important difference between the SABIL program and the Compact-funded RBF program, in addition to the former's incorporation of self-employment, is its focus on localization in rural and peri-urban areas, whereas the RBF program operated primarily in urban areas. The SABIL program sets up dedicated service delivery areas called MARKAZ in these areas. Participating service providers will be responsible for managing these spaces, which will offer services similar to those provided by ANAPEC agencies in more urban settings. This, combined with the focus on self-employment and entrepreneurship, could mitigate some of the challenges RBF program providers noted related to working in more rural areas with more limited economic opportunities.

As part of the RBF for Employment sub-Activity, the WDA also provided technical assistance to INDH, a national development project, to pilot its own RBF job placement program, which the Compact did not fund. Respondents noted that the design and development of INDH's pilot program integrated learnings from the Compact-funded RBF program.

Though this pilot program drew both support and key learnings from the Compact-funded RBF program, INDH staff highlighted several differences between the Compact-funded RBF program and the INDH pilot. Specifically, the INDH pilot used a more flexible, regionally focused approach in which the needs and constraints of localities in which providers operated determined how programs adapted the RBF payment structure and results verification process—an adaptation that INDH viewed positively. Other Moroccan government stakeholders echoed these sentiments, recommending that any future RBF-type programs take a more regionalized approach, in line with the SABIL model. This is consistent with the challenges

> "We adopted a results-based financing approach for the INDH pilot. It has produced results, but from our point of view, the more rigid it is, the more unworkable it becomes. It has to be flexible, according to the standards of each territory, each city having its own specificity, and this is the difference between the RBF INDH program, which is based on a decentralized regionalization approach, and the RBF MCA program."
>
> — Moroccan government respondent

Compact-funded RBF program providers and implementers reported in working in areas with more limited employment opportunities.

INDH staff indicated a lack of clarity around whether the INDH pilot program would continue or expand in the future. They noted the program had achieved "satisfactory results" and several participating regions had expressed interest in renewing the program.

2. Challenges to scale-up

There is some skepticism that ANAPEC will scale up the RBF model in the future because it is more costly and challenging to run compared to traditional programs.

Despite the generally favorable perception of the RBF program, some stakeholders expressed skepticism that ANAPEC would adopt the RBF model in any large-scale way because it is a more challenging approach to running the same types of programs ANAPEC already implements. They cited several key challenges:

- **High management costs, especially for complex verification procedures.** Moroccan government stakeholders noted that the high cost of the program, especially the funding and resources required to support implementation and results verification, makes it difficult to advocate for expansion or obtain the necessary funding. Verifying each result proved to be challenging but possible for a relatively small program serving about 5,000 participants. Implementing partners agreed that in a scaled-up version of this program results verification would likely be infeasible or cost prohibitive. Some stakeholders suggested that one alternative option, verifying a randomly selected subset of results, could be more feasible.
- **Lack of capacity among service providers.** Implementing partners and MCA-Morocco staff also noted the need for more capacity-building before scaling up of this type of program. Existing job placement service providers already cannot handle the current demand for their services. New organizations entering this space lack the experience and employer relationships required to provide effective job placement services and lack the management capacity and experience needed to operate under a complex RBF structure. An implementing partner observed that RBF programs require a "level of performance management and oversight that is higher than normal programs." During the Compact-funded RBF program, Instiglio provided a significant amount of technical assistance and capacity-building support to providers (including budgeting support, assistance to correct improperly submitted results for verification and payment and ongoing guidance to understand and operate under contract terms and conditions) to enable them to successful operate under the RBF payment structure. Future RBF programs would likely require an implementation partner experienced with such programs to perform similar functions to those undertaken by Instiglio, such as designing the program's incentive structure and verification procedures, supervising and managing the results verification and payment process and providing technical assistance to program providers, which adds additional costs to the program. In addition, INDH respondents noted that some providers who participated in both the Compact-funded RBF program and the INDH pilot program were unable to replicate their results , achieving significantly lower placement and retention results under the INDH program compared to those achieved under the Compact-funded program. In one case, INDH linked the variation in

performance over time to the departure of a key staff member at the provider organization, suggesting a fragile ecosystem that depends highly on individual performance and/or experience with RBF-style programs. The lack of institutional knowledge suggests the need for significant investments in human resources and capacity-building to successfully replicate or scale up the Compact-funded RBF program, even with the same providers.

- **Lack of access to labor market information and limited private sector engagement.** Several providers also mentioned that access to improved labor market information would be helpful for future programs or scale-up, to enable providers to identify sectors and regions with the greatest demand for labor. The Compact-funded labor market observatory platform could provide this information when it is operational. Providers also noted a need for increased private sector involvement and buy-in from employers, especially to facilitate job placement and retention for women and youth without high school diplomas, particularly if the program is taken to scale or focuses explicitly on formal sector employment.

IV. ONMT sub-Activity Findings

The ONMT sub-Activity sought to provide labor market actors—including Moroccan government ministries and agencies, TVET providers, universities, prospective trainees, job seekers and employers—up-to-date, relevant and accessible data on the labor market to improve decision-making, primarily through the development of an online data platform, called marssad.ma. In this chapter, we discuss findings from the qualitative study of the ONMT sub-Activity to answer three evaluation questions. **Box IV.1** summarizes the key findings for each evaluation question. Our ability to answer these questions is limited though, given that the platform has not yet publicly launched due to unresolved disagreements regarding the ownership, ongoing management, and future financing of the platform.

Box IV.1. Summary of key findings for the ONMT sub-Activity

EQ 7a/b: How and to what extent are Charaka-funded centers and ANAPEC using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform?

- **Although development is complete and the platform is ready for release, it had not launched publicly as of May 2024.** The public launch depends on resolving disagreements over ownership, management, and future financing of the platform.
- **The data platform has not yet improved the availability of labor market data to support decision-making but has the ability to do so if publicly launched.** However, the platform still lacks access to some key data inputs from institutional partners such as CNSS and the Office of Vocational Training and Work Promotion (OFPPT), which limits the data it can process and provide to users.
- Because the platform has not yet publicly launched, **Charaka-funded TVET centers and ANAPEC continue to obtain labor market information from other sources.** They continue to have unmet data needs, most of which the platform would fulfill given its current functionalities.

EQ 7c: What aspects of the ONMT's new data platform are expected to be continued?

- The **future continuity of the platform is uncertain** given challenges associated with launching it. Nevertheless, **all parties involved are invested in publicly launching the platform** and have discussed several potential options to ensure its continuity.

A. Design and development of the data platform

The data platform was designed to aggregate and analyze data on labor market demand and supply and present these data to users in a digestible format.

Before the Compact, the labor market information provided by the ONMT was not comprehensive, coherent or integrated enough to meet the country's needs (*Consortium International de Développement en Education* 2018). There was no centralized platform to access labor market information and the available data were often of poor quality, out of date or costly to access. The

> "In Morocco, there was no centralized platform providing access to the state of the labor market before the existence of marssad.ma. There was a heterogeneity of data sources, which made it difficult to obtain an overall vision of the market without consulting different data sources."
>
> — ONMT development and management team

platform was designed to address these challenges by establishing a cloud-based platform that combines labor market data from various sources, including universities, TVET centers, ANAPEC and employers. The platform uses artificial intelligence and other big data methods to analyze trends in the labor market and disseminate real-time labor market information to different users, such as institutions providing data, job seekers and employers. It also provides users with dashboards and decision support tools such as digital coaches tailored to their needs.

Box IV.2 summarizes some of the platform's key features, including those that are already functional and planned features that are not yet operational. Although the platform includes many of the functionalities originally envisaged, some respondents highlighted time constraints, missing data sources and an insufficient number of users to implement all the functionalities that were originally requested, including forecasting, supply data and better personalized recommendations for job seekers. In addition, some institutions providing input data have stated they will not share data until the parties agree to address the continuity of the platform, which has constrained the development of some functionalities.

Box IV.2. Key features of the platform

Functional features

Dashboards with customizable and interactive interfaces for data aggregation, disaggregation, automatic report generation and identifying trends in job demand and supply

Digital coaches and assistants tailored to each user profile

- For **job seekers**: support for CV writing, career advisory services, identifying competency gaps and recommendations based on users' profiles
- For **TVET centers**: checking to see if training programs align with market needs and providing suggested adaptations to bridge these gaps
- For **recruiters**: support for tailoring job postings and improved targeting to reach job seekers

Planned features not yet operational

- **Automated data collection** from CNSS and ANAPEC
- **Forecasting and prediction capabilities for labor supply**
- Personalized advice and location specific **recommendations for job seekers** (requires user inputs)

The development of the data platform was a highly collaborative effort involving several public and private partners.

A consortium led by UM6P and including OCP Solutions and Atlas Cloud Services developed the platform. The consortium designated UM6P to develop and build out the platform. The design of the platform began with a pilot committee and various workshops attended by Moroccan government stakeholders and private sector partners. These workshops helped to identify available and credible data sources, understand the needs of different user profiles (including job seekers, training centers, employers, intermediaries and policymakers), establish benchmarks for best practices in the Moroccan context and establish priority functionalities based on feasibility. The consortium then established several different teams, or work streams, including teams focused on data analytics, dashboards, infrastructure, users' needs and continuity. Several respondents noted the importance of the interaction and coordination

between public and private sector stakeholders during the design phase to identify issues and develop functionalities adapted to the needs of each user profile type.

Following the initial workshops, the team of data scientists led by UM6P set out to develop the prioritized functionalities. The process of designing and developing the platform focused on ensuring the data provided would meet the needs of end users through several rounds of user testing with many of the institutional partners involved in the design. Respondents noted they anticipate ongoing adjustments in the future through feedback mechanisms, examining data use and using algorithms to better understand what users like or do not like.

> "What went well, especially during the design phase, was that we managed to obtain information on the pain points, and we managed to organize interactive workshops with our partners to design the solution. I think this went very well because everyone was enthusiastic and expressed what they wanted to see in the platform. Everyone contributed their ideas, which allowed for a perfect mix of collective intelligence."
>
> — ONMT development and management team

The platform obtains inputs from institutional partners and job board websites; however, there are administrative challenges to access some of these data.

To facilitate access to data and improve the functioning of the platform, particularly related to data on job offerings, UM6P and six entities—MIEPEEC, *Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation* (MESRSI), *Ministère de la Transition Numérique et de la Réforme de l'Administration* (MTNRA), ANAPEC, OFPPT and CNSS—signed a memorandum in April 2022. ANAPEC signed an additional memorandum to ensure the platform would have access to information on job seekers and ANAPEC confirmed it would still provide data to the platform as of May 2024. UM6P has also engaged in talks with the HCP, the government statistical institution, to join the consortium and contribute official survey data to the platform. This is particularly pertinent given directors of several TVET centers supported by the Charaka Fund and ANAPEC stakeholders mentioned they use HCP data for decision-making.

Despite these institutional arrangements, respondents noted there were still many administrative challenges to access some of these data. Some attributed the challenges to the lack of buy-in from some information producers. For example, as of May 2024, there were ongoing challenges to access CNSS data. Although the platform can gain access to sample CNSS data on salaries, job losses and job creation for testing purposes, there is no formal agreement to automate data collection from CNSS. This makes it difficult to collect the real-time data needed for the platform. Some stakeholders noted a

> "After identifying the data we needed, we encountered challenges accessing it quickly, particularly for institutional data. I understand that there are administrative protocols to follow, but this has significantly delayed the development of many features. I would say that access to data has been the most important challenge in developing marssad.ma."
>
> — ONMT development and management team

hesitancy to share data with the platform while there is ongoing uncertainly around who will own and fund the platform in the future, as we discuss below.

The platform also collects data by automatically scraping data from at least 17 Moroccan job board websites and dynamically cleaning, analyzing and benchmarking the data. The platform has obtained data related to labor demand, identifying almost 14,000 competencies and 130,000 available jobs according to the data platform website marssad.ma. However, the platform currently lacks sufficient data related to labor supply. As of May 2023, UM6P noted it also collected data from universities on the types of training provided but has not yet signed any memoranda with OFPPT or other TVET providers and, as a result, has not obtained crucial data on the supply of labor.

The platform has not yet publicly launched due to disagreements over ongoing management and future financing of the platform.

Although development of the platform is complete, has integrated many key data inputs and the website marssad.ma is live and the platform is ready for release, it had not publicly launched as of May 2024. The public launch depends on a partnership agreement between MIEPEEC and UM6P that will define management of the platform and the commitments of each party to ensure the platform's future operationalization, financing, ongoing development and continuity. As of May 2024, three rounds of partnership negotiations had taken place with no resolution.

B. Use of labor market information by TVET centers and ANAPEC

Because the platform has not yet publicly launched, TVET centers and ANAPEC continue to obtain labor market information from other sources but have additional unmet data needs.

Directors of TVET centers supported by the Charaka Fund noted some online sources provided information on labor market demand and the skills required for jobs at the regional and national levels. These sources include the *Centre Régional d'Investissement* (CRI), which provides information on the performance of different sectors; the HCP, which reports on labor statistics; ministry-level planning reports; and various reports and sectoral analyses from private sector associations and federations. However, most center directors mentioned they typically collect labor market information—including, crucially, data on job availability—on their own by conducting needs assessments through their connections with private or public sector partners. Overall, these various data sources enable directors to determine the number of participants to enroll and the types of courses they should teach and help center staff place participants in internships and jobs.

Directors of Charaka-supported centers identified several additional labor market data needs their current sources do not meet. These needs include having access to an integrated platform that aggregates all labor market data, real-time and more localized information and consistent data for all sectors. If publicly launched, the platform would meet almost all these needs. Some respondents also highlighted the need for capacity-building on how centers can better use labor market data for decision-making, although the Compact did not envision capacity-building around using the platform and data-driven decision-making as part of the ONMT sub-Activity.

Similarly, ANAPEC staff noted they also use HCP data—which include quarterly reports on labor—and have their own labor market platform, which uses data from an annual survey that aims to monitor the future job market to anticipate employers' recruitment needs. ANAPEC staff noted a desire for a more comprehensive integrated platform that brings together disparate labor market information sources—a need the platform would meet if publicly launched.

Although the platform is not yet available to TVET centers and ANAPEC, there are some expectations regarding how they would use the platform to access custom dashboards and reports specific to their needs. For example, TVET centers would have access to data and analysis that check for alignment between course offerings and market needs. ANAPEC could then access information on the estimated gap between labor market supply and demand and map this information to its training offerings.

C. Continuity of the data platform

Negotiations are ongoing to define future ownership and financing of the platform and address the barriers to a public launch.

As mentioned, due to disagreements over the partnership agreement between MIEPECC and UM6P the platform has not yet publicly launched as of May 2024 and it is unclear who will own, manage and finance the platform moving forward. Due to this situation, DONMT personnel have had very limited access to the platform since the end of the Compact, leaving them with few updates on its status since May 2023.

One potential path to resolving the partnership agreement could be securing funding for ongoing operations and maintenance from outside partners, end users and/or the Moroccan government to address UM6P's concerns over continuing to finance the platform while handing over some ownership. DONMT and UM6P stakeholders both acknowledged that funding for the platform is particularly important for continuity, specifically to cover operating costs, such as hosting and subscriptions for secure data management. UM6P stakeholders report they currently finance the platform and estimate the ongoing cost will be 14 to 18 million dirhams (approximately $1.4 to $1.8 million) annually. DONMT personnel raised concerns about the accuracy of the cost estimate, noting that it seemed unjustifiable high.

Some stakeholders suggested a hybrid financing approach, in which the sale of services on the platform to end users generates some of the funding, with another portion guaranteed through public financing. Fees charged to end users could vary depending on the type of user (for example, employers could have to pay a fee but youth, trainees and/or students might have free access) or the level of access (for example, all users could access basic functionalities with a fee for certain premium features). Decisions regarding financing the platform and whether or how much to charge users relate to decisions about the management and operation of the platform and therefore remain unresolved.

Despite the disputes over ownership and management, all parties involved are invested in publicly launching the platform as soon as possible.

Although negotiations remain unresolved, UM6P has continued to update and maintain the platform since the end of the Compact in May 2023. This work includes renewing contracts for storage and licenses, updating the platform's code to enable ongoing software updates, signing new contracts to facilitate the implementation of new features, and purchasing additional servers and clusters.

> "The platform is available, and it must be used! It is as if we had a Lamborghini gathering dust in the fifth basement of the garage, or a private jet abandoned at the airport, or an exceptional yacht abandoned at the dock."
>
> — ONMT development and management team

All stakeholders involved are eager for the platform's public launch and all believe it will be a crucial tool to improve decision-making pertaining to the labor market in Morocco. Many lamented that the tool was ready and operational but that a lack of consensus over ownership and financing issues hindered the launch. When stakeholders obtain consensus and establish a suitable institutional framework, many hope this will improve collaboration among the key parties so the platform can launch and undergo continual adaptation to effectively meet the needs of users.

V. Conclusion

This report has discussed the key findings of the evaluation of the employment sub-Activities of the Morocco WDA. In this concluding chapter, we summarize the findings for each evaluation question and discuss their broader implications.

A. Summary of findings

Table V.1 summarizes the key findings related to each of the evaluation questions. Overall, the findings suggest the RBF program demonstrated a potentially effective model for job placement services and realized the causal pathway envisioned in the WDA logic model (**Figure I.1**). The program successfully identified and trained women and individuals without a high school diploma (program outputs). It also helped a large percentage of program participants secure and retain formal employment in the two years after completing training (program outcomes), although employment rates were lower for women and individuals without a high school diploma compared to other participants and varied greatly by provider. Given that all program participants were unemployed prior to participation in the RBF program and most obtained employment at least at some point in the two-years following program participation the sub-Activity likely did improve household income (program impact) as envisioned in the logic model. However, the employment outcomes of participants varied greatly across program providers, likely due to the variation in the characteristics of participants served, the location where participants received services and searched for jobs, providers' capacity to manage and adapt to a results-based financing model, and providers' previous experience with and approach to providing intermediation services. Thus, the RBF program model's effectiveness depends on the context and providers' ability to implement it successfully.

The evaluation design did not include a comparison group because participants in other similar job placement programs were substantively different from RBF program participants due to the RBF program's eligibility criteria; thus, there were no appropriate comparison groups for the RBF program. The absence of a comparison group makes it difficult to fully contextualize the employment outcomes of RBF program participants. Nevertheless, the programs' achievements are notable given that: (1) providers worked with participants with limited prior work experience and medium-term unemployment immediately prior to program participation; (2) most participants received only a short period of nontechnical training and job search assistance; (3) the program required placing participants in formal jobs, which is challenging given the prevalence of the informal labor market in Morocco, especially for women and individuals without a high school diploma; (4) the program began right before the COVID-19 pandemic which resulted in significant labor market disruptions that were not anticipated during program design; and (5) some providers did not have previous experience providing labor intermediation services.

Given these results, stakeholders viewed the RBF payment model favorably and some small-scale programs funded by ANAPEC have adopted an RBF model based on the experience of and learnings from the Compact-funded program. However, scaling up the RBF program's model faces significant obstacles. Stakeholders highlighted key challenges related to complex and costly verification procedures, a need to provide intensive technical assistance and capacity-building to service providers and a desire for improved access to labor market information and increased private sector engagement.

Under the ONMT sub-Activity, the Compact funded the creation of an impressive online integrated data platform called marssad.ma that has the potential to improve the availability of labor market data and meet the needs of a variety of users, including the Charaka-funded centers and ANAPEC. The platform includes many of the envisioned functionalities, but still lacks access to some key data inputs from institutional partners such as CNSS and OFPPT. Due to ongoing unresolved disputes over ownership and management of the platform, it had not yet publicly launched as of May 2024 and the future of the platform is uncertain. The causal pathway envisioned in the WDA logic model (**Figure I.1**) has not been realized because the outputs and outcomes cannot be achieved until the platform is publicly launched.

Table V.1. Summary of key findings, by evaluation question

Evaluation questions	Key findings
Results-based financing (RBF)	
EQ 6a. How did the implementation of RBF programs facilitate or hamper the achievement of the envisaged outcomes in the WDA logic model?	• The RBF program's payment structure incentivized a focus on employment outcomes but might have overemphasized training results relative to placement and retention for some providers. • Binding subtargets for all subgroups might have constrained the program's intended focus on serving women and individuals without a high school diploma. Although the program later relaxed subtargets for women and individuals without a high school diploma for two providers, this flexibility was not extended to all providers and the limited experience of most providers in tailoring services to these populations remained a challenge. • Implementation support provided by Instiglio helped providers navigate the complex program and was crucial to managing the eligibility and results verification processes. However, the verification processes were slow, which hindered providers' ability to receive timely results payments.
EQ 6b. What are participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings?	• 54 percent of survey respondents had held a paid formal job at some point in the approximately two-year period following training completion. • At about two years post-training, 39 percent of respondents were employed in a paid formal job. • Respondents who were formally employed since training completion earned a median monthly wage close to the national minimum wage.
EQ 6c. Do labor market outcomes vary by participant subgroup (sex, age, education level and region where job placement services are provided)?	• Women, participants without a high school diploma and those without any work experience prior to the RBF program were less likely to be formally employed compared to other groups. • Among respondents in formal employment, average monthly earnings were slightly lower for those without a high school diploma relative to those with a diploma, but were similar by sex and pre-RBF work experience. • Employment outcomes did not vary by participants' age, and we did not analyze the data by region given that provider location was highly variable and they provided some services virtually.
EQ 6d. Do RBF stakeholders (participants, grantees, employers) perceive that the program has increased opportunities for women and individuals without a high school diploma?	• Stakeholders noted the program successfully recruited and trained groups that other ANAPEC programs tended to underserve. They perceived the program equipped participants with nontechnical skills that facilitated employment for this population and had some success in encouraging employers to hire them.

Evaluation questions	Key findings
EQ 6e. Did the RBF incentives have any unintended effects on participant recruitment and service provision?	• Unintended effects on service provision and participants' recruitment were not widespread. However, some providers reported instances of prioritizing serving participants who seemed most likely to obtain formal employment.
EQ 6f. To what extent has RBF been continued and expanded after the end of the Compact?	• Since the end of the Compact, some ANAPEC programs, such as the SABIL program, have adopted and refined the Compact-funded RBF model on a small scale. Stakeholders noted it would be difficult to scale-up the RBF program's model because it is costly and challenging to run relative to traditional labor intermediation programs.
ONMT and marssad.ma	
EQ 7a/b. How and to what extent are Charaka-funded centers and ANAPEC using the labor market information produced by the ONMT's data platform?	• Because the ONMT data platform has not yet publicly launched, Charaka-funded TVET centers and ANAPEC continue to obtain labor market information from other sources. However, they have additional unmet data needs, most of which the platform could fulfill given its current functionalities.
EQ 7c. What aspects of the ONMT's new data platform are expected to be continued?	• Due to ongoing negotiations over ownership, management, and future financing of the platform, it has not yet publicly launched and its future continuity is uncertain.

B. Implications

The experience of the employment sub-Activities suggests several recommendations for future programs:

It is important to consider trade-offs between efficiency and program reach when setting payment terms and results targets for RBF programs.

Incentivizing results, especially training and job placement outcomes, commonly leads to cream skimming, in which providers select or prioritize support to participants who are easiest to train or place in a job. Some providers reported cases of selectively enrolling participants they thought were most likely to obtain employment, primarily when faced with excess program demand. In addition, some RBF participants did not receive any job placement or retention services after training, which could be due to providers focusing limited resources on easier-to-place participants. Cream skimming is a rational and even efficient use of limited program resources and might lead to better overall results. However, it risks leaving the populations most in need of support without it, which is of particular concern if it becomes widespread in large-scale public programs.

The RBF program's strict eligibility criteria and subtargets disaggregated by sex and level of education helped mitigate the potential for and negative consequences of cream skimming by ensuring that only youth who had been unemployed for at least three months were eligible for the program and establishing subtargets based on sex and high school diploma status. However, future programs could consider making only the subtargets for subgroups that are relatively easier to place in employment, namely men and individuals with a high school diploma, binding. The Compact-funded RBF program made this change during implementation for two providers and Instiglio recommended it be extended to all providers to enable them to serve additional women and individuals without a high school diploma even after meeting the subtargets for those groups. Differential incentive payments for subgroups for whom outcome

achievement is more challenging, such as women and individuals without diplomas, could also be considered.

The payment structure of RBF programs must also strike a careful balance between mitigating providers' financial risk and sufficiently incentivizing outcomes.

An RBF payment model partly or entirely based on outcomes rather than outputs can impose financial risk on providers because they might not be able to recover some of their operating expenses. Providers and implementers noted the Compact-funded RBF program's payment structure helped mitigate this risk by providing pre-financing, paying for training results in addition to employment and retention and paying for individual participant results (as opposed to all-or-nothing payments for overall target achievement).

Despite these strengths of the program's financing model, providers struggled to accurately anticipate operating costs and might not have appropriately budgeted for the risk inherent to an RBF payment model, resulting in challenges for implementation and continuity. For example, some providers felt the training duration was too short to adequately prepare participants for employment; however, they could have been reluctant to incur the costs of providing additional services to participants due to the associated financial risk.

In addition, for some providers the payments for placement and retention might not have been high enough relative to those for training to incentivize the desired focus on employment outcomes. For all providers, retention payments were the lowest result payment, while also being the most difficult outcome to support and achieve. This could explain, at least in part, why very few participants received job retention support beyond a phone call or text message from the provider. The incentive structure, combined with the challenges in anticipating program costs, might also have contributed to six of the eight providers concluding training activities five to 24 months before the end of the RBF program, when most had received the maximum possible training payments but still had the potential to receive additional job placement and retention payments.

Future programs could consider providing up-front budgeting support for providers during program design to mitigate some of these challenges by ensuring providers more appropriately factor the risk of not achieving outcomes into their implementation costs and program budgets. Future programs could also ensure that payments for employment outcomes are sufficiently high relative to payments for training outcomes for all providers. This might introduce additional risk for providers, but they could factor in that risk when setting payment amounts or offset it with relatively higher pre-financing amounts.

For further scale-up of the RBF program to be feasible, there is a need for less time-consuming and costly approaches to eligibility and results verification.

Moroccan government stakeholders noted the costs and complexity of verifying the eligibility and results of the Compact-funded RBF program were a major barrier to continuity and scaling up the program. Providers found it impossible to screen for some of the program's eligibility criteria tied to prior employment or training and registration with ANAPEC and eligibility verification was sometimes delayed to the point where a provider trained or even placed a participant in a job before learning they were ineligible. Providers verified employment results based on CNSS declarations for employed participants, but they had little control over whether employers declared participants to the CNSS, declarations often

substantially lagged employment start dates and the verification process was slow. All of this contributed to delayed provider payments and managing these processes required significant time and effort on the part of ANAPEC, Instiglio and providers.

Future programs could consider (1) simplifying eligibility requirements, (2) adapting alternative verification requirements to CNSS declarations (such as an employment contract or pay stub) and/or (3) verifying a random subset of participant results rather than all individual results to reduce costs and speed up the verification process.

A dedicated and experienced program implementation team within the government agency, such as ANAPEC, responsible for RBF programs is crucial to successfully oversee and manage these programs.

The role Instiglio played in managing the Compact-funded RBF program from design through implementation was critical. The complexity of RBF programs requires a substantial amount of work to set appropriate incentive structures, manage ongoing verifications and provide support to service providers. This work includes budgeting, especially for those who are new to RBF programs. Such intensive support requires appropriate human resources from the overseeing agency, in terms of experienced staff with sufficient time to dedicate to overseeing a successful RBF program.

Future MCC investments in information technology products should clarify ownership issues and propose a plan for post-Compact management and financing responsibilities.

A lack of clarity on these issues has led to the impressive data platform, marsaad.ma, not launching formally post-Compact, leaving potential users with no net improvement in the availability of labor market information to inform decision-making. Although these issues are challenging to resolve, addressing them at the outset is critical to prevent later disagreements and ensure post-Compact continuity of MCC's investments. This lesson applies more broadly to other MCC investments in information technology products, such as online platforms and land management systems.

References

Abarcar, Paolo, Emilie Bagby, Margo Berends, Evan Borkum, and Kristen Velyvis. "Evaluation Design for the Morocco Workforce Development Activity." Washington, DC: Mathematica, July 2022.

Beeck Center. "Funding for Results: How Governments Can Pay for Outcomes." 2014. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1043021/Funding-for-Results_BeeckCenter.pdf?sequence=1.

Brookings Global Economy and Development. "Are Impact Bonds Reaching the Intended Populations?" 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Are-impact-bonds-reaching-the-intended-populations-FINAL-1.pdf

Clarke, Marguerite, Meghna Sharma, and Pradyumna Bhattacharjee. "Review of the Evidence on Short-Term Education and Skills Training Programs for Out-of-School Youth with a Focus on the Use of Incentives." Discussion Paper No. 2103. World Bank, 2021. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/8c2b0a33-72a0-571a-98a5-fc3b1f97331c/content.

Consortium International de Développement en Education. "Plan d'Action Détaillé et Planification de la Mise en Œuvre du Nouveau Cadre du Système Intégré d'Observation du Marché de Travail." Rabat, Morocco : Consortium International de Développement en Education, November 2018.

Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP). « Ahmed Lahlimi Alami : "la prédominance de l'informel est symptomatique d'une économie qui peine à se transformer ...." 2023. https://www.hcp.ma/Ahmed-Lahlimi-Alami-la-predominance-de-l-informel-est-symptomatique-d-une-economie-qui-peine-a-se-transformer_a3793.html.

Instiglio. "Results-Based Financing to Enhance the Effectiveness of Active Labor Market Programs." 2018. https://instiglio.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDRC-Final-Report.pdf.

Millennium Challenge Corporation. "Monitoring and Evaluation Plan. Compact II. Version 3.1." Washington, DC: Millennium Challenge Corporation, June 2023.

Ministry of Economic Integration, Small Business, Employment and Skills (MIEPEEC): "Direction de l'Observation National du Marché du Travail." 2023. *Le Marché du Travail en 2022*. https://miepeec.gov.ma/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Le-marche-du-travail-en-2022.pdf.

Royaume du Maroc: "Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable 2030." 2017.

Appendix A.
Overview of RBF provider performance relative to results targets

In this appendix, we assess verified provider results against contract targets. Doing so provides information on how well providers performed relative to their expectations, challenges they may have encountered in achieving results for subgroups and the extent of payments they received relative to the potential maximum. The achievement of results targets is not directly related to absolute achievements such as the percentage of trained participants who were placed or retained in a formal paid job; we discussed these and other labor market outcomes in Chapter III, Section C.

Nearly all providers achieved or came very close to achieving their overall targets for the number of participants trained.

Seven providers achieved or were close to achieving their overall targets **(Appendix Figure A.1)**. The only provider that fell well short of its overall training target was Ego Intérim, which only achieved 56 percent of this target (Appendix Figure A.1). In general, providers came close to or surpassed the training subtargets for women and individuals with high school diplomas, with some exceptions. Notably, Al Jisr surpassed the subtarget for training women by more than 2.5 times. Al Jisr was one of two providers (along with AMAPPE) who received contract amendments allowing them to surpass the subtargets for women and individuals with high school diplomas (as discussed in Chapter III, Section A).

Appendix Figure A.1. Percent of targets achieved for participants trained



Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023 (results) and provider contracts (targets).

Most providers did not achieve their overall targets for participant job placement.

Under the RBF program, job placement was defined as being employed in a job in the formal sector which requires that the employer is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports the RBF participant's salary to the CNSS. AMIDEAST and SFORHET achieved their overall targets for participant job placement, with the other six providers achieving between 7 and 53 percent of their overall targets (**Appendix Figure A.2**). EFE Maroc, AMAPPE and Al Jisr achieved about one-half of their targets. AOVDD, Ego Intérim and IPDF achieved less than 15 percent of their job placement targets. For almost all providers, the achievement rate of the placement subtarget for women was close to or exceeded the achievement rate for the overall placement target, which likely reflects the program's focus on serving women and, for Al Jisr and AMAPPE, their ability to surpass the initial subtargets for women and still receive payments once their contracts were amended to allow that. In contrast, for a handful of providers the achievement rate of the placement subtarget for individuals without a high school diploma was substantively lower than the achievement rate for the overall placement target, suggesting that it remained challenging to place these individuals.

Appendix Figure A.2. Percent of targets achieved for participant job placement



Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023 (results) and provider contracts (targets).

Most providers achieved less than 25 percent of their targets for participant job retention.

Under the RBF program, job retention was defined as retaining a job in the formal sector for at least six consecutive months during which the RBF participant is reported as employed to the CNSS for at least 15

days each month. Participants did not have to retain the same job for all six months as long as they were consecutively employed for all six months. Provider achievement of job retention targets varied greatly, with AMIDEAST and SFORHET achieving 75 percent and 82 percent of their targets, respectively, while AOVDD, Ego Intérim and IPDF achieved 5 percent or less of their job retention targets (**Appendix Figure A.3**). Consistent with the findings for job placement, achievement rates for retention subtargets for women generally met or exceeded achievement rates for the overall targets, but achievement rates for retention subtargets for individuals without a high school diploma were lower in some cases.

Appendix Figure A.3. Percent of targets achieved for participant job retention



Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023 (results) and provider contracts (targets).

Full results on targets and achievement are represented in **Appendix Table A.1** below.

Appendix Table A.1. Targets and results for number of participants trained, placed in jobs and retained jobs overall and by provider

	Training			Job Insertion			Job retention		
	Target	Results	% of target achieved	Target	Results	% of target achieved	Target	Results	% of target achieved
Al Jisr									
Male	350	67	19.1	280	10	3.6	202	3	1.5
Female	150	417	278.0	120	162	135.0	86	45	52.3
Diploma	150	148	98.7	120	41	34.2	86	7	8.1
No diploma	350	336	96.0	280	131	46.8	202	41	20.3
Total	500	484	96.8	400	172	43.0	288	48	16.7
AMAPPE									
Male	250	238	95.2	160	42	26.3	105	21	20.0
Female	250	310	124.0	140	96	68.6	95	20	21.1
Diploma	180	321	178.3	130	112	86.2	70	34	48.6
No diploma	320	227	70.9	170	26	15.3	130	7	5.4
Total	500	548	109.6	300	138	46.0	200	41	20.5
AMIDEAST									
Male	270	295	109.3	225	229	101.8	190	151	79.5
Female	330	385	116.7	275	309	112.4	190	160	84.2
Diploma	465	538	115.7	385	443	115.1	280	265	94.6
No diploma	135	142	105.2	115	95	82.6	100	46	46.0
Total	600	680	113.3	500	538	107.6	380	311	81.8
AOVDD									
Male	84	87	103.6	72	16	22.2	66	4	6.1
Female	88	90	102.3	68	4	5.9	64	3	4.7
Diploma	64	66	103.1	64	11	17.2	60	4	6.7
No diploma	108	111	102.8	76	9	11.8	70	3	4.3
Total	172	177	102.9	140	20	14.3	130	7	5.4
EFE Maroc									
Male	265	244	92.1	199	91	45.7	160	38	23.8
Female	294	332	112.9	221	132	59.7	176	46	26.1
Diploma	531	537	101.1	399	201	50.4	319	70	21.9
No diploma	28	39	139.3	21	22	104.8	17	14	82.4
Total	559	576	103.0	420	223	53.1	336	84	25.0
EGO Intérim									
Male	600	357	59.5	500	68	13.6	400	11	2.8
Female	600	309	51.5	500	57	11.4	400	11	2.8

	Training			Job Insertion			Job retention		
	Target	Results	% of target achieved	Target	Results	% of target achieved	Target	Results	% of target achieved
Diploma	420	345	82.1	350	79	22.6	280	19	6.8
No diploma	780	321	41.2	650	46	7.1	520	3	0.6
Total	1,200	666	55.5	1,000	125	12.5	800	22	2.8
IPDF									
Male	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A
Female	1,000	985	98.5	600	42	7.0	550	9	1.6
Diploma	500	439	87.8	300	27	9.0	280	5	1.8
No diploma	500	546	109.2	300	15	5.0	270	4	1.5
Total	1,000	985	98.5	600	42	7.0	550	9	1.6
SFORHET									
Male	144	147	102.1	120	122	101.7	88	87	98.9
Female	856	924	107.9	688	689	100.1	512	365	71.3
Diploma	140	161	115.0	112	139	124.1	84	105	125.0
No diploma	860	910	105.8	696	672	96.6	516	347	67.2
Total	1,000	1,071	107.1	808	811	100.4	600	452	75.3
Total (all providers)									
Male	N/A	1,435	N/A	N/A	578	N/A	N/A	315	N/A
Female	N/A	3,752	N/A	N/A	1,491	N/A	N/A	659	N/A
Diploma	N/A	2,555	N/A	N/A	1,053	N/A	N/A	509	N/A
No diploma	N/A	2,632	N/A	N/A	1,016	N/A	N/A	465	N/A
Total	N/A	5,187	N/A	N/A	2,069	N/A	N/A	974	N/A

Source: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023 (results); provider contracts (targets).

Notes: The diploma subgroup is defined as those who have obtained their high school diploma (*baccalaureate*). This group includes those who also started or completed higher education including vocational training or university studies. The no diploma subgroup is defined as those who have not obtained their high school diploma (*baccalaureate*). It includes those who started or completed high school but did not pass the baccalaureate exam required to obtain a high school diploma.

Job insertion is defined as being employed in a job in the formal sector which requires that the employer is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.

Job retention is defined as retaining a job in the formal sector for at least six consecutive months during which the employee is reported as employed to the CNSS for at least 15 days each month. They do not have to retain the same job for all six months as long as they are consecutively employed for all six months.

All participants belong to one sex subgroup (female/male) and one education subgroup (diploma/no diploma).

N/A = not applicable

Appendix B.
Supplemental tables for analysis of nonresponse for RBF tracer survey

Appendix Table B.1. Demographics of original tracer survey sample, comparing survey respondents and non-respondents

	Completed a survey	Did not complete a survey	Difference	*p*-value
Female (%)	61.4	72.8	-11.4***	0.001
Age (years)	25.4	24.9	0.5*	0.070
Has *baccalaureate* (high school) degree or higher	59.2	43.6	15.7***	0.000
Months without CNSS declarations prior to RBF program	11.7	11.6	0.0	0.690
Sample size	**356-373**	**407-427**	**-**	**-**

Sources: RBF providers' administrative program data as of May 2023.

Notes: Reported characteristics are means unless otherwise indicated.
Original sample refers to the 800 participants in the random sample drawn for the tracer survey.

***/**/*: Difference between population and sample means is statistically significant at the .01/.05/.10 level, respectively.

Appendix Table B.2. Labor market outcomes of original tracer survey sample based on administrative program data, comparing survey respondents and non-respondents

	Completed a survey	Did not complete a survey	Difference	*p*-value
Placed in formal job after RBF program	34.3	36.8	-2.5	0.471
Retained a formal job for at least 6 consecutive months after RBF program	15.8	15.2	0.6	0.817
Sample size	**373**	**427**	**-**	**-**

Sources: RBF providers' administrative program data as of May 2023.

Notes: Reported outcomes are means unless otherwise indicated.
Original sample refers to the 800 participants in the random sample drawn for the tracer survey.

***/**/*: Difference between population and sample means is statistically significant at the .01/.05/.10 level, respectively.

Appendix C.
Complete results from analysis of RBF tracer survey and administrative program data

Appendix Table C.1. Paid employment since completing the program

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Employed in formal paid job since completing program (%)	54.4	52.6	58.7	74.0	39.6	69.7	46.6	37.4	55.7
Employed in paid job since completing program (%)	68.6	67.0	70.0	85.0	64.4	77.5	66.0	54.0	64.8
Sample size	**824**	**100**	**110**	**100**	**101**	**102**	**103**	**100**	**108**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.

Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Appendix Table C.2. Labor market experiences among respondents with no paid job since training completion

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Searched for work since end of program (%)	74.1	62.5	75.0	92.9	83.3	81.8	79.4	73.9	59.0
Has applied for jobs since end of program (%)	66.0	43.8	71.9	92.9	66.7	81.8	77.1	67.4	48.7
Has interviewed for jobs since end of program (%)	35.9	28.1	37.5	50.0	19.4	59.1	60.0	21.7	33.3
Has been self-employed since end of program (%)	10.0	9.1	3.0	20.0	27.8	4.3	11.4	2.2	7.9
Sample size	**259**	**33**	**33**	**15**	**36**	**23**	**35**	**46**	**39**
Self-assessment of main reason for not finding a job since end of program, among those who searched (%)									
No available jobs	47.5	52.6	26.1	23.1	53.3	29.4	66.7	62.5	40.9
Available jobs are unappealing or have poor working conditions	18.6	26.3	21.7	30.8	6.7	23.5	18.5	15.6	18.2
Available jobs are too far away	25.7	15.8	34.8	23.1	40.0	29.4	29.6	18.8	9.1
Available jobs do not pay enough	21.9	31.6	21.7	46.2	13.3	11.8	25.9	12.5	27.3
Unavailable during required work hours for job	12.0	15.8	8.7	30.8	3.3	29.4	7.4	6.3	13.6
Does not have required education	17.5	15.8	30.4	23.1	6.7	5.9	14.8	31.3	9.1
Does not have required language skills	12.6	21.1	26.1	30.8	6.7	0.0	3.7	15.6	4.5
Does not have required work experience	23.0	26.3	21.7	46.2	10.0	41.2	29.6	15.6	13.6
Difficulties applying or interviewing for jobs	6.6	0.0	13.0	15.4	6.7	0.0	3.7	0.0	18.2
Other	5.5	0.0	13.0	0.0	3.3	5.9	7.4	9.4	0.0
Sample size	**183**	**19**	**23**	**13**	**30**	**17**	**27**	**32**	**22**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Table includes participants with no employment or only self-employment post-program.

The categories for sections on "Reasons for not searching for work among those who didn't search" and "Main reason for not finding a job among those who searched" do not add up to 100 percent because these questions allowed respondents to select more than one response to the question (multi-select question).

Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Appendix Table C.3. Employment since training completion among respondents with at least one paid formal job since training completion

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
First job									
Duration of first job if formal, mean (weeks)	55.1	42.0	60.9	49.0	57.2	56.4	48.5	50.4	73.3
Duration of first job if formal, median (weeks)	49.7	21.9	62.6	39.3	58.4	50.7	41.7	43.4	92.6
All jobs									
Number of formal jobs since completing program, mean	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0
Number of formal jobs since completing program, median	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Duration of longest period of continuous formal employment since completing program, mean (weeks)	56.6	46.3	60.6	56.3	52.4	59.7	49.4	48.9	71.7
Duration of longest period of continuous formal employment since completing program, median (weeks)	53.6	31.4	61.4	55.7	52.1	56.0	46.6	43.4	90.6
Percent of time formally employed since completing program, mean	53.6	41.3	58.7	54.8	47.7	56.2	48.7	49.6	64.7
Percent of time formally employed since completing program, median	55.0	30.0	60.0	59.0	47.5	59.0	45.0	53.5	81.0
Sample size	**539**	**51**	**63**	**71**	**38**	**68**	**48**	**37**	**59**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Appendix Table C.4. Employment and productive engagement at the survey date

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Labor market status at the survey date (%)									
Formally employed in paid job	39.0	21.4	44.5	49.0	30.6	57.0	37.9	31.3	39.3
Informally employed in paid job	9.0	7.1	9.1	4.0	17.3	6.0	14.6	10.1	3.7
Self-employed	4.0	2.0	2.7	5.0	13.3	1.0	3.9	1.0	3.7
Unemployed, available, and searching for work	37.2	48.0	40.0	30.0	33.7	27.0	33.0	41.4	43.9
Unemployed, available, and not searching for work	5.0	7.1	3.6	5.0	4.1	4.0	5.8	9.1	1.9
Out of labor force	5.8	14.3	0.0	7.0	1.0	5.0	4.9	7.1	7.5
Sample size	**815**	**98**	**110**	**100**	**98**	**100**	**103**	**99**	**107**
Productive engagement at the survey date (%)									
Employed in paid job	48.5	30.0	53.6	53.0	49.5	63.7	52.4	42.0	43.5
Self-employed	4.0	2.0	2.7	5.0	12.9	1.0	3.9	1.0	3.7
Pursuing additional training or higher education	14.0	14.0	13.6	15.0	3.0	19.6	15.7	14.0	16.7
Productively engaged	62.1	43.0	63.6	67.0	65.3	76.5	68.6	55.0	57.4
Sample size	**824**	**100**	**110**	**100**	**101**	**102**	**103**	**100**	**108**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS. Productive engagement is defined as being employed in a paid job (formal or informal), self-employed or pursuing educational or training opportunities—respondents might be conducting more than one of these activities concurrently.

Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Appendix Table C.5. Monthly earnings for most recent or current formal employment among respondents with at least one paid formal job since training completion

	Providers								
	Overall	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	EGO Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Mean, among those in a formal job	3,055	2,376	3,212	3,073	2,973	3,425	3,395	2,841	3,001
Median, among those in a formal job	2,900	2,500	2,900	3,000	2,825	3,143	3,000	2,700	3,000
Sample size	**436**	**50**	**62**	**74**	**38**	**68**	**48**	**37**	**59**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.

Results were not sensitive to outliers, therefore top-coding was not deemed necessary.

Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

Appendix Table C.6. Employment and productive engagement, by subgroup

	Overall	Sex			High school diploma status			Age			Prior work		
		Men	Women (adj.)	Diff.	Diploma	No diploma (adj.)	Diff.	>=25 years	<25 years (adj.)	Diff.	Prior work	No prior work (adj.)	Diff.
Paid employment since completing the program (%)													
Employed in formal paid job since completing program	54.4	59.9	53.6	6.3	59.6	49.4	10.2***	54.8	52.6	2.2	59.7	49.2	10.5***
Employed in paid job since completing program	68.6	75.9	67.1	8.8**	69.1	69.5	-0.4	69.1	67.5	1.6	75.0	62.8	12.2***
Labor market status at the survey date (%)													
Formally employed in paid job	39.0	47.6	36.7	10.9***	45.4	33.6	11.8***	40.5	35.2	5.3	43.3	34.5	8.8***
Informally employed in paid job	9.0	10.9	9.0	1.9	6.6	12.2	-5.6***	9.6	8.8	0.8	10.4	8.2	2.2
Self-employed	4.0	7.1	3.1	4.0**	3.2	4.3	-1.1	4.6	4.1	0.5	4.8	4.2	0.6
Unemployed and available for work	37.2	28.6	39.7	-11.1***	34.8	38.3	-3.5	36.7	38.4	-1.7	35.6	38,2	-2.6
Unemployed, available, and searching for work	5.0	3.7	5.1	-1.4	4.9	5.5	-0.6	3.0	7.2	-4.2***	2.0	7.7	-5.7***
Out of labor force	5.8	2.0	6.4	-4.4**	5.1	6.2	-1.1	5.6	6.4	-0.8	3.8	7.2	-3.4**
Productive engagement at the survey date (%)													
Employed in paid job	48.5	59.2	45.8	13.4***	52.5	46.3	6.2*	50.9	44.5	6.4*	54.5	42.8	11.7***
Self-employed	4.0	7.0	3.1	3.9**	3.2	4.3	-1.1	4.5	4.0	0.5	4.8	4.3	0.5
Pursuing additional training or higher education	14.0	13.1	13.8	-0.7	22.5	2.2	20.3***	8.0	19.1	-11.1***	10.8	15.9	-5.1**
Productively engaged	62.1	74.2	58.7	15.5***	70.6	52.5	18.1***	61.1	60.8	0.3	65.8	58.6	7.2**
Sample size	**815**	**299**	**525**	**-**	**476**	**348**	**-**	**401**	**423**	**-**	**400**	**423**	**-**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those without a diploma, youth under 25 years of age, and those with no work experience prior to the program are adjusted for provider effects.
Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.
Productive engagement is defined as being employed in a paid job (formal or informal), self-employed, or pursuing educational or training opportunities.
Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference between those with a diploma and without a diploma at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level, respectively.

Appendix Table C.7. Job characteristics for most recent or current formal employment among respondents with at least one paid formal job since training completion, by subgroup

		Sex			High school diploma status			Age			Prior work		
	Overall	Men	Women (adj.)	Diff.	Diploma	No diploma (adj.)	Diff.	>=25 years	<25 years (adj.)	Diff.	Prior work	No prior work (adj.)	Diff.
Monthly earnings (dirhams)													
Mean, among those in a formal job	3,055	3,167	3,166	1	3,196	2,916	280**	2,944	3,108	-164	3,041	3,074	-33
Type of contract													
Permanent employee (*salarié CDI*)	31.6	34.5	30.8	3.7	34.0	25.6	8.4*	22.6	19.0	3.6	31.9	32.3	-0.3
Fixed term employee (*salarié à durée déterminée*)	35.3	36.4	36.8	-0.4	33.6	36.2	-2.6	36.0	34.3	1.7	38.0	34.7	3.3
Short-term employee	5.8	8.8	4.3	4.5*	3.4	9.8	-6.4***	7.1	5.3	1.8	6.6	6.1	0.5
Apprenticeship or internship	17.8	14.5	19.5	-5.0	21.1	15.5	5.6	15.7	17.8	-2.1	14.6	17.9	-3.3
Other	1.9	0.6	2.8	-2.2	1.5	1.8	-0.3	1.5	2.3	-0.8	2.8	1.4	1.4
No contract	7.5	5.5	6.1	-0.6	6.4	11.1	-4.7*	5.6	9.7	-4.1	6.1	7.6	-1.5
Very satisfied or satisfied with job (%)	67.3	63.4	71.6	-8.2	69.9	59.7	10.2**	62.7	56.7	6.0	69.4	65.6	3.8
Sample size	**437**	**165**	**252**	**-**	**266**	**150**	**-**	**202**	**214**	**-**	**216**	**200**	**-**

Source: RBF tracer survey.

Notes: Means for females, those without a diploma, youth under 25 years of age, and those with no work experience prior to the program are adjusted for provider effects.
Formal employment is defined as employed with a company that is registered with the CNSS (social security administration) and reports employees' salaries to the CNSS.
Sample sizes are shown for the largest sample, but some values may have a smaller sample size due to missing data.

*/**/*** Statistically significant difference between those with a diploma and without a diploma at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level, respectively.

Appendix D.
Summary of key characteristics and outcomes across providers

Appendix Table D.1. Summary of key characteristics and outcomes across providers

	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Implementation								
Locations of operations	Oriental	Casablanca-Settat Oriental Rabat-Salé-Kénitra Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma	Casablanca-Settat Rabat-Salé-Kénitra Souss-Massa Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma	Drâa-Tafilalet	Casablanca-Settat Fès-Meknès Marrakech-Safi Rabat-Salé-Kénitra	Casablanca-Settat Marrakech-Safi	Fès-Meknès	Casablanca-Settat Marrakech-Safi Rabat-Salé-Kénitra Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma
End of training provision	July 2022	April 2021	December 2021	November 2020	December 2022	July 2022	December 2022	March 2021
Result with largest payment	Training	Placement	Training	Training	Placement	Training	Placement	Training
Number of participants trained	484	548	680	177	576	666	985	1,071
Female participants (%)	86	57	57	51	58	46	100	86
Participants without a high school diploma (%)	69	41	21	63	7	48	55	85
Training duration (hours)	62	27	35	163	35	50	26	36
Training components (beyond soft skills training)	Legal Professional Technical	n.a.	n.a.	CV workshop Technical Professional	Technical	n.a.	Psycho-social	Technical
Participant rated training as good or excellent (%)	88	82	91	69	89	89	76	94
Participants believe training provided them with employable skills (%)	73	71	74	44	71	80	55	88

	Al Jisr	AMAPPE	AMIDEAST	AOVDD	EFE Maroc	Ego Intérim	IPDF	SFORHET
Participants received job placement services (%)	78	70	90	39	91	37	46	86
Participants received post-placement services (%)	49	51	71	31	75	47	42	57
Employment outcomes								
Paid formal employment since training completion (%)	53	59	74	40	70	47	37	56
Paid employment (formal or informal) since training completion (%)	67	70	85	64	78	66	54	65
Paid formal employment at survey date (%)	21	45	49	31	57	38	31	39
Paid employment (formal or informal) at survey date (%)	30	54	53	50	64	52	42	44
Productive engagement at survey date (%)	43	64	67	65	77	69	55	57

Sources: RBF administrative program data as of May 2023 (first seven rows in implementation section) and RBF tracer survey data (all other rows).

Notes: For training components beyond soft-skills, only components that were provided to 10 percent or more of participants are listed.

Productive engagement is defined as being employed in a paid job, self-employed, or pursuing educational or training opportunities.

Color coding is as follows: For implementation: green indicates 80 percent or higher, orange indicates 60-79 percent, red indicates less than 60 percent. For employment outcomes: green indicates 70 percent or higher, orange indicates 50-69 percent, red indicates less than 50 percent.

Appendix E.
Stakeholder comments and responses

Appendix Table E.1 Response to stakeholder comments

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
1	MCC M&E	Overall	We would request that the activity logic diagram feature again towards the end of the report with comments about which causal chains were realized and which were not. This has been done in other evaluation reports and can helps recenter the evidence and findings around the logic.	The logic model for the Employment Component of the WDA has a very simple linear casual chain, so we do not believe that featuring the logic model again in the conclusion would add much value. However, we have edited the logic model in Section I.B to emphasizes the Employment sub-activities that are the focus of this report by graying out the TVET sub-activities and have added a high-level discussion in the conclusion about the extent to which the simple causal chain was realized (Section V).
2	MCC HCD	Overall	There is a nuance to the RBF sub-activity that I do not believe was mentioned in the report, although I could be wrong. While the sub-activity originally focused on marginalized women and youth without diplomas, because so many people with jobs and diplomas lost their jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a decision to allow those who had lost their jobs because of the pandemic to participate in the program. The report mentioned that there were more trainees with diplomas than without but did not indicate that this was due to a programmatic decision within a few months of program launch in response to the job loss of the pandemic. Also, and I am not sure if it had any impact on job placement for the RBF sub-activity, I believe the Government of Morocco incentivized companies to hire people due to the job loss during the pandemic by waiving the CNSS payments for up to six months or something along those lines. As I said, I am not sure that had any direct impact on providers being able to place trainees, but I think that incentive was there.	On the first point, we have revised the description of the population served on page 2 (Section I.A.) to make it clearer that the program served men and women and individuals with and without high school diplomas, but with a particular focus on serving women and youth without high school diplomas. From our understanding the program did serve individuals with high school diplomas from the outset; this was not a change that was made in response to job loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The contracts signed with program providers prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic include eligibility criteria related to participants with high school diplomas and sub targets for individuals with and without diplomas. On the second point, we had not previously heard anything about the Government of Morocco waiving CNSS payments for a period of time due to the COVID-19 pandemic job losses. However, if this did affect job placements for the RBF program, we assume it would have been raised during our qualitative interviews as we discussed facilitators and challenges related to job placement in-depth. We are therefore reasonably confident that this did not have a significant impact on job placement for the RBF program.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
3	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Overall	It would be relevant to compare the experience of this project with other international experiences (benchmark) in order to contextualize it and place it in a global framework.	It would be challenging to draw meaningful conclusions from comparing the results of the RBF program in Morocco to RBF programs in other countries because of differences along key dimensions such as the characteristics of populations served, the types of services provided to participants, the characteristics of targeted job placements, and the duration of service provision. Additionally, the RBF program in Morocco coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, which created unique labor market conditions that were not faced by most other international programs which could serve as potential reference points. In sum, the RBF program in Morocco was quite unique to the local and temporal context. However, in the Evaluation Design Report we provide a review of the literature on other similar RBF programs which could provide some helpful background context (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455).
4	DEPF	Overall (RBF)	Lack of perspective with other international programs: It would be interesting to compare the results of the Moroccan RBF with similar programs in other countries that have adopted results-based financing, except that this program is really unique to Morocco.	Please see response to comment #3.
5	INDH	Overall (RBF)	The report does not put the performance of the sub-activities into perspective compared to similar initiatives in other countries. For example, the RBF models adopted in countries such as Rwanda or India could provide relevant lessons.	Please see response to comment #3.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
6	DEPF	Overall (RBF)	The results of the RBF program have not been put into perspective with the trends in the Moroccan labor market. Without this context, it is difficult to assess its real performance. As an illustration, the report indicates that 54% of beneficiaries found formal employment at least once within two years. However, a comparison with the youth integration rates at the national level is missing (for example, employment after training via ANAPEC or the post-COVID unemployment rate). Also, a relevant data would have been the integration rate of vocational training graduates 24 months after their training, information available thanks to regular surveys conducted by the professional training department.	We have added in information regarding national youth unemployment rates in Section III.C.2 to help benchmark unemployment rates among program participants at the survey date. We were unable to find information regarding ANAPEC insertion rates to use as a benchmark. While the government does publish data on outcomes for TVET students, because the RBF program was substantially different from TVET programs (notably the type of training provided (soft skills rather than technical training), duration (median duration of one week rather than 1-2 years), and population served (youth with medium-term unemployment and no recent training plus the focus on women and individuals without a high school diploma), it would not be appropriate to use TVET graduates' employment outcomes as a benchmark for RBF program participants.
7	INDH	Overall (RBF)	Specific limitations in the RBF section: - The results do not integrate geographical disparities or differentiated regional impacts. - The economic analysis does not take into account contextual variables such as inflation or sector dynamics. - The complex administrative procedures, linked to the RBF model, represent an obstacle for providers, limiting their efficiency and commitment.	1) The evaluation originally intended to analyze results by the region where job placement services were provided (Evaluation Question 6c. However, due to the variability of provider location (most providers operated in multiple locations) and the fact that some services were provided virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic it was not feasible to analyze outcomes by region. Similarly, we did not analyze outcomes by participant region of residence because participants often moved over time. 2) The evaluation focused on contextual factors that were raised by stakeholders' interviews as affecting the RBF results. Regarding inflation specifically, we compare participants' wages to the national minimum monthly wage in 2023, which provides a benchmark for the same time period that is subject to the same inflationary effects as participants' salaries. 3) Yes, we agree with this point about the challenges related to the complexity of the administrative procedures linked to the RBF model, which is discussed at length throughout the report, in particular in sections III.B and III.E.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
8	INDH	Overall (ONMT)	Specific limitations in the ONMT section: - The perceptions and needs of end users (young people, training centers, companies) are not sufficiently documented. - The marssad.ma platform, although promising, has not yet resolved critical issues such as access to strategic data (CNSS, OFPPT) and the question of its future management.	1) It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to document in detail the needs of end users of the ONMT data platform. We do, however, discuss in Section IV.A how the data platform design and development process considered and incorporated the needs of end users. Given that the platform has not yet been launched, the evaluation was also unable to explore users' perceptions of the platform. We do, however, discuss in Section IV.B. potential ways in which the data platform would meet existing needs of end users if it is launched. 2) Yes, as you note these critical issues regarding access to input data and the future management of the platform are discussed in Section IV.
9	DONMT	Overall (ONMT)	Failure by the evaluator to cover all actions carried out under sub-activity 4. In fact, the report limits sub-activity 4 to the ONMT (Platform), ignoring all the above-mentioned actions and the effort provided by MCA Morocco and partners. Thus, the evaluation questions had to be aligned with the objectives of sub-activity 4 with its 4 dimensions.	It is accurate that the evaluation focuses on the labor market platform under sub-activity 4 (ONMT). The evaluation questions, which focus on the labor market platform, were developed based on the WDA logic model, in consultation with MCC and finalized in the evaluation design report (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455). We have revised the wording of the questions slightly to make it clearer that the questions center on the data platform (also given another comment received regarding potential confusion between the ONMT data platform and the DONMT). The evaluation focused on the labor market platform for several reasons: (1) the labor market platform was the largest investment within sub-activity 4; (2) the other components of sub-activity 4, namely labor market surveys and technical assistance to the existing ONMT, were intended to feed into the labor market platform; and (3) the outcome linked to sub-activity 4 in the logic model is the "improved quality and availability of data to inform policy- and decision-making" which is most appropriately measured through an analysis of the availability, quality, and use of the labor market data platform.
10	DONMT	Overall (ONMT)	The name of the platform mentioned in the report by the ONMT requires revision, as it is confusing with that of the DONMT	We have revised throughout the report to clarify when we are referring to the DONMT versus the labor market platform.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
11	MCA-Morocco	Overall	Here are some key structuring elements and lessons to consider in assessing the outcome of the components of the employment project: - Continuity challenge in the face of the dissolution of MCA (insufficient efforts) - Choice of technical partners for subsidies (crucial efforts of partners, but difficult for institutions after the Compact) - Commitment of institutional partners upstream and downstream of the Compact (some decision-making problems and the role of these partners) - Cost-sharing requirement between MCA and partners (ONMT) - Setting the minimum of 25% contribution from partners (in kind and in budget) (difficult for partners to achieve)	Thank you for these additional considerations. Regarding the first point, given that the RBF program itself was not anticipated to continue after the end of the Compact, but rather the hope was that the model could be adopted or scaled by government agencies based on the experiences and lessons learned during the Compact-funded program, the evaluation focuses on the broader adoption of the RBF model rather than the persistence of the Compact-funded program itself. Regarding all of these points, while these are certainly elements to consider they are not mentioned in the report because the qualitative interviews conducted and documents reviewed did not highlight these issues as the most significant challenges or lessons learned.
12	MCA-Morocco	Overall (RBF)	For MCA, the main learning related to the costs incurred by the RBF is as follows: - Seek the support of institutional stakeholders in the analysis of the cost-effectiveness ratio in a timely manner - Provide sufficient financial resources to support program managers in their change management - Provide sufficient resources when replicating or scaling up a pilot	Thank you for sharing these learnings. They are well noted, and the report emphasizes the need for sufficient human and financial resources as a key lesson for scale-up.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
13	INDH	Overall (RBF)	Possible improvements for the RBF sub-activity: - Simplify administrative procedures to reduce costs and increase provider adherence. - Introduce specific financial incentives to integrate more women and young people in difficulty. - Develop regional and sectoral indicators for a more detailed analysis of results.	Thank you for sharing these recommendations. They are well noted and the first two points are reflected in the conclusion of the report (Section V.B). Regarding the third point, we assume this was a recommendation regarding the analysis of results presented in the report. The evaluation originally intended to analyze results by the region where job placement services were provided (Evaluation Question 6c). However, due to the variability of provider location (most providers operated in multiple locations, resulting in service provision throughout the country) and the fact that some services were provided virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic it was not feasible to analyze outcomes by region. Due to the wide variety of sectors in which participants obtained employment and the relatively small survey sample size it was not possible to analyze the results by sector.
14	INDH	Overall (ONMT)	Possible improvements for the ONMT sub-activity: - Resolve governance issues related to the marssad.ma platform by establishing a clear framework for its management and future financing. - Conduct an in-depth consultation with potential users to adapt functionalities to the specific needs of beneficiaries. - Strengthen institutional partnerships to obtain stable and continued access to key data.	Thank you for sharing these recommendations. They are well noted. 1) The conclusion of the report (Section V.B) makes the same recommendation regarding establishing a clear framework for management and future financing of the platform. 2) Section IV.A mentions that the ONMT development team did conduct consultations and tests of the platform with potential users to adapt functionalities to their needs. 3) The report does not explicitly make a recommendation around strengthening institutional partnerships to obtain access to key data, but does discuss the challenges related to and importance of data access in Section IV.A.
15	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Overall	The testimonials (quotes) must be formatted appropriately (placed in a box)	While we appreciate this suggestion, we prefer to retain the current formatting of the report which places the quotes in a separate textbox, even though there is no border around the textbox. Additionally, we believe you may have opened the report in an older version of Microsoft Word, which resulted in some formatting issues. The final version of the report will be in PDF format, which should avoid similar issues in the future.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
16	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Cover page	Add all partner logos.	We appreciate this recommendation, however the standard practice is to only include the logo of Mathematica on the cover page because Mathematica is the independent evaluator who wrote the report. Including other partner logos could create confusion regarding their role in the elaboration of the report and the independence of the evaluation.
17	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Cover page (Photo)	The photo takes up too much space on the cover page. It should be reduced and re-centered, with the project title placed at the top and the report title positioned at the bottom.	We appreciate this perspective, however this is a standard format that Mathematica prefers to use for all reports.
18	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Cover page (Date)	The lowest element on the page	We appreciate this perspective, however this is a standard format that Mathematica prefers to use for all reports.
19	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Cover page (Authors)	Editors? Evaluators? In this case: Prepared by: - Thus the table must be put on a separate page at the end of the report	We appreciate this perspective, however this is a standard format that Mathematica prefers to use for all reports.
20	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page vii (Acknowledgements) "C&O Marketing"	Add to acronym section	This is the name of the firm, there is no acronym associated with it.
21	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page vii (Acknowledgements)	Add the Moroccan parties in this part of the acknowledgements: MIEPEEC (ANAPEC ONMT etc.) who contributed to the implementation of this project	We appreciate the crucial role that a large number of implementing partners played in the implementation of the RBF and ONMT sub-activities. However, the purpose of the acknowledgements section in this report is to recognize the individuals and organizations that contributed specifically to the evaluation itself and the writing of this report, not those who played a role in the implementation of the sub-activities being evaluated since Mathematica was not engaged in implementation. We have, however, added an additional note to the acknowledgements section to thank the parties who participated in interviews for the evaluation.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
22	MCC HCD	Page ix (Sub-Activity 3)	Do we want to mention how the focus expanded a bit because of Covid? My understanding is that there were a significant number of participants with diplomas but who had lost their jobs during Covid who were eligible to apply. It might be helpful to have the numbers or percentages of participants with and without diplomas	Please see our response to comment #2 regarding the focus of the program. Additionally, we prefer to keep the description of the sub-activity in the Executive Summary higher-level and believe that the description accurately reflects the programs' focus on serving unemployed youth (regardless of education status) and secondarily on women and youth without high school diplomas.
23	DONMT	Page ix (Sub-Activity 4)	It is stated that "Marssad" had been created and that most of the planned functionalities were fully operational. However, the platform delivered to MCA-Maroc does not integrate all of the functionalities initially planned, in particular those related to the job offer and the interoperability of data between the actors of the ecosystem.	We have revised the language to reflect that "many" of the planned functionalities are fully operational rather than "most". There is also a more detailed discussion on this issue in Chapter V of the report.
24	DONMT	Page x (Table ES.1)	The limitation of the platform's value offering to the production of insight for the benefit of vocational training stakeholders while the objective of the platform is broader. Indeed, the platform aims to provide all stakeholders, including those in vocational training, with relevant data and indicators on the dynamics of the labor market. Thus, the evaluation questions had to be aligned with the platform's objectives. It should be noted in this sense that the Compact II Monitoring and Evaluation Plan document specifies that the evaluation had to answer the following question: "Has the "ONMT" sub-activity improved the consistency and integration of labor market data from different sources?"	We would like to clarify that the evaluation questions, which were developed based on the WDA logic model in consultation with MCC, differ from what might have been included in the Compact's M&E Plan. The Evaluation Design Report provides a full list of the evaluation questions developed by Mathematica in consultation with MCC (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455). Although the platform does aim to provide a variety of different stakeholders with relevant data on the labor market, the evaluation focuses specifically on decision-making in the TVET sector because the WDA logic model links the improved quality and availability of data resulting from the data platform to outcomes linked to the TVET component of the WDA (e.g. "quality training that adapts and responds to the needs of the labor market.") Please see Figure I.1.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
25	Instiglio	Page xi (Key findings)	As described below in the reports, a more nuanced perspective could be brought here, emphasizing that it is an effective model under certain conditions (service provider with a strong capacity for management and adaptation to the technicalities of the RBF, an established network with the private sector, etc.)	We agree with the point you have raised here. To ensure this nuance is not lost while keeping the Executive Summary relatively high-level, we have adjusted this sentence to state that "the RBF program demonstrated a potentially effective model…." . We have also added text in the conclusion of the report and the conclusion of the executive summary summarizing various factors that may have contributed to variation in employment outcomes across providers and emphasizing that the model's effectiveness depends on the ability of providers to implement it successfully. Please also see Section III.D where we discuss variation across providers in more detail, where we attempted to identify factors associated with success.
26	MCC HCD	Page xi "primarily nontechnical training and job search assistance, to women and those without a diploma"	Is this group defined somewhere?	We have adjusted this and similar terminology in the report based on recent guidance from MCC.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
27	DONMT	Page xi	The report highlights the difficulty of constituting a comparison group for the evaluation of the RBF program, attributing this constraint to the substantial differences between RBF participants and those in other similar professional integration programs, due to the specific eligibility criteria for the RBF. Indeed, these criteria, in particular age (18 to 35 years) and prior professional situation (no formal employment or training for at least 6 months, or even 1 year for graduates), define a very specific population. This specificity restricts the possibility of comparing the results of the RBF program with those of other professional integration programs. However, it would be relevant to consider constituting a control group meeting similar criteria in order to more rigorously evaluate the comparative effectiveness of the program. This approach could be based in particular on the files of job seekers registered with ANAPEC before the implementation of the program and the files of salary declarations to the CNSS.	We agree that it would have been interesting to create a comparison group with similar characteristics and agree that other similar programs have been evaluated using this approach. However, the evaluation design and budget designed by Mathematica and approved by MCC did not include such an approach. Further, it may have been challenging to implement such an approach due to privacy concerns about accessing individual-level ANAPEC and CNSS data. For additional information, the approved evaluation design can be found in the Evaluation Design Report (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455).
28	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page xii (EQ 6a last paragraph)	Text offset	This formatting issue has been corrected.
29	RBF program provider	Page xii (EQ 6a) "Although the program later relaxed sub-targets for women and those without a diploma"	There was no relaxation of sub-objectives by category for all providers. For us, the objectives by sex remained the same and any excess of the quota of women was therefore not reimbursable. The same goes for the quota of non-graduates. An excess of objectives should nevertheless be encouraged.	Thank you for raising this. We had received some conflicting information on whether or not this relaxation was granted to all providers. Upon further investigation, we have confirmed that it was only granted to two providers - Al Jisr and AMAPPE. We have updated the report throughout accordingly.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
30	Instiglio	Page xii (EQ 6a) "However, these verification processes were slow, which hindered providers' ability to receive timely results payments."	I would like to point out here that this is not a question of the slowness of the verification process itself, but rather that linked to the obtaining of data from the CNSS by ANAPEC (as specified below).	Thank you. We have revised here to clarify the cause of the delays. The sentence now reads "However, these verification processes were slow, primarily due to delays in obtaining the data required for the verification of eligibility and employment results, which hindered providers' ability to receive timely results payments."
31	DONMT	Page xiii (EQ 6b)	For the answer to "EQ 6b. What are the participants' job placement rates, retention rates and average earnings?", the indicators provided and the analyses conducted (pages xii, etc.) focused only on the rates of integration or employment during approximately two years after the completion of the training. However, no information was provided on the rate of retention in employment of the respondents to the survey, as defined (formal employment for at least six consecutive months). To this end, it would be relevant to further develop the analyses related to this question by focusing on the rate of retention in employment, calculated on the basis of the results of the survey of beneficiaries of the RBF program. Such an analysis would provide a more complete understanding of the performances in terms of maintained integration of the beneficiaries of the program in the labor market.	The report does briefly discuss formal job retention at six months, which was measured by the RBF program itself through the verification of job retention results. For example, Section I.A mentions that a total of 974 program participants retained formal employment for at least six consecutive months and Appendix A provides more detailed information on the number of participants retained in formal employment for at least six months by provider and relative to each provider's targets (see Appendix Figure A.3 and Appendix Table A.1). However, as you note, the report's findings instead focus on a broader definition of employment retention that goes beyond the six-month timeframe that was the focus of the program's results framework. For example, Figure III.8 presents the median percentage of time participants had been formally employed since completing the program and Appendix Table C.3 presents the mean and median job duration. This focus on a broader definition of employment retention is aligned with the evaluation questions and supplements the information that was already collected by the RBF program for the verification of results by providing information on employment retention in the full two-year period post-program-completion.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
32	MCC EA/PSC	Page xiii (EQ 6b) "Respondents who were formally employed earned a median monthly wage of 2,900 dirhams (about $290) in their most recent or current formal job"	Suggestion to adjust language slightly to clarify that the group for this analysis includes the ever reported formal employment, which is 54% of the 824 survey respondents. The language is clearer on page 35 where this result is described. Are these values adjusted to be put in a certain year's currency? Particularly as it seems that you are combining information across years, with data collection conducted in five waves from December 2022 to February 2024 and as this is whether they ever had a formal position. It would be beneficial to note the year of the currency value here - also helpful as the report ages to know the year these were valued. Based on the timing of data collection and the comparison here to the 2023 national monthly minimum wage, perhaps these are in current 2023 dollars/dirhams. Related, I see that the footnote 10 mentions that the exchange rate used is from October 2024. It would seem more appropriate to use perhaps an average for 2023 given when wages were reported in surveys, and the current year value used in these estimates.	1) Thank you for pointing this out. We have revised the language in the executive summary to mirror the language on page 35. 2) It would be appropriate to interpret the wages as being in the median year of data collection, which was 2023. We have added a note on this in the report where appropriate. We do not adjust wages for inflation. Adjusting for inflation would not substantively affect the median wage since making this adjustment would result in some wages be adjusted slightly up and some being adjusted slightly down depending on the survey date. 3)We have updated the currency exchange rate to use the average exchange rate from 2023 throughout the report as you have suggested. We agree that this is more appropriate since this exchange rate is aligned with the median year of data collection and the comparison to the national monthly minimum wage in 2023. The revised exchange rate is not significantly different from the 2024 conversion rate that was previously use and therefore did not substantially change the results.
33	DEPF	Page xiii (Figure ES.1 Notes) "Some values have lower…"	This comment applies rather to the following figure ES.2?	Thank you for catching this. You are correct and we have revised the figure notes.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
34	MCA Morocco	Page xiv (Figure ES.1 Notes)	Have the formal and informal employment data been compared with those of the system, or does this only represent the respondents' survey responses? It would be advisable to triangulate and assess the reliability of the reported data, especially since the survey participants have been identified and a link with the administrative data is possible.	In this figure, and for the majority of the report, we rely on participants' self-reports of formal and informal employment. In Annex A we report participants' employment outcomes based on the administrative program data, that is the verified employment results for payments under the program. Although it could have been interesting to do so, we did not compare self-reported employment with administrative data at the individual level for several reasons. The survey focused on a longer time period (approximately 2 years post-program completion) and the administrative data only covers the earlier portion of this time period. Additionally, the survey data captures informal employment (including self-employment) which was not captured in the administrative data. Finally, it would have been time consuming to match individual jobs for individual respondents between the survey data and the administrative data and conducting such a verification was beyond the scope of the evaluation.
35	MCC M&E	Page xiv (Figure ES.2)	I appreciate the data behind this, but what is the main takeaway of this graph? it's a little hard to grasp.	The main takeaway is provided in the text above Figure ES.1: "At the survey date, about two years after completing training, 39 percent of survey respondents were employed in a formal paid job and a further 13 percent were employed in an informal paid job or self-employed (Figure ES.2)."
36	DEPF	Page xiv (Figure ES.2 Notes) "The respondents out of labor force …"	Since they are not available why did you point out that they are not looking for work.	Thank you for pointing this out. We have removed the reference to searching for work by revising the figure note to clarify that "Out of labor force is defined as those who are unavailable for work".
37	MCA Morocco	Page xiv (Figure ES.2 Notes)	The same data source (RBF tracer survey) presents different data: Figure ES.1 lists 824 participants, while Figure ES.2 lists 815. Please verify the data.	The total sample size for the survey was 824. Some outcomes and figures, including this one, have lower sample sizes due to missing data - for example respondents who preferred not to respond to a specific question or did not know or remember the answer. In other cases, the sample sizes are smaller because the survey question and outcome is only relevant for a subset of survey respondents, for example only those with at least one job post-program completion. For Figure ES.2 specifically, there are 9 respondents with missing values for their current labor market status at the time of the survey.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
38	MCA Morocco	Page xv (Figure ES.3) and page 15	Is the diploma only for those with a high school diploma? What about other diplomas, such as Technician (Bac level + 2 years in a vocational training center), Specialization or Qualification?	When we conduct subgroup analysis by level of education, we classify all respondents into one of two categories - has a high school diploma or did not obtain a high school diploma. Thus, those with a diploma such as a vocational training degree that requires a high school diploma or a university degree would be included in the "with a high school diploma" subgroup, because they have a high school diploma in addition to a more advanced degree. This aligns with the definition used by the program to establish subtargets for subgroups by education level - with and without a high school diploma. We have made edits throughout the report to clarify that "diploma" and "no diploma" refer to with and without a high school diploma.
39	MCA Morocco	Page xv (Figure ES.3) and page xvi (Figure ES.4)	To enrich the analysis, would it be possible to present a sex breakdown (men/women) within the categories 'Qualified/Non-Qualified' and 'Experienced/No Experienced'? This would provide a better understanding of differences in access to formal employment. For example: - Do men and women with degrees equally access formal employment? Does previous professional experience benefit women and men in the same way?	Due to small sample sizes, we do not present these analyses separately for women and men with and without high school diplomas and with and without prior work experience. However, in Section III.C.5, we do discuss that women tended to have less education and prior work experienced compared to men and discuss different experiences and outcomes for men and women in more detail. To provide some additional information, 38.9% of women did not have a high school diploma, compared to 48.2% of men. And 56.8% of women did not have prior work experience, compared to 41.8% of men.
40	MCA Morocco	Page xv (Figure ES.3 Notes)	Verify data.	Please see our response to comment 37. In this case, missing data is due primarily to instances where the respondent was unable to tell us if their employer generally declares employees to the CNSS or not (that is, they were unable to tell us if their job was formal or not).

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
41	MCC M&E	Page xvi (Figure ES.4)	Again I'm confused as to the main takeaways. I'm looking at the first sentence reading, "Women, participants without a high school diploma and those with no work experience prior to the RBF program were substantially less likely to have been formally employed since completing training or at the survey date compared to other groups". It seems like that is what the graph should clearly demonstrate.	Thank you for this feedback. We think the confusion was likely arising from the label on the y axis of this figure, which was vague. We have revised the y axis label to read "Percentage of respondents formally employed at the survey date" rather than "Percentage of respondents". Hopefully this makes it clearer that the figure is showing differences in the percentage of respondents from different subgroups (e.g. men vs. women) who were formally employed at the survey date. We have also made similar edits to the y axis labels on other similar figures. Additionally, we have revised in the references to this figure and Figure ES.3 in the text preceding the figures to make it clearer that Figure ES.3 demonstrates differences in formal employment since training completion for these subgroups while Figure ES.4 demonstrates differences in formal employment at the survey date for these subgroups.
42	Instiglio	Page xvi (EQ 6d)	As described in the endline learning report, support for women and those without a diploma could have been improved through an even more flexible programmatic design, for example: not prescribing a certain number of hours of training, which can lead to non-graduates dropping out; broadening the type of training/support accepted (work-study training, psychosocial support, etc.)	Thank you for highlighting these additional recommendations, which we agree were important learnings from the RBF program. We have incorporated them into Section III.C.5 of the report, where we discuss in more detail the extent to which the program increased opportunities for women and individuals without high school diplomas.
43	Instiglio	Page xvii (EQ 6e)	It is important to note here the main tool that was put in place to avoid the "cream skimming" of participants: quotas to encourage the support of women and non-graduates. Even if it is not perfect, this tool has proven to be simple and relatively effective.	This point was included in Section III.B.1 (page 16). We have now also included it here in the executive summary.
44	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page xvii (EQ 6f, EQ 7a/b, EQ 7c)	Text offset	This formatting issue has been corrected.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
45	RBF program provider	Page xvii (EQ 6f)	The INDH also took up the RBF model and was even accompanied by MCA in this process. The result of this program, however, has not yet been widely communicated.	Yes, the INDH RBF program is discussed in Section III.E. We do not mention it in the executive summary since the INDH program received technical support from MCA, as you note, and to answer this evaluation question we focus primarily on expansion of the model since the end of the Compact.
46	RBF program provider	Page xvii "commonly leads to “cream skimming,” "	This is not about skimming but about selection based on the employment criteria requested by employers who are not partners of the program. The absence of incentives for employers has forced the program's "providers" to reconcile the needs of companies with those of the program, in particular the obligation to be unemployed for a minimum period (which is not necessarily part of the prerequisites of employers who would have preferred candidates with recent experience or recent graduates).	The challenges faced by providers to reconcile the tensions between the program's eligibility requirements and employers' requirements is well understood. However, this practice of selecting participants who meet employment criteria set out by employers does still fit under the broad definition of "cream skimming". In this sentence in particular we are noting that "cream skimming" is a concern in general in programs operating under a results-based financing model. We go on to note that the practice is rational and was not widespread or a cause for concern in the Compact-funded RBF program given the programs eligibility criteria and subtargets for women and individuals without high school diplomas. A more detailed discussion of this topic with additional context and information is included in Section III.B.1 (page 16).
47	RBF program provider	Page xix "payments for placement and retention might not have been high enough"	This was mainly a problem of verification delays. Training is easily verifiable, which made payment more "fluid". The integration and maintenance components, on the other hand, depended on ANAPEC and CNSS and therefore constituted a bottleneck for verification. This not only caused payment delays but also impacted the performance of the project by reporting a lower number of placements than the reality (flow of the project without verification for the last trained-integrated groups).	The challenges related to verification delays and the resulting impact on the providers and the program's outcomes are well noted throughout the report (in particular see Section III.B.4). However, based on our analysis of the data collected and correlations observed between results achieved by different providers and the associated variable payments for each provider we conclude that the payments for employment results may have been too low to sufficiently incentivize job placement and retention for some of the providers. The analysis and findings behind this implication are discussed in more detail in section III.D (pages 43-44).

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
48	MCA Morocco	Page xix "less time-consuming and costly approaches…"	I believe this observation of delays is no longer relevant. Although there were initial delays, the system has gradually been optimized. ANAPEC has since responded within the required timeframe, which demonstrates a notable improvement in process management.	Thank you for pointing this out. However, during data collection for the evaluation in 2023 and 2024, we did not explicitly ask if delays decreased over time and the stakeholders we spoke with did not mention that delays were longer at the beginning and the verification system improved over time, although this may have been the case. Almost all stakeholders we interviewed agreed that delays in the verification of eligibility and results remained a challenge throughout the duration of the program, so that is the primary point we raise here.
49	MCA Morocco	Page xix "created significant delays in verification"	Does this assessment concern the first cohorts or the last ones? It would be useful to clarify, because if the observed delays were specific to the first cohorts, this could reflect initial adjustments that were then corrected in subsequent cohorts.	Please see our response to comment 48. Verification delays remained a challenge throughout the duration of the program, not only for the first cohorts.
50	MCA Morocco	Page xx "for example, using employment contracts…"	It is important to note that employment contracts and pay stubs, although offered as alternatives to CNSS declarations, are not reliable means of verification. These documents can be easily falsified or altered, which would limit their credibility in the results verification process.	We agree that these alternative approaches to verification of employment are not as reliable or credible as independently verifying CNSS declarations directly. However, our recommendation is related to balancing tradeoffs between the reliability and cost of verification methods. Employment contracts or pay stubs would be a lower cost verification approach and have been used in other results-based financing programs. Accordingly, we present them as a possible alternative for consideration given the concerns about delays and cost of verification that were raised by numerous stakeholders.
51	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 1 (Introduction)	Add how the project objectives align with Moroccan national priorities.	We have added a sentence that mentions that the project objectives are aligned with Morocco's national development strategy.
52	RBF program provider	Page 2 "operated through independent service providers "	Service providers and associations.	This edit has been incorporated.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
53	RBF program provider	Page 2 "RBF program service providers focused primarily"	The duration and nature of the training offered are the result of the program's prerequisites and in particular the ambitious objectives, the allocated budget and the relatively short duration of the project compared to the verification stages imposed by the RBF model.	This is well understood. Here we simply provide a high-level overview of the RBF program. In Section III.B.2 we provide more information that explains the design of the program and training offerings and includes some of the points noted here.
54	MCC HCD	Page 2 "a global nongovernmental organization"	FYI, we usually call them international nongovernmental organizations (iNGOs), but I guess "global NGO" is okay too	We do not have a particular preference regarding the terminology here, so we have adopted "international nongovernmental organization."
55	Instiglio	Page 2 "Nine providers"	Eight?	Please see the following sentences regarding a ninth provider that was initially selected but later withdrew before implementation began.
56	MCC HCD	Page 2 End of page	Here again, do we want to mention that the participant pool was expanded to include participants who had lost their jobs due to Covid?	We have covered these points in edits made to the description of the population served earlier on page 2, in response to another comment received. The paragraph here focuses on the disruptions to the program's timeline due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
57	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 5 (First paragraph)	Briefly introduce why a mixed evaluation is needed for these sub-activities	The Evaluation Design Report (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455) thoroughly documents the evaluation methodology, including the motivation for a mixed-methods evaluation. Given that this report is focused on the findings of the evaluation of the employment sub-activity, we prefer not to reiterate that information again in this report.
58	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 5 (II.B first paragraph)	Add good practices too	We mention here that the study explored the "mechanisms underlying achievement of outcomes" which is another way to saying we explore the successful practices of the program. The report also touched on best practices for RBF programs in general and provides some recommendations for future similar programs.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
59	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 6 (II.B second paragraph)	How many, where are the protocols	The number of interviews conducted is provided in the following two paragraphs - there were 70 respondents during the first round of interviews and 9 respondents during the second round. In accordance with standard MCC practices for evaluations, the protocols will not be made publicly available.
60	INDH	Page 5 (II.B Qualitative study)	Limitations in the qualitative analysis: - Representativeness of key informants: The report does not specify whether the informants include sufficient range of regions, sectors or levels of responsibility. For example, employers in informal sectors, crucial in the Moroccan context, seem underrepresented. - Potential effects on data: The responses obtained during the KIIs may be influenced by expectations or relationships with the program. A complementary approach such as anonymous studies or validations by objective data would strengthen the conclusions.	1) We have provided some additional detail in this section on the representativeness of key informants, but are limited in the level of detail we can provide to protect the anonymity of respondents. Given that the eight program providers operated across seven regions, by interviewing representatives from all providers and participants from all providers we have ensured geographic coverage of all regions in which the program operated. We did not interview any employers in the informal sector because the RBF program focused explicitly on formal sector employment and we interviewed employers specifically to understand their experiences with and perceptions of the RBF program and its participants. 2) This is a limitation with any qualitative study. For this reason we interviewed a variety of different types of stakeholders to obtain a variety of different perspectives from individuals who had different roles and experiences with the sub-activities. Additionally, whenever possible we interviewed several respondents of the same respondent type and also relied on program documents. We then triangulated findings across all these different sources to mitigate potential undue influence from individual perspectives. Additionally, for the evaluation of the RBF sub-activity we relied on administrative data and survey data whenever possible and also triangulated findings across qualitative and quantitative data sources. For the evaluation of the ONMT sub-activity, we also participated in a demonstration of the labor market data platform to supplement interview data and document review. More information on our approach to analyzing the qualitative data and mitigating potential undue influence of individual perspectives and experiences is available in the Evaluation Design Report (Abarcar et al. 2022: https://mcc.icpsr.umich.edu/evaluations/index.php/catalog/455).

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
61	INDH	Page 6 (II.C Quantitative descriptive study)	Limitations in the quantitative analysis: - Low response rate: With only 46.6% of responses among the initial participants, analyses on the characteristics of non-respondents would be necessary to assess potential undue influence. - Self-reported data: Self-reported income, not verified by external sources, may be overestimated or underestimated. The reliability of these data remains an open question. - Impact of the pandemic context: The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on participant outcomes (employer and participant adaptations) have not been comprehensively analyzed.	1) In the next sub-section on this page (entitled "2. Nonresponse") we discuss our analysis of the potential for nonresponse to influence the results due to this low response rate, including a comparison of characteristics of respondents and non-respondents which is provided in Appendix B, Table B.1. We also compare verified employment outcomes between these two groups, provided in Appendix B, Table B.2. We conclude there is not strong evidence that the results in this report are substantially influenced by nonresponse based on the characteristics we examined, although we cannot rule out that differences in unobserved characteristics between respondents and nonrespondents might have affected some outcomes. 2) Yes we agree that self-reported income introduces error to the reported income measures. In the scope of this evaluation it was not possible to independently verify survey respondents' wages, including historic wages, using external sources. 3) Where possible we discuss potential ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic may have influenced the implementation of the RBF program and participants' labor market outcomes to provide additional context to the findings. Given that the program did not operate in a pre-pandemic conduct, we are limited in our ability to understand the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as there is no pre-pandemic counterfactual available as a reference point. Additionally, it was beyond the scope of this evaluation to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor market.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
62	DONMT	Page 6 (II.C Quantitative descriptive study)	The sampling method adopted for the survey of RBF program participants has certain limitations that affect the representativeness of the sample, the relevance of the indicators calculated and the analysis carried out, as well as the possibility of extrapolating and generalizing the results to all program beneficiaries: - The choice of a fixed number of participants (100) per provider, regardless of their relative weight among all trained participants, has a significant limitation. Indeed, the total number of trained participants varies considerably between providers (from 177 to 1,071). This approach leads to an overrepresentation of providers who have trained few participants and an underrepresentation of more active providers, which can skew the results and limit their representativeness.	As noted throughout the report, there were significant differences across providers in terms of program implementation, participants served, and participant outcomes. For this reason, it was more important for the evaluation to be able to analyze the outcomes by provider than it was to ensure the sample reflected the distribution of program participants across providers. The evaluation therefore used a fixed number of participants (100) per provider to ensure that the sample size from each provider would be large enough to facilitate subgroup analysis by provider, while balancing logistical and cost considerations. However, we did also reweight the survey data by the number of participants served by provider to estimate the results for the average participant. This did not meaningfully change the results, so we report unweighted means throughout the report. We have added a note about this additional analysis we conducted and our findings in Section II.C.1 and Section III.C.1.
63	DONMT	Page 6 (II.C Quantitative descriptive study)	The results obtained in terms of training, integration and retention in employment, from the use of administrative data, reveal significant gaps in performance according to sex and level of qualification for each provider. A stratification of the sample based solely on the "Provider" variable, without taking these two dimensions into consideration, could fail to reflect these disparities. This could influence the conclusions from the data collected as part of the survey, and limit the ability to analyze the specific results of women and individuals without diplomas targeted by the program, in particular women and non-graduates.	As you note the sample was stratified by provider and training completion date but not sex or high school diploma status. However, even without stratifying the sample by sex and diploma status the random sample reflected the overall distribution of these characteristics among the population served and facilitated analysis by these subgroups for the pooled sample across providers.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
64	DONMT	Page 6 (II.C Quantitative descriptive study)	The interpretation of the survey results, focusing on the "participant served by the average provider", masks significant differences between providers in terms of the rate of achievement of objectives, particularly in terms of integration and retention in employment, which shows a great deal of variability, ranging from 7% to 107.6% for integration, and from 1.6% to 81.8% for retention in employment (Appendix Table A.1, page A.5). This limits the scope of the comparative analyses presented in the report and limits the ability to draw precise conclusions on the specific performances of providers in terms of placement and retention in employment in particular.	Overall survey results should be interpreted as applying to the "participant served by the average provider" due to the sampling approach used. However, when we present employment outcomes in Section III.C, in addition to presenting the overall survey results we also present the results by provider, which allows for analysis of the performance of specific providers. We also discuss potential reasons for these observed variations across providers in Section III.D.
65	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 7 (below Table II.2)	Mention specific testimonies or cases from the qualitative data to illustrate the findings	Specific quotes from the qualitative interviews have been incorporated throughout the findings (Chapter III) where appropriate. The section of the report where this comment was added describes the contents of the tracer survey and the tracer survey sample frame.
66	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 7 "The overall response rate for the original sample was 46.6 %"	The low response rate (46.6%) raises questions about representativeness, despite efforts to correct for nonresponse.	Yes, the low response rate did raise concerns about the representativeness of the surveyed respondents. However, as we note on the following page "We assessed the potential for survey nonresponse in two ways using administrative program data, which are available for both respondents and nonrespondents in the original sample. We conclude there is not strong evidence that the results in this report are substantially influenced by nonresponse based on the characteristics we examined, although we cannot rule out that differences in unobserved characteristics between respondents and nonrespondents might have affected some outcomes."

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
67	MCC HCD	Page 8 "These sociodemographic characteristics reflect the program's focus of reaching women and those without a high school diploma"	How does more than half the participants with a high school diploma reflect the focus on those without a high school diploma?	Thank you for pointing out the inconsistency between this statement and the previous sentence. We have removed this sentence. As we note in the next section on nonresponse, survey respondents were more likely to have a high school diploma than nonrespondents, so the sociodemographic characteristics of our sample do not fully reflect the program's focus on reaching participants without a high school diploma. Despite this, as we note in the section on nonresponse, we conclude that the results are not substantially influenced by nonresponse.
68	Instiglio	Page 12 "Instiglio and ANAPEC verified …"	Technically, this task was subcontracted to the AISSE firm by Instiglio	Thank you for this clarification. We have adjusted the text accordingly.
69	Instiglio	Page 14 "Noncompliance with eligibility and verification processes could lead to sanctions and/or withdrawal of funds from noncompliant providers"	More specifically, this results in the rejection of the submitted results, and therefore their non-payment.	Thank you for this clarification. We have adjusted the text accordingly.
70	MCA Morocco	Page 14 (Table III.1)	I did not fully understand this table. In particular, I do not clearly understand the meaning of the "X" values and coefficients (e.g., 1.54X or 1.20X) in the context of payments for results.	The purpose of this table is to illustrate the relative size of payments for training, placement, and retention results across providers. Because it could be sensitive to disclose the exact payment amounts for each provider, since they differed across providers, we instead let X stand in for the retention payment and the coefficients illustrate the size of the training and placement payments relative to the retention payment. For example, for Al Jisr, this means that the training payment was 1.54 times the size of the retention payment and the placement payment was 1.20 times the retention payment. Supposing the retention payment was $100, then the training payment would be $154 and the placement payment would be $120. We have revised the table note to hopefully make this clearer.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
71	RBF program provider	Page 16 "MCA later amended the contracts "	This change was not generalized. It has not been granted to us for example despite our request. The excesses in terms of training and integration of women/non-graduates have therefore not been counted or remunerated.	Thank you for raising this. We had received some conflicting information on whether or not this relaxation was granted to all providers. Upon further investigation, we have confirmed that it was only granted to two providers - Al Jisr and AMAPPE. We have updated the report throughout accordingly.
72	MCA Morocco	Page 16 "In other cases, given limited resources"	Is this representative data (a ratio based on general observations) or is it simply an isolated quote from a participant? This clarification is important to understand whether this perception reflects a general trend in the program or an individual experience.	In our interviews with RBF program providers, participants, and implementing partners we heard a recurring theme regarding the prioritization of some participants over others given limited resources and the results-based payment model. This was not an isolated incident or based on the experience of just one participant. Regarding the final sentence of the paragraph, where we note that many participants did not receive placement services or post-placement services from the provider, this was based on the survey data. We have added a reference to the table and figure where these results from the survey are presented later on to clarify that the statement that many participants did not receive placement or post-placement services is based on the survey data.
73	MCA Morocco	Page 16 quote	Can you specify whether it comes from a beneficiary, an instructor or a service provider? This information is essential to provide context and better understand the perspective from which this observation was made.	This quote is from an RBF program participant, as noted below the quote. RBF program participants are beneficiaries.
74	MCA Morocco	Page 16 "Clarke et al. 2021"	Clarke et al. 2021?	In order to provide some background and context on cream skimming in RBF programs, we are citing an evidence review of training and job placement programs that use RBF models. The paper is entitled "Review of the Evidence on Short-Term Education and Skills Training Programs for Out-of-School Youth with a Focus on the Use of Incentives" and the full citation can be found in the references. The placement of the citation at the end of the sentence here may have created some confusion so we have moved it to earlier in the sentence, directly after the cited information.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
75	MCA Morocco	Page 17 "median duration of 36 hours…"	Please check, the number of training hours must correspond to the hours specified in the provider contracts. However, it is not necessary for these hours to be completed in one week.	We agree that the hours did not have to be completed during one week (or any specified period of time) as long as the minimum number of required hours were achieved. We believe this point is clear in the following paragraph. In this sentence, 36 hours is the median number of hours and 1 week was the median time period of training. We have edited the sentence to hopefully make this clearer by specifying that 1 week was the median and adding the median period of training for some providers to the second paragraph of this section as well. We do not specifically discuss the number of hours required in the providers' contracts since this varied by provider and it is more pertinent to focus on the number of hours of training participants actually received.
76	MCA Morocco	Page 17 "26 and 27 hours…"	Do the hours mentioned in this paragraph comply with the provider contracts? If not, this raises the question of compliance with contractual requirements. Furthermore, how was payment handled in these situations? Did the time differences have an impact on the amounts paid to the service providers?	Please see our response to comment 75. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to confirm whether or not the number of hours received aligned with the providers' contracts. We simply report the number of training hours received based on the program's administrative data used for the verification of training completion and associated results payments. The training hours reported here are based on training hours among program participants who were verified as having completed training. The completion of the required number of hours was independently verified by Instiglio and their subcontractor using training session attendance records and site visits. We can also clarify that providers received all or nothing payments for training completion - that is participants had to complete the required number of training hours in order for the provider to receive a training completion payment. If fewer than the required number of training hours were completed no payment was received. There were no partial payments for training if fewer hours were completed. In Annex A, we do report the number of payments each provider received for each result type, relative to the maximum number they could potentially receive, which may be of interest as a related point.
77	MCA Morocco	Page 18 (Table III.3)	Are the durations in accordance with the provider contracts?	Please see our response to comments 75 and 76.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
78	MCA Morocco	Page 18 (Table III.3)	Did the provider receive payment for beneficiaries who completed this number of hours, even though it potentially differs from what was specified in the contracts? If so, this raises the question of the basis used to validate payments in this specific case. Clarification would be helpful in understanding how these discrepancies were managed contractually.	Please see our response to comments 75 and 76.
79	MCA Morocco	Page 18 (Table III.3)	How do these variations impact the uniformity of results for participants?	With the data we have available and the evaluation methodology used, we cannot definitively answer this question. This table presents both variation across providers and across participants within a given provider with regards to characteristics of training received. Some providers reported assessing participants upon intake to determine their specific needs and to provide targeted support. Some of the variation in training received across participants within a given provider could therefore reflect differences in participant characteristics and needs. However, we are unable to disentangle the effects of the receipt of any services/training in particular on employment outcomes. However, in Section III.D we do discuss variations across and within providers regarding service provision and participants' employment outcomes and hypothesize ways in which differences in service provision may have contributed to these differential employment outcomes.
80	RBF program provider	Page 21 (Figure III.3)	Grouping fair and poor together doesn't seem relevant to me because the two categories are not similar. Maybe it would be more judicious to have an "average" category on its own since it is close to good and still shows a service effort. And group poor with the "did not receive service" category or leave it apart if you want to make it stand out.	There are many possible ways to present these results. While we appreciate this alternative, we chose to combine "good and excellent" and "average and poor" because given there were four possible response categories it seemed reasonable to group the two highest categories together and the two lowest categories together. We considered showing the disaggregation by all four categories, but this would have made the figure more challenging for readers to digest and interpret.
81	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 23 (Title of Figure III.4)	Long sentence and spelling mistakes	The title of Figure III.4 was unclear in the French translation of the report. We have revised.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
82	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 26 "Providers noted challenges with delays and complexity in the eligibility and results verification processes"	The analysis focuses heavily on providers and their challenges	In this section of the report we focus on answering evaluation questions 6a and 6e, which are related to the implementation of the RBF program and any unintended effects of the RBF incentives. Due to the focus on implementation, this section does focus heavily on the experience of providers who implemented the program, including challenges they experienced, which can be informative for future programs.
83	MCC M&E	Page 29 (Section III.C)	Is the average salary of 2900 dirhams more or less than what we expected? The minimum wage benchmark is useful, but did we want to employ people at minimum wage or were we looking to achieve more?	The program did not set any expectations regarding the wages of participants. However, given that more than one-half of participants did not have previous work experience and only 1 in 6 had previous formal work experience we think it is reasonable to expect program participants to earn a median wage that is close to the minimum wage.
84	INDH	Page 39 (Section III.C.5)	Analysis of structural challenges faced by women, young people without diplomas. These populations require in-depth exploration to identify specific barriers (social norms, accessibility of opportunities, etc.).	Yes we agree that these groups face specific barriers that require targeted assistance. In this section we discuss some of the barriers these participants faced and the extent to which providers were able to address them through service provision based on the qualitative interviews conducted. It was not within the scope of the evaluation to conduct an independent, in-depth analysis of these structural challenge.
85	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 39 (Section III.C.5)	At the end of this section, it is worth noting that qualitative data from stakeholders and participants are interesting, but they are underused to flesh out the analysis. Testimonies could shed more light on the reasons for the difficulties encountered and the good practices of service providers.	The analysis in this section is based on a synthesis of the qualitative interviews that were conducted. We have provided some direct quotations throughout the section (and other sections in the report) where we feel they add significant value beyond what has already been discussed in the synthesis. We must be cautious when including quotes to ensure they could not reveal the identity of the respondent. While we could always add additional quotes to the report, we feel the report currently strikes the right balance between synthesis and direct quotations, which ensures the majority of the analysis focuses on common themes that emerged across different stakeholders who were interviewed rather than individual experiences or perceptions.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
86	DEPF	Page44 (Section III.E.1) "neither ANAPEC nor the Moroccan government "	ANAPEC is the representative of the Moroccan government in this matter.	We have revised to clarify that our intention was to say "neither ANAPEC nor other Moroccan government agencies".
87	DONMT	Page 48 (Section IV)	In the report, the non-development of the functionality related to interoperability is justified by the impossibility of accessing the data of the CNSS and the OFPPT. However, it is important to specify that the developer (consortium) is responsible for the development of the functionality, with the possibility of carrying out the tests later, regardless of the feasibility of accessing all the data, by separating the technical aspects from the conventional aspects. It is also relevant to emphasize that the technical team had all the elements necessary for the development of the functionality, in particular the data samples provided by the DONMT. In addition, it should be specified that ANAPEC did not express any resistance to sharing the data, and yet the access functionality was not developed for the ANAPEC data.	Thank you for providing this additional insight. We have edited the text in Box IV.2 to clarify that the lack of access to input data is not the only reason these functionalities have not been developed. Additionally, please note that on page 50 we note that access to sample CNSS data has been provided, that both ANAPEC and CNSS have signed memorandums to provide data access, and that ANAPEC confirmed they were still providing data to the platform as of May 2024.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
88	DONMT	Page 48 (Section IV)	The evaluator limited himself to referring to disputes, which he refers to as "disputes" in the report, conditioning the operation of the platform, without delving into the underlying reasons or proposing solutions to address them. In this regard, it should be noted that the partners are experiencing difficulties in stabilizing a continuity model due to (i) intellectual property issues and (ii) the business model associated with the operation of the platform. Indeed, UM6P requests a high budget ($1.5 to $1.9 million per year) for the management of the platform, without clear justification. It should be noted that the evaluator provided details regarding the operating budget requested by UM6P, which he said would include the renewal of contracts for storage and licenses, the signing of new contracts to facilitate the implementation of new features, as well as the acquisition of servers. However, this justification seems irrelevant, because it is based on unclear foundations, particularly with regard to the costing of features that have not yet been defined. It is also important to note that UM6P received a donation for the acquisition of sufficient servers for the platform, covering all of its features.	Thank you for providing this additional insight. Because there is a lack of consensus among different stakeholders regarding the reasons for the disputes over the platform, we were unable to provide a clear synthesis of the details of the disputes in the evaluation report. Additionally, it is beyond the scope of the evaluation to propose solutions to address the disagreements, which would be better left to the parties directly involved. We have however modified the text related to the budget requested by UM6P to note that the DONMT has raised concerns about the accuracy of this cost estimate.
89	UM6P	Page 48 (Box IV.1) "The public launch depends on resolving disagreements over intellectual property rights and management and future financing of the platform."	The IP rights are clear in the signed contract, they are the responsibility of UM6P. The management and financing points remain problematic. Our last proposal is that management control should be relative to the support of operating costs.	Thank you for the clarification. Because there is a lack of consensus among stakeholders as to whether or not intellectual property rights are clear, we have removed references to intellectual property throughout the report and focused on management and financing.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
90	MCA Morocco	Page 49 (Section A)	I would like to raise a question regarding the operability of the platform. You indicate that it is partially operational, but, to my knowledge, it is not yet fully functional. Can you clarify which functionalities were actually in place to date or at the time of your investigation (as an independent evaluator)? Furthermore, what are the main reasons for the delays in its implementation, and what measures are planned to ensure its full deployment?	Please see Box IV.2 where we note which characteristics of the platform are functional and which are not. Please see Section IV.C where we discuss the reasons the platform has not yet been launched and potential future steps. In summary, it has not yet been launched due to disagreements over ownership and future management of the platform that need to be resolved.
91	UM6P	Page 49 (Box IV.2) "Planned features not yet operational"	Regarding the features planned but not yet operational. - Data collection is automatic and necessary from the CNSS, ANAPEC, the Ministry of Higher Education and OFPPT. - Personalized advice and recommendations specific to the region are implemented. Simply select the region at the top of the dashboard	For the point on automatic data collection, it was our understanding based on interviews with multiple stakeholders that not all data was being automatically collected as of May 2024. For the latter point, our intention here was to highlight that individualized recommendations are not yet functional because they require user inputs which will not be available until the platform is launched. We have edited to the text to ensure this is not misinterpreted as stating that region-specific information is not yet available, as we agree that region-level information is available.
92	DONMT	Page 49 (Box IV.2) "Planned features not yet operational"	It is indicated that ANAPEC is part of the consortium. However, it should be noted that the consortium, led by UM6P, is composed solely of OCP Solutions and Atlas Cloud Services, which are responsible for developing the platform. ANAPEC is a key partner in the "Marssad" development project, alongside DONMT, OFPPT, CNSS, MESRSI and MENTRA. This distinction should be further clarified in the report in order to avoid any confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved in the project.	Thank you for this clarification. We have adjusted the text accordingly.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
93	UM6P	Page 50 "while there is ongoing uncertainly around who will own and fund the platform in the future"	See point above on IP	Please see response to comment #89.
94	MCA Morocco	Page 51 “marssad.ma”	Is the site operational?	At the time of writing this report, it is possible to navigate to the website and view the landing page. However, to view any of the data or functionalities of the platform a user must be logged into the site, which requires login information. To the best of our knowledge, as of May 2024 only the marssad.ma development and management team had active login information. Thus, the site is not accessible for anyone outside of that team, although the site is operational.
95	MCA Morocco	Page 51 “As of March 2023, UM6P…”	It is 2025, so it would be appropriate to update the information, especially since this update does not require a significant investment. Furthermore, the information mentioned in the report is from March 2023.	We conducted interviews in April/May 2023 and May/June 2024 and this report was drafted in late 2024. Unfortunately, we have not spoken with stakeholders since May/June 2024 (the final round of data collection for this evaluation) and therefore do not have any more recent updates on the platform. Accordingly, we cite the dates of our interviews to make it clear when we obtained the information referenced since it is possible some could be out of date now. Thank you for raising this, as we realized that in this sentence we had a typo and March 2023 should have been May 2023. We have revised the sentence accordingly.
96	UM6P	Page 51 "The platform has not yet publicly launched due to disagreements over intellectual property rights"	See point above on IP	Please see response to comment #89.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
97	UM6P	Page 52 "that will define ownership of intellectual property rights of the platform…"	The latest discussions are no longer about intellectual property rights. But about obligations and rights in terms of management decisions.	Please see response to comment #89.
98	UM6P	Page 52 "while handing over some intellectual property ownership"	See point above on IP	Please see response to comment #89.
99	MCA Morocco	Page 52 “scale…”	Was continuity considered when the project was initially chosen? If so, what was the estimated operating cost at that time? Furthermore, if this cost differs from the current estimate (14 to 18 million dirhams per year), could you explain the reasons for this discrepancy? This would help us better understand any adjustments or unforeseen circumstances that may have arisen.	When the data platform was being designed, there was a team that focused specifically on considering different models for funding the platform on an ongoing basis, specifically if the platform would be provided free of charge to users, require payment from all users, or a hybrid model where some users pay for access or premium access while others have free access. Unfortunately, we do not have any information on any specific cost estimates for the ongoing operating costs of the platform from the beginning of the project and cannot answer the two questions. Given the ongoing disagreements over the future financing and management of the platform, in Section V of the report we recommend that future similar projects more thoroughly clarify ownership, management, and financing issues at the outset.
100	UM6P	Page 52 "Some stakeholders suggested a hybrid financing approach"	One of the deliverables of the project was the continuity plan and that covered all the possibilities of financing and continuity including the 3 models, private, public, hybrid. The final recommendation based on the feedback collected was to start with public funding and evolve it to a hybrid mode as the platform has more data.	There was a lack of consensus from different parties we interviewed regarding whether and when the hybrid financing model could be implemented. It was therefore unclear whether or not this recommendation had been adopted. Thus, we decided to focus on describing the hybrid financing model as one possible option.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
101	UM6P	Page 52 "This work includes…"	We continue to update the platform code also to support updates of standards such as ESCO. We have started to expand the scope of the platform to cover data from other countries (Sahel, Arab and African countries)	Thank you for providing this additional information. We have revised the text to include the mention of the updates to the platform code, but please note that this statement was intended to be illustrative of the key work that has continued since the end of the Compact, rather than a comprehensive list of all work performed.
102	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 54 (Conclusion)	The writing style is complex, which detracts from the clarity and ease of assimilation of the content by the readership. Sentences are sometimes too long, and ideas lack direct and fluid targeting. An editorial reorganization could improve the clarity and strengthen the relevance of the report.	We understand this feedback, which stems from the fact that the report was originally written in English and translated to French (and this comment applies to the French version of the report) as well as the dense subject matter. We have re-reviewed the French translation of the executive summary and conclusion of the report to improve the clarity and fluidity of the language as appropriate for these key sections of the report.
103	MCA Morocco	Page 58 "For scale-up of the RBF program…"	It is important to note that the government has already replicated the RBF project. Successful providers of the MCA RBF project were selected as a part of INDH. This raises several questions: - What options were chosen in this replication? - Were less time-consuming and less costly approaches to eligibility and results verification adopted? If the replication followed the same approach as the initial project, this calls into question the relevance of current suggestions aimed at simplifying criteria and processes. A comparison with practices adopted in this context would be useful to assess the applicability and impact of the proposals.	We have revised this sentence to read "For further scale-up of the RBF program….", recognizing that there has been some replication of the model by the government of Morocco. Additionally, please see Section III.E where we discuss the INDH program, which received technical assistance through the Compact, as well as another ANAPEC project called SABIL that has replicated aspects of the Compact-funded RBF program while making other adjustments to address some of the challenges the Compact-funded program encountered.

No.	Reviewer	Page	Comment	Evaluator response
104	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Page 59 (References)	The bibliography should be expanded to reflect the quality of the work, adding recent documents and ensuring that all sources used in the evaluation are included.	While we appreciate this suggestion, it would not be appropriate to include a list of all the program documents reviewed because they are not publicly available, nor would it be possible to list all the respondents interviewed for the qualitative study as doing so would allow individual respondents to be identified. For this reason, the bibliography includes only external sources that were consulted. We instead provided a summary of the qualitative data sources (including the types of documents reviewed and interview respondents' organizations) and the quantitative data sources (RBF tracer survey and administrative program data) in the methodology section (Section II.B and Section II.C) which we believe is sufficient to document the evaluation sources.
105	Employment Department, MIEPEEC	Appendices	Add in appendix the questionnaires used and the interview guides also	In accordance with standard MCC practices for evaluations, the questionnaire and interview guides will not be included as an appendix to the report and the interview guides will not be made publicly available. However, the questionnaire and a de-identified version of the RBF tracer survey data will be made publicly available separately at a later date after review and release by MCC.

Mathematica Inc.

Our employee-owners work nationwide and around the world.

Find us at **mathematica.org** and **edi-global.com**.